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1I N T R O D U C T I O N
Half of Faith gathers a selection of resources on, and reflections and analyses of, 
Muslim marriage and divorce in twenty-first century America. In the United States 
as elsewhere, marriage is central to ongoing Muslim conversations about belonging, 
identity, and the good life. The articles collected here, written over the course of 
two decades, provide a window onto moments in American Muslim life and thought. 
They help us think about women’s varied experiences with getting married, being 
married, and leaving marriages.
A few things are published here for the first time, but most of these pieces have 
appeared elsewhere: in Azizah magazine, in professional or policy newsletters, 
and in edited volumes or academic journals. They range considerably in length 
and tone, which makes sense considering the variety of audiences they originally 
addressed. They cover a broad range of topics, including diversity in Islamic legal 
thought, marriage contracts, wedding customs, dower norms, divorce practices, and 
experiences of polygyny. But this reader is neither comprehensive (it omits both 
interreligious and same-sex marriage, for example) nor programmatic. Contributors 
do not speak with a single voice. Some of us argue with our past selves in addition 
to each other. Because the contributions go back twenty years, some statistics are 
dated and some norms have shifted. By bringing together and making more widely 
available existing publications alongside a few purpose-written essays, this reader 
aims to enrich current conversations. It also helps document decades of scholarly 
debates and community activism, though of course there remains much to do. 
This reader is a pandemic project. It came together as we entered the second year of the 
global COVID-19 crisis, which has magnified and exacerbated existing inequalities. 
Marginalized and impoverished people have suffered disproportionately, both 
around the world and inside the United States.  Alongside and intersecting with 
deadly racist disparities in virus exposure, illness, and care, there have been strongly 
gendered impacts. Even as it has shifted how Muslim communities observe weddings 
and other lifecycle events, the pandemic has wreaked havoc on women’s professional 
lives. This is especially true for those whose care duties include parenting small and 
school-aged children. Putting together a collection of all-new chapters was simply 
not feasible. But one lesson of this extended crisis is that we can adapt. This reader 
is an exercise in taking what we have—in this case, a body of existing but difficult 
to find research and writing—and making it more accessible. I’m mindful, still, of its 
exclusions and distortions. For every piece and author included, numerous others 
are excluded. It’s meant to be a contribution to, and an entry point into, an ongoing 
conversation, not the last word.
Figuring out how to present these articles posed challenges. They don’t separate easily 
into “tying” and “untying” the knot. Discussions of contract provisions like dower 
are tangled up with divorce settlements. Several of these essays address, at least in 
passing, the issue of unregistered marriages, whether monogamous or polygynous. 
Indeed, alignment or conflict between civil and religious law is a persistent theme. 
(Of course, that concern isn’t unique to the United States context or to places where 
Muslims are minorities. Even in places where national law is ostensibly Islamic, 
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issues abound about how private extrajudicial acts—whether contracting marriage 
or pronouncing divorce—affect civil status. But that’s a whole other reader.) Because 
so many lines of connection emerged among these pieces, I considered chronological 
order and even debated presenting them alphabetically by author name.
Ultimately, I opted for three sections: Weddings, Marriage, and Divorce. Each piece 
is preceded by an author’s note that reflects on its original context or current 
implications. In several cases, these notes illuminate an ongoing dialogue among the 
scholars and work in this reader. This dialogue is always smart and vibrant, by turns 
loving and contentious, and occasionally downright messy, just like community life.
This is a project defined by constraints—limited time, limited budget, limited 
energy—yet marked by tremendous enthusiasm, generosity, and good will. The 
contributors, who Gisela Webb would classify as “scholar-activists,” are members of 
my academic network; despite pandemic exhaustion, each responded positively to 
my initial invitation within hours and met deadlines with alacrity. Editors of journals 
and anthologies replied to emails about republication rights quickly; numerous 
presses and publishers granted permissions. Designer Komal Zehrah skillfully did 
the creative and technical work to produce the reader on time and on budget. At 
Boston University, the project was supported by Associate Dean Karl Kirchwey 
through grants from the Humanities Research Fund and the Associate Dean’s 
Discretionary Fund. Department of Religion administrator Wendy Czik handled the 
necessary paperwork with her customary expertise and good cheer. OpenBU librarian 
Eleni Castro advised on matters of access and copyright. Boston University doctoral 
student research assistant Sandry Matondo and University of Wisconsin librarian Jay 
Tucker helped obtain digital files. I am grateful to everyone. 
Bringing these materials on marriage and divorce together, and making them 
freely available online for Muslim community members, students, and scholars, 
has reminded me both how much important work already exists and how much 
remains to do, on the page, and in our homes and mosques, and in our community 
spaces, both physical and virtual. This reader is an offering, highlighting women’s 
scholarship, centering women’s lives, and trusting in God’s justice.
Kecia Ali
April 2021/Ramadan 1442
Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Suggested citation: Kecia Ali, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of Faith: 
American Muslim Marriage and Divorce in the Twenty-First Century (Boston: OpenBU, 
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Weddings: Love and Mercy 
in Marriage Ceremonies
J U L I A N E  H A M M E R   ( 2 0 1 7 )
This chapter appears in a volume on the practice of Islam in the United States and I wrote it in 2016 after 
having attended a significant number of Muslim weddings over the course of the previous year. Our charge as 
contributors to the volume was to write without jargon and in such a way that the reader could imagine being in 
attendance at the respective religious practices we were writing about. My goal was to show that every Muslim 
American wedding is unique and different from the next one; that Muslim couples and families negotiate their 
ideas about religion, gender norms, culture, and family in their preparations for and celebration of a couple’s 
nuptials; and that Muslim wedding practices are embedded both in Muslim traditions (very much in the plural) 
and in the US context that they take place in. In and through their weddings, Muslims navigate changing gender 
and sexual norms while also defining them through their choices. They have to account for a wide range of 
ideas about gender norms and practices as they exist in their family and community networks, and weddings 
most often in my experience end up being a compromise based on the smallest common denominator. What 
the chapter could not make visible is that the common focus on the couple to be wed actually distracts from 
the fact that wedding preparations not only involve extended families but are most often driven by family 
members other than the couple itself. I had originally planned to write a book on American Muslim weddings 
but rethought the idea when I experienced the stress and tension surrounding wedding planning and the day(s) 
of – it turned out to be a very difficult situation for my interlocutors to both be in and reflect on as I was 
observing, asking questions, and conducting interviews. The couples were also surprisingly reluctant to meet 
with me again a few weeks after their weddings, as if reflecting then would somehow put the events in a different 
and not always positive perspective. I found that last research result, namely that Muslim couples want their 
wedding to have been perfect even if it was not, to be unexpected and reflective of the fact that Muslims, not 
unlike other Americans, see a direct connection between the character of the wedding and the nature of the 
marriage/relationship despite much evidence and advice to the contrary.
This chapter first appeared in Edward E. Curtis IV, ed., The Practice of Islam in America: An Introduction (New York: 
New York University Press, 2017), pp. 165-187. © 2017 by New York University. It is republished by permission.
Suggested citation: Juliane Hammer, “Weddings: Love and Mercy in Marriage Ceremonies,” in Kecia Ali, ed., Half 
of Faith: American Muslim Marriage and Divorce in the Twenty-First Century (Boston: OpenBU, 2021), pp. 4-16. 
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42505
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Every wedding is its own story. We might think that 
once we have attended a few weddings, we know 
the basics: a ceremony, a celebration, the bride in a 
dress, food, and music. Watching American weddings 
in movies and on television deepens the feeling that 
once we have seen a few we know what they are all 
about and we know what to expect. American Muslim 
weddings are a combination of religious and cultural 
practices and norms and as such, they might or might 
not conform to our expectations. It is equally flawed to 
try to judge the Americanness of American Muslims or 
their Islamic authenticity by their wedding practices. 
Both assume a standard or a norm against which we 
measure human practices and actions. After attending 
quite a few American.
Muslim weddings I have chosen here to tell three of the 
wedding stories I encountered in my research. They are 
each unique and specific to the couple, and they are 
also part of the communal fabric of Muslim religious 
practices in the United States. My three stories are 
held together by two things: references to two verses 
from the Qur’an on marriage which were referenced at 
each of them, and the creation of an American Muslim 
family through marriage.
A Muslim wedding is many things: a celebration, a legal 
contract, a ritual, a ceremony, and an announcement 
to families and communities. The basic requirements 
for a nikah, the Muslim marriage ceremony, to be 
Islamically legal are simple: the consent of both 
parties, a mahr (an agreed upon gift from the groom 
to the bride), and the presence of two witnesses at 
the ceremony. It is possible and recommended to 
also agree upon a marriage contract that stipulates 
ethical as well as practical terms for the marriage. This 
contract does not have to be in writing but most often 
is these days, and it is signed either before or at the 
ceremony. Many American Muslim couples are married 
by a person who has both Islamic legal authority and 
state authority to perform a marriage ceremony, which 
in turn makes the ceremony legal according to the laws 
of a particular U.S. state and Islamic law. The former 
requires a certification process and the latter basic 
knowledge of the form and function of Islamic legal 
requirements for a marriage— but not extensive legal 
training or recognition as a general religious authority 
for Muslims.
I have found that a wedding is not always one event 
but rather that many Muslims, for many reasons, 
divide the different components of ritual, ceremony, 
and celebration along different lines into more than 
one event. Weddings are sites for discussing and 
embodying gender roles, and they are spaces for 
American Muslims to negotiate what they consider 
American culture, other cultural backgrounds, and 
religious norms. In what follows we will see these 
negotiations play out in a variety of ways.
The Nikah at the Mosque: Patricia and Collin
On a rainy day in October, I am on my way to a mosque 
in the Northeast of the United States. I arrive at the 
specified location before anyone else does. A few 
minutes later, two African American men arrive, one, 
Oh Humanity! Be conscious of your Lord who created you from a single soul, 
and created from it its mate, and out of the two spread a multitude of men and 
women. And remain conscious of God in whose name you demand your rights 
from one another, and of the ties of kinship. Verily, God ever watches over you.
Qur’an 4:1
And among His Signs is this, that He created for you mates from among 
yourselves, that ye may dwell in tranquility (sakinah) with them, and He has put 
love (mawaddah) and mercy (rahmah) between you: verily in that are Signs for 
those who reflect.
Qur’an 30:21
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as I find out, the father of the bride, the other the imam 
(here this means he is a religious authority figure) who 
will conduct the nikah ceremony. We are welcomed 
by a man present at the mosque and shown into the 
musallah, the main prayer space of this small mosque. 
As more guests arrive, a spatial division by gender 
becomes apparent. There is no one telling women to 
go to one side and men to the other, but a side-by-
side arrangement emerges. This is likely due to the 
fact that most Muslims are familiar with and used to 
such arrangements in their own mosques. I realize at 
this point that there is a separate entrance for women 
at the side of the mosque, which I did not see when I 
first arrived.
About half an hour later, the bride, Patricia, arrives, 
out of breath, in a white, sequined wedding dress and a 
wrapped scarf turban covering her hair. She was stuck 
in traffic and feared she would not make it, and she 
worried that the thunderstorm we all encountered 
on our way here was a bad omen. She clearly is the 
one responsible for organizing this event and quickly 
recovers her wits as more people arrive.
Patricia and Collin met at their workplace, a social 
service agency. Patricia is part of an African American 
family and grew up as a Muslim. Her parents joined the 
community of Warith Deen Mohammed1 in the 1980s 
and raised their children within that community. 
Collin is the son of white Methodists and converted 
to Islam about six months ago. He is committed to 
his new religion but apprehensive about knowing all 
that is required in terms of ritual practice and other 
rules. Collin and Patricia have met for coffee, then 
later for dinner, and have talked, but they have not 
dated and have certainly not consummated their 
relationship or lived together. Rather, they have spent 
time talking about their values, histories, families, and 
expectations. Collin proposed to Patricia by coming to 
her parents’ house for dinner and asking her father for 
her hand in marriage.
Closer to the scheduled time of the ceremony, a group 
of folks arrive in fancy dresses and suits. Many are 
dressed for a party— these are Collin’s family members. 
They are looking a bit perturbed by the need to take off 
their shoes at the entrance and the suggestion that they 
join the women’s and men’s sides respectively and sit 
on the floor. Chairs appear from somewhere and some 
of them sit at the back of the prayer space, at least a 
little more comfortable than they would have been on 
the floor. After the Muslims in the room perform their 
maghrib, or sunset, prayers, they rearrange themselves 
side by side for the imam to perform the ceremony. The 
bride is sitting on a chair at the front of the women’s 
section and several men, the groom, the imam, and 
the father of the bride are sitting on the floor at the 
front of the room, facing the audience. Then the imam 
begins to speak.
It is perhaps unusual but perfect for the audience 
that he begins his speech by welcoming the coming 
together of families, expressing his gratitude to Allah, 
and explaining that an Islamic wedding is perhaps a 
little different from what non-Muslim Americans are 
used to. He addresses Collin’s family directly when he 
begins with the fact that there are negative ideas about 
Islam in public discourse and then presents a picture of 
God as the Creator and the human need to obey God. 
He points to a history of revelation and a succession 
of prophets sent to what he calls mankind/womankind 
and thus to the connection of Islam to other faith 
traditions. He appeals to them to respect and support 
Collin in his journey in the faith, and prays that more 
people will join the fold of Islam.
He begins the “official part” of the wedding ceremony 
with a du‘a, a supplication in Arabic, appealing to 
God and his messenger, honoring the prophets, and 
emphasizing the importance of family for Muslims. 
Next he recites the first verse of chapter 4 in the 
Qur’an, also in Arabic, pertaining to God’s creation 
of spouses and the significance of kinship, both signs 
of God’s omnipotence and infinite wisdom. Then he 
recites Qur’an 30:21, the verse about spouses having 
been made to live in tranquility, love, and mercy, and 
paraphrases the supplication and Qur’anic verses in 
English. Then he continues:
We want to concentrate on what is really 
important, which is the coming together of 
families. We are grateful to Allah, our Creator 
and Lord, for bringing us together in this 
moment. The marriage really starts with people 
seeking a mate. . . . What matters is character, the 
right kind of person, looking for the right kind 
of character that will bring about a wholesome 
family and develop well-adjusted children who 
are ready to be a productive member of the 
society. They learn what their responsibilities 
are. Both Collin and Patricia have studied, 
have sat and listened, and then decided on an 
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agreement. They have a contract. There were no 
such written contracts in the Prophet’s time but 
now we have the paper to print them. But what 
is more important is that they understand the 
contract that is in their hearts. . . . For married 
people the first obligation is to the Creator. 
They need to know that the purpose of their 
coming together is to please the Lord. Marriage 
is about others, not ourselves. . . . You were “I” 
for a long time, in the womb, then mama’s me, 
your teenage me, but in marriage it becomes 
“we.” You are still individuals but looking for 
reward from Him.
The imam mentions that the bride and groom have 
met with him for premarital counseling and to agree 
on the marriage contract. They have fulfilled the three 
conditions: they consent to the marriage, they have 
provided a bridal gift which has been accepted, and 
witnesses are present. Then he explains that the actual 
ceremony will go as follows: the wali, or representative/
guardian of the bride, which in Patricia’s case is her 
father, is the agent for the woman. He is looking out for 
her interest and needs her approval for the marriage to 
be valid. He will make an offer to the groom and then 
Collin will accept. “That is really the marriage: no aisle 
to walk down, no flower girl, no ring boy, no big kiss at 
the end. These things are reserved for their privacy.”
The father gets the microphone and says in English: “I 
offer you, Collin, my daughter, Patricia, in marriage.” 
Collin takes the mic and says, clearly nervous: “Yes, 
I take her.” When people snigger a little, he corrects 
himself: “Yes, I accept her.” The imam speaks one more 
time: “Alhamdulillah, this concludes the wedding. You 
are now one family and we ask the Creator to bless 
these two people, and to bless their families, and to 
give them the strength really, in these times, to put Him 
first, to please Him, and in doing so they will please 
each other and they will make their children happy and 
they will be good to their parents. We are all here for 
both of you, the community, and the family.” He closes 
with another supplication, this time in English, for God 
to bless the marriage and the children coming from it.
The women walk over to Patricia, offering hugs, kisses 
on both cheeks, and congratulations. The men do the 
same with Collin. The imam approaches first Collin and 
then Patricia to sign the required documents for the 
marriage to be legal in their state. People are milling 
about the mosque for a few more minutes. From the 
imam’s first sentence to the supplication at the end, 
this event has lasted less than twenty-five minutes.
Patricia and Collin have invited their families, friends, 
and coworkers for a reception at a nearby library and 
community center and everyone files out to drive 
there. The room is set up with ten tables, eight chairs 
each. Each table is covered with a purple tablecloth 
and decorated with candles, books, and fresh flowers. 
Each place setting is marked by a metal plate and a 
napkin with cutlery. The invitation called it a reception 
with refreshments but the buffet actually consists of 
catered dishes constituting a dinner menu, including 
baked fish, mashed potatoes, salad, and cheesecake. 
The drinks table contains a variety of sodas in cans 
and water in bottles. Several of the women are 
helping in the small kitchen and serve the food when 
the guests line up at the buffet table. Collin’s family 
congregates around two of the tables while many of 
the Muslim guests, family, friends, and coworkers fill 
the other tables, most of them divided into men and 
women. Patricia and Collin are seated at the same 
table but seem to be spending their time directing 
the buffet, talking to their guests, and receiving more 
congratulations and hugs. There is no music but the 
low hum of friendly conversation and the occasional 
shrieks and giggles of the younger children roaming 
the space between mouthfuls of food from their 
mothers. I spend most of the reception at a table with 
female friends of Patricia asking about my research 
and in turn telling me their stories of marriage, finding 
spouses, and having children.
Collin and Patricia are planning an official wedding 
party in a few months and Patricia protests when I 
say that this was already like a wedding. She admits 
that they are trying to find enough funds for a more 
elaborate celebration of their marriage but she hopes 
that this will resolve itself sooner rather than later. 
The couple will move in together after today, so they 
consider this ceremony and celebration their legal and 
Islamic wedding and a first public announcement of 
their union.
Interlude I: Marriage and Islamic Law in the 
United States
Marriage is often taken for granted as a timeless societal 
institution and it is only on closer inspection that its 
historical embeddedness in religious discourses on 
sexuality and gender is discovered. Islam is no exception 
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in this regard. Muslim marriage norms regulate sexual 
access and practice and provide Muslims with guidelines 
for sexual and gender norms. Like other religious norms 
and practices, marriage, divorce, custody of children, 
and sexual access are regulated by Islamic law, itself an 
institutional framework for the legal interpretation of 
sacred sources, including the Qur’an and Sunna of the 
Prophet Muhammad.2
Because American Muslims live as a religious minority 
community, the application of Islamic law to their 
lives, including marriage, is limited and increasingly 
combined with, if not replaced by, direct references 
to the Qur’an and the prophetic example. American 
Muslim scholars and leaders have contributed to the 
development of Islamic legal frameworks for minorities 
(fiqh al-aqalliyyat) and have tended to emphasize the 
obligation of Muslims to follow the laws of the countries 
they are citizens of and/or live in, which is especially 
relevant for family and personal status law. Muslims 
with the requisite Islamic legal training can act as legal 
advisors and decision makers for other Muslims. Many 
efforts have been underway to develop organizational 
structures which offer American Muslims legal advice, 
fatwas on issues raised in their specific context, and 
recommendations for how to address the challenges of 
contemporary life.
There are specific challenges to navigating the 
application of Islamic law— because it is a set of 
interpretations and not an immutable legal code— to 
the particular life cycle rituals and practices related 
to marriage. If and when weddings are recognized as 
regulated by Islamic law, couples and their families 
approach religious scholars and leaders for more 
specific knowledge and/or they search for information 
available in other forms such as online resources and 
marriage advice literature.3
American Muslim organizations, leaders, and activists 
have recognized the significance of marriage for the 
preservation of Muslim communities and Muslim 
identity. There are initiatives and programs that have 
helped produce guidance materials in two specific 
areas: premarital counseling to ensure compatibility 
between the prospective spouses in their values 
and expectations, and templates for the Islamic 
marriage contract that recognize mutual rights and 
responsibilities and at least attempt to be legally 
enforceable in U.S. courts. The issue of Islamic 
marriage contracts as legally valid in U.S. family courts 
is a significant one. The Islamic marriage ceremony is 
only recognized in U.S. courts if it has been carried out 
by a certified civil celebrant— this certification can be 
acquired through an application, and many imams in 
American mosques are qualified to perform a marriage 
ceremony recognized in state courts.4 The marriage 
contract as a legally enforceable contract becomes 
relevant in case of a divorce, which needs to be 
channeled through the U.S. court system. Provisions 
made in the marriage contract such as alimony and 
spousal support can only be enforced if the contract 
abides by the standards of U.S. law.
In addition to offering sample marriage contracts, 
Islamic marriage advice literature relies heavily 
on anecdotes and stories like the ones told here 
to illustrate challenges and solutions to Muslim 
matrimonial issues and trends that are specific to U.S. 
Muslim communities.
The Nikah at the Hotel
As I get out of my car on this unseasonably warm 
December morning, I wonder whether my outfit is 
fancy enough (long black skirt, teal tunic, and colorful 
pashmina scarf around my shoulders) for this South 
Asian American Muslim wedding. It is the fourth such 
wedding I am attending for my research and I am 
always hardpressed to come up with anything to wear 
that can compete with the splendor of South Asian 
wedding outfits. Women and girls wear shalwar kameez 
and saris in all the colors of the rainbow which sparkle 
even more with beads, sequins, and tiny mirrors. 
Gold jewelry, elaborately braided hair, and especially 
glamorous scarves covering the hair of some women 
complete the picture. Men appear in shalwar kameez 
as well, in more muted colors, or wearing formal suits.
As I enter the hotel lobby I am directed by a sign 
toward the ballroom. This wedding is both the official 
nikah ceremony and a celebration/reception, in one 
evening. There is a lobby area outside the ballroom 
where people are beginning to arrive. The parents of 
the bride are standing in the front, welcoming guests as 
they enter the space. It is a widely practiced custom for 
American Muslim weddings, though not a requirement, 
to have two separate wedding events: First, the nikah, 
sometimes with a reception built in, and at other times 
later in the same day, often in a different location. 
The parents of the bride often organize (and finance) 
this part of the wedding. There is then a second event, 
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the walima, which is a celebration to announce the 
wedding of a couple to the community and society. The 
walima is organized and paid for by the groom’s family. 
It also usually takes place in a different location. This 
practice helps accommodate geographically distant 
families and friends: some will come for both the nikah 
and the walima, and some will only attend one or the 
other. Nor is it uncommon for the walima or nikah to 
take place in another country— often the place from 
which the family or one of the spouses originated. Both 
the walima and nikah are also a reflection of economic 
ability and thus class.
Rabia and Mohsin are both of Pakistani American 
background and Rabia made sure to tell me that their 
union was not arranged by their parents or families. 
Instead, they met at a matrimonial banquet at an 
Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) convention. 
Such matrimonial banquets have taken place for 
several decades and ISNA is not the only organization 
that organizes them in conjunction with its annual 
convention. Muslims interested in matrimony can 
sign up for these events in advance and meet potential 
spouses in a banquet hall over food and in a completely 
chaperoned environment. Mohsin is a graduate 
student in public health and Rabia is completing her 
residency program to become a pediatrician. She told 
me in an interview that she was not sure how she felt 
about Mohsin at first and that it was only thanks to 
his insistence that they continue talking on the phone 
that they stayed in touch and eventually decided 
there was a future for them. Rabia had tried an online 
matrimonial site for Muslims— I suspect Mohsin did 
as well but would not admit it— and had found the 
experience frustrating. She said that the matrimonial 
banquet allowed for a first impression of the person 
that online exchanges preclude. She was worried, as 
was Mohsin, that both online matchmaking and the 
banquet would make people think they were desperate 
to get married. They weren’t but there was pressure, 
especially from Rabia’s family for her to get serious 
about getting married as she approached thirty.
When things started getting serious, both sets of 
parents got involved. Informal checks on the respective 
families did not uncover anything worrisome and the 
families even found common friends and connections 
in Pakistan, a plus in their quest to make sure that their 
children would marry into “good families.” Mohsin’s 
older sister is divorced and Mohsin had been worried 
about what he called “making a mistake” in choosing 
his future wife. Divorce, while legally possible, is still 
considered a stigma in many South Asian Muslim 
families and communities. 
In interviews it often becomes clear that young 
Muslims consider their marriage and family histories 
carefully and that the experiences of family members 
inform their own matrimonial choices. Rabia was 
adamant that for her the most important consideration 
was that she and Mohsin had similar levels of religious 
commitment and practice. It did not hurt that they 
were both of Pakistani heritage— there would have 
been family debate otherwise— but she had been 
open to marrying a Muslim man from a different 
background, at least in principle. Muslim families have 
long expected that their children continue to practice 
endogamy, marrying within one’s community, the 
argument being that cultural compatibility and the 
preservation of cultural norms and identities are an 
important part of marriage.
Mohsin suggested the person who is performing 
the nikah ceremony. Walid is a friend of his and 
well-known in the local Muslim community for his 
efforts to work within the mosque setting to attract 
more young Muslims to lectures, workshops, and 
community activities. Rabia and Mohsin both met with 
him, separately, and then together, for what I would 
call premarital counseling even though they did not 
use that term. They discussed expectations and the 
possibility of a marriage contract. Rabia wanted the 
contract to include several stipulations in her interest: 
that she would be able to work as a physician if she 
wanted to, that she would not have to share a house or 
apartment with her in-laws, and that she could initiate 
a divorce, a right that in Islamic legal terms is the 
husband’s alone unless otherwise spelled out in the 
marriage contract. All these conditions are common 
in such contracts but also reflect the specific concerns 
of individual couples and spouses. Perhaps the hardest 
for Rabia, she said, was to discuss divorce stipulations 
before getting married.
A buffet with appetizers is arranged in the center of the 
lobby and about fifty guests are already milling about. 
Conversations are a mix of Urdu, the national language 
of Pakistan, and English. Guests and family hug, shake 
hands, and greet each other as they move around the 
room. Servers offer appetizers on trays and along a 
wall guests can pick up water, soft drinks, and chai. 
The appetizers are distinctly South Asian: vegetable 
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pakoras, small chicken kebabs, and vegetable samosas, 
complemented by spicy, tangy, and yogurt-based sauces.
The ballroom is set up with a stage in the front that 
contains a white and gold couch and chairs, draped 
red curtains, and flowers on the sides. A three-level 
wedding cake, decorated in white and red, adorns the 
right side of the stage. Guests will be seated at round 
tables for ten people each. They are covered in white 
and gold tablecloths and decorated with flowers as 
well. There is a table on the side with wedding favors: 
small red boxes containing chocolates and small bags 
of fennel seeds and candies. There is also a table for 
the wedding gifts: as is customary at many South Asian 
Muslim weddings, guests are asked to offer cash gifts 
(the invitation said: “no boxed gifts”), so the table 
contains a large box to deposit the envelopes in. There 
is also a wedding register where guests can sign in and 
write out congratulatory messages to the couple.
As the guests file in they arrange themselves at the 
various tables. I see the wedding photographer and her 
assistant, two Muslim women in hijab, who specialize 
in Muslim wedding photography. They start taking 
pictures in the ballroom and then call select family 
members for more staged photos in the adjacent 
rock garden. When everyone seems to have settled 
in, the bride’s uncle announces the beginning of the 
ceremony. As the guests stand up and congregate 
around the door of the ballroom, a Sikh man wearing 
the traditional Sikh turban and beating a drum appears 
at the door. To the sound of the drum, the bride 
and groom enter the ballroom followed by parents, 
siblings, and their children. Smart phones and cameras 
capture the moment and two small girls throw rose 
petals before the couple’s feet. Rabia is wearing an 
elaborately decorated dark red South Asian silk dress 
with long white sleeves, heavy gold embroidery, and 
sequins. Her hair is partially covered with a similarly 
decorated scarf, which is very heavy and large, and she 
wears a gold ornament on part of her forehead. Her 
hands are covered in the complicated lines of henna 
flowers and ornaments.5 She wears a large amount of 
gold jewelry, including bracelets and several necklaces. 
Mohsin’s outfit consists of white shalwar pants and a 
black knee-length kameez shirt with gold embroidery 
on the collar and sleeves as well as a white flower pin 
on his chest. He also wears pointy black leather slippers 
and a red and gold turban. The couple walks toward the 
stage and settles on the white and golden couch, their 
parents in the chairs on both sides. By now there are 
at least three hundred adults and quite a few children 
in attendance.
Walid walks up to the stage and takes the microphone. 
He outlines the structure of the ceremony as follows: 
he will read some verses from the Qur’an and some 
hadith, or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, then he 
will offer the wedding khutba or sermon, followed by 
the official wedding ceremony. The couple will then 
exchange rings, followed by a supplication which will 
mark the end of the ceremony.
In a melodious voice and beautiful tajweed (qur’anic 
recitation) style he proceeds to intone several verses 
from the Qur’an in Arabic. As he begins his recitation, 
many of the women in the room who are not wearing 
a hijab pull their dupattas to cover their hair in a sign 
of respect for the Qur’an and its recitation. The first 
verse is from Sura al-Imran, the third chapter of the 
Qur’an, verse 102. It tells Muslims to be conscious of 
God. Walid will later translate this God-consciousness 
(taqwah) as fear of God. The second verse is the already 
familiar Q 4:1 which we encountered in Patricia and 
Collin’s ceremony. It speaks of God’s creation of a 
single soul, then of a pair from that one soul, which 
becomes a multitude of men and women. Muslims are 
called to be conscious of their Creator and honor the 
bonds of kinship. The third verse is Q 33:70, another 
verse imploring Muslims to speak out for justice and 
truth. Together these verses establish the connection 
of the ceremony to God and to faith and the God-
given institution of marriage as a natural pairing of 
men and women. Walid translates all three verses into 
English and explains that these three verses are part 
of the traditional wedding khutba. He expounds the 
significance of God-consciousness as the single most 
important dimension of a marriage: the responsibility 
for one’s actions in the eyes of God and thus 
accountability in worldly affairs such as marriage.
The qur’anic verses and explanations are followed 
by three hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad 
emphasizes the significance of marriage as part of 
Muslim practice, as important as prayer, fasting, and 
giving charity; represents himself as the example of a 
Muslim husband to his community; and— ironically, 
given the setting— describes the best wedding as one 
that is modest and within the family’s means. As Walid 
explains, this nikah ceremony is the wedding, and 
what needs to be stripped away is the layers of South 
Asian cultural practice of six-day wedding proceedings 
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and the excesses of consumer culture. I read it as his 
simultaneous critique of both Pakistani culture and 
American capitalism in one sentence.
From there he moves on to a story of Mullah 
Nasreddin, a figure in Muslim lore famous for his 
wise as well as funny actions and rebuttals in which 
Nasreddin begs for money to buy an elephant and, as 
he is questioned by a passerby about the stupidity of 
his plan, says that he is asking for money, not advice. 
So here is Walid, sharing his wedding khutba and 
there will be some advice! People chuckle here and on 
several other occasions. Later I will hear comments 
about this being the most “modern” and entertaining 
wedding khutba ever.
Walid’s advice comes in three stories and revolves 
around three central values: gratitude, selflessness, 
and simplicity. Gratitude to God is connected to 
companionship in the story of Adam and Eve, whose 
Arabic name, Hawwa, means “the living being.” Walid 
explains that Adam was not really living until God 
created Eve to be his companion. After the fall from 
paradise for transgressing God’s command to not 
eat from the tree of knowledge, Adam and Eve were 
separated for two hundred years, finding each other 
again at Mount Arafat in Arabia, a place that Muslims 
visit during the hajj season. It is thus innate to human 
beings to yearn for companionship and to only be fully 
human through the family. At the same time God is 
due eternal gratitude for creating humans with that 
yearning and giving them the possibility to fulfill it 
through marriage.
Selflessness is exemplified in relationships like a 
mother’s care for her child or love between siblings 
that do not involve selfish gain. Walid mentions 
Richard Dawkins’s book The Selfish Gene, only 
to disagree with Dawkins that all human acts are 
ultimately selfish. According to Walid, true faith and 
truly faithful acts come from true selflessness. He 
quotes a famous saying by a Sufi, or spiritual master, 
claiming that every spiritual seeker is a product of 
his time. Walid takes this saying to mean that in our 
time the more trying life is the more the true Muslim 
needs patience and grace, in daily interactions as well 
as in relationships with people. He suggests that each 
of us should surprise people, perhaps buy someone 
coffee, and that Muslims in the room lead the charge 
in interpersonal relations. This reference to the 
political climate in the United States and the particular 
challenges to Muslims, as much as the earlier stories, 
is clearly addressed to all the people in the room, 
not just the bride and groom: “And this is very true 
for marriage: don’t always worry about your rights. 
Be consumed by your responsibilities. Just as Adam 
was the caretaker of this planet, we are by extension 
caretakers of this planet. So be simple, be consistent, 
be filled with empathy and compassion. Be filled with 
mercy and draw strength from your daily prayer.”
Walid’s third message is to embrace simplicity. Islam is 
not complicated. Perhaps if one is looking at it from the 
exterior it looks very complicated, but it is not. What 
matters is being mindful, honoring one’s elders, not 
cheating, being grateful for all blessings— this is what 
Islam is teaching us. “The Prophet, Peace Be Upon Him, 
ate very little meat and he looked at everyone he met 
as a potential friend.” While God instilled in people 
a thirst for knowledge, he also gave us a yearning for 
order and simplicity, which is the only way to find 
meaning and guidance in a world that seems like total 
chaos at times. “The little things in life are truly the big 
things in life. . . . We focus so much on our brain and on 
logic that we forget to listen to our hearts. Listen to 
your heart, this is also the message of Islam.”
Walid then turns to the bride and groom and recites 
this poem attributed to the well-known Sufi woman, 
Rabia al-Adawiyya, the bride’s namesake:
In love nothing exists between heart and heart,
Speech is born out of longing
True description comes from taste
The one who tastes knows
The one who explains lies
How can you describe the true form of something
In whose presence you are completely blotted
out And in whose being you still exist
And who lives as a sign for your journey.
This is followed by another poem, this one about 
the internal and external beauty of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Walid recites the poem in Arabic and then 
translates it into English. He wishes for the couple 
that they may always be a gift to each other, to live 
in companionship, and to recognize the possibility of 
miracles. He turns to the families and recites an Urdu 
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saying about the possibility of miracles and who can 
see them— the audience murmurs in affirmation. “A 
family from one coast is connected to a family from 
the other coast through a city in the Midwest and here 
we are acting like that is completely rational and not 
a miracle!” Everyone laughs as he continues to speak 
of marriage as a journey, as a connecting of souls and 
families, as gaining sons and daughters, and as he 
explains that each person in the room is a veil to God 
and a door to God. With this he concludes the khutba 
and moves on to what he calls the formal ceremony.
According to Walid, five things need to occur in the 
ceremony. The first is the establishment of guardianship 
for the bride— Walid asks the father of the bride for 
permission to proceed, which is granted verbally. The 
second condition is the presence of witnesses. Only two 
are needed, but as Walid points out, there is a roomful 
present at this ceremony, so the condition is more than 
met. God is the greatest of witnesses. In addition, there 
is a list of three official male witnesses, whose names 
he reads aloud for confirmation. The third condition 
is the mahr, a gift agreed upon between the families 
or the parties which can be paid upon the wedding 
or delayed, but it has to be honored for the marriage 
to be valid. Walid mentions that it has been agreed 
upon, so the condition is met. The fourth condition is 
the marriage contract which the parties have agreed 
upon and which has already been signed by the groom. 
Rabia will sign the contract which lists the witnesses, 
the mahr, and the conditions, as part of the ceremony. 
The fifth and final condition is the ceremony itself, 
which he describes as the offer and acceptance of the 
offer of marriage.
Walid recites the basmallah, a phrase that prefaces 
every action of a Muslim to be carried out in the name 
and under the blessing of God. He continues: “Here 
is how we are going to do this. I will offer Mohsin to 
you and you accept. I will ask you three times and you 
have to accept three times.” And now Walid sets up the 
crowd for a joke. “But because you can say, ‘I do’— he 
skips a beat and whispers unders his breath— ‘not,’ I 
want you to [also] say in Arabic, ‘qabaltu,’ which means 
I accept you wholeheartedly, and no fingers crossed, 
okay?” People begin to snicker halfway through 
Walid’s instruction and at the end they are laughing 
out loud. “And then after the third one I will ask you to 
sign the paper.” After clearing his throat, he proceeds 
in a serious voice: “I ask you Rabia, daughter of Afzal 
and Ambreen, in accordance with Islamic law and 
according to the tradition of our noble Prophet, Peace 
Be Upon Him, and according to the contract and the 
mahr agreed to, do you accept Mohsin, son of Faisal 
and Zahra, as your husband?” Rabia answers “qabaltu” 
in a quiet voice. He repeats the question two more 
times and she answers the same way two more times. 
He then thanks her and asks her to sign several papers. 
Some shuffling of papers occurs and he again recites 
the basmallah as she signs the papers.
Walid then turns to the groom’s side and asks 
whether he accepts Rabia as his wife. He answers in 
the affirmative, also in Arabic, and the question and 
answer are repeated two more times. Mohsin also signs 
the papers, followed by the signatures of the three 
official witnesses. Walid then prays for their union to be 
blessed. He asks Mohsin to place a ring on Rabia’s hand 
and he does, followed by applause from those present 
and murmurs of “mashallah,” which literally means 
“what God wills,” an expression of acknowledging 
God’s power over everything that happens but also 
an expression of amazement at something beautiful, 
which in turn always comes from God. The final du‘a, 
or supplication, recited by Walid in Arabic, asks for 
God’s blessing, honors the prophets from Adam to 
Muhammad and their families, and expresses gratitude 
for all the blessings already bestowed. As is the custom, 
after every specific blessing those in attendance 
murmur “ameen” to support the supplication. The 
ceremony ends with Walid translating parts of the 
supplication into English.
Both bride and groom are then hugged by their parents 
and new parents in-law. Family and friends file onto 
the stage to congratulate them. Hugs and kisses are 
followed by picture taking, official and amateur. And 
then there is the food! The buffet consists of more 
excellent South Asian food including haleem, tandoori 
chicken, beef biryani, chicken curry, basmati rice and 
naan, complemented by green salad. As guests line up 
and get their food, waiters bring soft drinks and juices as 
well as chai, South Asian tea with milk and spices, and 
coffee. After about half an hour, they cut the wedding 
cake and lay out pieces of it on the dessert table.
This could be the end of the evening, but we have not 
yet encountered our verse from the beginning of this 
chapter. After dinner and dessert, there is a speech 
by an older bearded man who turns out to be Rabia’s 
former Sunday school teacher.6 He begins his speech 
by quoting Q 30:21 and takes its focus on tranquility, 
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love, and mercy as the central points in his reminder 
to the couple of what matters most in a marriage. He 
explains the love meant in the Qur’an as more than the 
romantic English notion of infatuation and describes it 
as a lifelong commitment that comes from wanting to 
serve God through the family just created through this 
wedding. He emphasizes the wife’s need to be obedient 
to the husband and that of the husband to protect 
his wife.
After his speech, the father of the groom tells me 
that he did not like this speech and that he does not 
understand why it was necessary to bring up obedience 
in it. He would have preferred a more traditional and 
“less religious” after-dinner entertainment. Some of 
this does happen in the form of male family members 
producing stand-up poetry in Urdu, some serious 
and some humorous. This is a wedding tradition in 
some parts of Pakistan and people seem to enjoy it. 
It becomes quite apparent which guests and family 
members understand enough Urdu to get the jokes— 
this time there is no one translating into English. I 
do not understand Urdu so am not in on the poetic 
prowess of the men; instead I observe the reactions of 
the audience. The bride and groom have managed to 
eat something and are back on the couch on the stage. 
They look tired but content and seem to enjoy the 
poetic performances and short speeches.
The evening ends with the bride and groom being 
walked to a waiting stretch limousine outside. The 
bride’s family can be seen hugging, kissing, and crying 
because she is now moving to the husband’s family. 
After more tearful goodbyes, blessings, and good 
wishes Rabia and Mohsin disappear into the back seat 
of the car and drive off into their new life as a married 
couple. After a breakfast with family members— with 
at least some innuendo about the wedding night— 
they will move in together. Their walima is already 
scheduled to take place in the city in the Midwest they 
both live in and will take place about a month after the 
nikah, followed by a two-week honeymoon.
Interlude II: Muslim Communities, Cultures, and 
the American in American Muslims
American Muslim communities are diverse in terms of 
their ethnic and national background, their religious 
affiliation and levels of practice, their economic status, 
education, and locations within the social fabric and 
geography of the United States. Not surprisingly, 
this diversity is reflected, at least to some degree, in 
matrimonial selections and practices, and in American 
Muslim weddings.
For much of the twentieth century, communities of 
Muslim immigrants and their descendants favored 
endogamy, the practice of marrying within one’s 
ethnic or cultural community, often on the grounds 
that cultural and linguistic compatibility were a 
precondition for marital success and contributed to 
the preservation of the communities in question. Other 
American Muslims, including African Americans from 
Muslim families, and white and Latina converts, have 
intermarried across community lines. Consequently, it 
is safe to assert that American Muslims have always 
married from within their communities and other 
Muslims from very different backgrounds. It is worth 
mentioning that there have always been marriages 
between Muslims and non-Muslims as well.7
While the idea of marrying for love is a relatively 
recent ideal, for Europeans and Americans as much 
as Muslims, American Muslims find their partners on 
their own and expect compatibility as much as mutual 
affection turning into romantic as well as lasting love. 
In attending weddings, discussing them with guests at 
the events, and interviewing couples, I have perhaps 
been most fascinated with the public nature of private 
life. Something as personal as who one wants to share 
one’s life with has turned out to be embedded in the 
larger contexts of family, community, and society. 
As a result, the weddings I have studied and written 
about are all continuous sites of negotiation; they 
display the diverse ideas American Muslims have 
about their religion, their culture(s), and perhaps 
equally important, gender roles and sexuality. Rather 
than defining and categorizing the couples I work with 
and their families, I expect them to tell me how they 
conceive of their own weddings and marriages. This 
makes for a lot of fluidity, which is a better reflection 
of their experiences than the insistence on clear labels 
and boxes to put them in.
It is quite common, even in academic literature, 
to create a distinction between the Muslimness of 
American Muslims and their Americanness. Being part 
of the fabric of American society means both shaping 
and being shaped by attitudes, values, and practices 
identified as “American.” In the process, dimensions of 
culture and religion are also continuously shaped and 
negotiated. In a small way, the complications of these 
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identity descriptions become apparent in the story of 
Noura and Abdullah.
The Walima at the Wedding Hall
The entrance to the wedding hall is surrounded by 
lovely flowering bushes and two lion statues. It feels a 
little like walking into the palace for Cinderella’s ball. 
The spacious foyer leads into a large room which is set 
up with large round tables and chairs around a circle 
of open space in the middle. The tables are covered in 
lavender tablecloths and feature chandeliers and floral 
arrangements in matching tones. There is a buffet 
waiting to open on the left and a table for gifts and 
cards on the right.
Noura and Abdullah met and fell in love with each 
other while in college. They were both active in the 
Muslim Students Association on campus and through 
many shared activities got to spend time together. 
They discovered their shared political commitments 
and academic interests. After college they both 
enrolled in graduate programs, in different cities, 
but managed to maintain contact. They refuse to say 
that they were dating in college and insist that their 
romance was rekindled when they spent time together 
at a friend’s wedding almost a year ago. From talking 
all night on Skype to meeting each other’s parents, 
their relationship accelerated to the point where they 
decided to get married. Noura is Palestinian American 
and comes from a family of proud activists on behalf of 
Palestine. Abdullah’s parents are from Egypt and his 
father came to study in the United States. He stayed 
and brought his wife from Egypt and they grew their 
family to include four children.
Noura and Abdullah’s nikah ceremony was a small 
affair at the house of Noura’s uncle. Only twenty of 
their closest family members attend. They did not call 
it a nikah either, but rather used the Arabic term katb 
al kitab, literally the writing of the book or contract. It 
involved the same conditions we have seen in the nikah 
ceremonies earlier: agreement, mahr, and witnesses. 
Their families considered the kitab closer to an 
engagement ceremony even though it legally married 
them. There was mansaf at the kitab, a traditional dish 
with rice, thin bread, and lamb in yogurt sauce, popular 
in Palestine and Jordan.
The walima for them is the big public announcement 
of their marriage and they are expecting at least four 
hundred guests. They arrive in smaller groups and 
settle around the tables. Noura’s family seems to be 
settling on the left side of the room and Abdullah’s on 
the right. There are tables with families and others with 
only women and children or only men. Some guests 
are friends, classmates, and colleagues of the couple. 
Many of the women are wearing party dresses, jewelry, 
and heels, while others, both older and younger, are 
attending the wedding in long traditional embroidered 
Palestinian dresses of a black or beige fabric, covered 
in mostly red, some gold, and blue embroidery. The 
patterns are intricate and hand-embroidered and 
represent an important part of and pride in Palestinian 
national culture. Some women have their hair covered 
and others do not.
People stand up and applaud as the bride and groom 
are carried into the room on chairs which are carried 
by four young men each. They are settled at the edge 
of the open space and the festivities begin. Noura is 
wearing an elaborate white wedding dress and a tiara in 
her beautifully styled hair. Abdullah is wearing a light 
grey suit and matching tie. The arrival of the couple is 
accompanied by the women in the room ululating, a 
familiar sound of celebration in Arab cultures. People 
talk in Arabic and English and children run around 
the room.
Noura’s uncle, a leader in his Muslim community, takes 
the mic to give a short speech. He welcomes the couple 
and guests, in Arabic and English, and talks about how 
Noura and Abdullah met— this is the official version. 
He speaks on behalf of both families when he says that 
they are very happy about their union and that they 
wish them the best for their new life together. He then 
beautifully recites our now familiar two verses from 
the Qur’an and reminds the couple of the significance 
of God consciousness in all they do, especially in 
their marriage, and of the centrality of building a 
relationship based on tranquility, love, and mercy. In 
a nod to Egyptian wedding traditions, he then offers 
the bride and groom a glass of hibiscus tea, and servers 
around the room carry trays with the same tea for 
the guests.
When he puts down the mic, music begins to play over 
the speakers and the bride and groom are urged into the 
circle for the first dance. They have hired a professional 
dabkeh dance group to accompany them and perform 
this traditional Arab/Middle Eastern dance. Abdullah 
was at first reluctant to include dabkeh in the walima, 
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as it involves men and women dancing together, but 
he has been practicing with Palestinian friends and 
manages quite well. Noura has performed as part of a 
dabkeh group since high school and presents a flawless 
performance despite the unwieldy wedding dress. 
Surrounded by the dance troupe, the two are joined 
by others who feel comfortable participating. Many 
of the guests have gotten up to line the circular space 
and clap along to the traditional rhythm of the music. 
Some of the Egyptian family members of the groom 
seem a bit scandalized by the gender-mixed dance and 
stay at their tables.
The music and dancing are interrupted by the dinner 
buffet being opened and attended to. The food is 
Middle Eastern, with chicken kebabs; minced meat 
skewers; tabbouleh, a parsley and semolina salad; 
mujaddara, a rice and lentil dish; succulent pieces of 
lamb on a bed of rice; fattoush, a green salad topped 
with fried pita bread and sumac; and large baskets with 
pita bread. There are overloaded trays of baklava and 
other sweets. Later, the couple will cut the three-layer 
white wedding cake and feed each other the first piece. 
It is a joyous occasion and the icing around Abdullah’s 
mouth elicits lots of laughter from all involved. The 
celebration, which started around 6 o’clock, does not 
wind down until almost midnight.
Conclusion
These three stories are my recollections of the wedding 
events, and additional information from interviews 
and conversations. They narrate the particular and 
tell us how these three couples found each other and 
created their families. Hundreds if not thousands of 
American Muslim weddings take place every year, and 
they are as diverse as the couples that celebrate and 
mark their marriages through rituals, ceremonies, and 
feasts. These weddings, including our three, share basic 
features such as a religious ceremony, the nikah or 
kitab, the presence of witnesses, and the agreement on 
a mahr, as well as the announcement of the marriage 
through a celebration or feast. Specific features such 
as dress, food, guests, music or not, and venue vary 
widely and reflect the many facets of American Muslim 
communities and families, from ethnic and racial 
background to class and gender norms.
Not all American Muslim weddings take place in the 
United States and not all weddings involve two people 
who are both Muslim or who identify as a man and a 
woman. And it is hard to believe from our three stories 
that not all American Muslims who get married are 
young or have never been married before. I wish there 
were room here for the story of the Muslim-Hindu 
wedding, or the Pakistani-Syrian wedding, or that 
of a Sudanese American man and his Indian Muslim 
wife, not to mention the older woman convert who 
was getting married for the fourth time, or the gay 
Pakistani couple’s wedding a friend told me about.8
There are stories of complicated paths to even having 
a wedding, the heartbreak of canceled weddings and 
broken promises, and the supportive and unsupportive 
reactions of families and communities. At times, 
weddings bring a foreboding of future troubles; at 
other times they set the tone for new and challenged 
gender relations and family norms. There are debts to 
be paid for expensive weddings and relationships to be 
mended when things did not go according to plan or 
everyone’s expectation. And although the marriage is 
more important than the wedding, an analysis of the 
who, where, when, and how of a wedding provides a 
fascinating framework for understanding the marriage 
it creates.
1 Warith Deen Mohammed (1933–2008) was the leader of the 
African American Muslim community organization that emerged 
from the Nation of Islam after the death of its leader, Elijah 
Muhammed (1897–1975). The organization had various names 
over the years, including American Society of Muslims and The 
Mosque Cares.
2 See Debra Majeed, “Sexual Identity, Marriage, and Family,” in J. 
Hammer and O. Safi, eds., The Cambridge Companion to American 
Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 312–329; 
Juliane Hammer, “Marriage in American Muslim Communities,” 
Religion Compass 9, 2 (2015): 35–44.
3 See, for example, Salma Abugideiri and Mohamed Hag Magid, 
Before You Tie the Knot: A Guide for Couples (No Place, 2013); 
Munira Lekovic Ezzeldine, Before the Wedding: Questions to Ask 
for Muslims before Getting Married (Irvine: Izza Publishing, 2009); 
Ruqaiyyah Waris Maqsood, The Muslim Marriage Guide (Hicks-
ville: Goodword, 2014).
4 There is a book that contains sample contracts: Hedaya Hartford 
and Ashraf Muneeb, Your Islamic Marriage Contract (Amman: Al- 
Fath, 2007), as well as online resources for marriage contracts, 
such as iman-wa.org, hijabman.com. For an example of premarital 
counseling materials, see this questionnaire developed by the 
ADAMS Center in Virginia and widely used in other mosques: 
www.adamscenter.org.
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5 The mehndi or henna party is technically also part of wedding 
practices among many Muslims. It revolves around the application 
of henna paste, in intricate designs, to the hands and feet of 
the bride and women present at the celebration. Henna parties 
are usually gender segregated and men have a party as well but 
usually do not apply henna. The application of the henna designs 
is part of the preparation and beautification of the bride for the 
wedding and wedding night.
6 Many American Muslim children attend classes, usually on 
Sunday, to learn about their religion.
7 A specific dimension of marital selection and discussions of it in 
Muslim communities are explored in Zareena Grewal, “Marriage 
in Colour: Race, Religion and Spouse Selection in Four American 
Mosques,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 32, 2 (2009): 323– 345.
8 See also two wonderful collections of first-person narratives 
about love and marriage: Ayesha Mattu and Nura Maznavi, eds., 
Love, Inshallah: The Secret Love Lives of American Muslim Women 
(Berkeley: Soft Skull, 2012); Ayesha Mattu and Nura Maznavi, eds., 
Salaam, Love: American Muslim Men on Love, Sex, and Intimacy 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2014).
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This essay originally appeared in the Harvard Divinity Bulletin, then a print-only periodical, and was republished 
on the long-defunct Muslim WakeUp! website. Today, I cringe at some of what’s included (a problematic 
assertion of firstness; a racist conflation of Americanness with whiteness) and sigh at some of what’s excluded 
(that wedding where the imam declared that it was the wife’s Islamic right not to be hit in the face by her 
husband? I was the bride). Still, I think it’s useful for what it says about the cultural and religio-legal elements 
of weddings as well as how it depicts a pivotal moment in American Muslim gender politics. (For more on the 
latter, see contributor Juliane Hammer’s American Muslim Women, Religious Authority, and Activism: More Than 
a Prayer [2012]). Since the wedding chronicled here, I’ve married other couples in Florida and in Massachusetts, 
sometimes with a notary doing the legal bit and sometimes as a formally registered officiant, a.k.a., an agent 
of the state. Because I get invitations to officiate that I can’t accept—including several during the pandemic—I 
hope at some point to produce a DIY guide to officiating a Muslim marriage.
This essay first appeared as “Acting on Frontier of Religious Ceremony: With Questions and Quiet Resolve, a 
Woman Officiates at a Muslim Wedding.” Harvard Divinity Bulletin 32:4, Fall/Winter 2004, pp. 8-9. It is republished 
here with permission.
Suggested citation: Kecia Ali, “Acting on a Frontier of Religious Ceremony,” in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of Faith: 
American Muslim Marriage and Divorce in the Twenty-First Century (Boston: OpenBU, 2021), pp. 17-21. https://
hdl.handle.net/2144/42505
Acting on a Frontier of  
Religious Ceremony
K E C I A  A L I  ( 2 0 0 4 )
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It hit me the moment I hung up the phone: I had nothing 
to wear. In retrospect, it seems an awfully girly thing to 
have focused on, given the substance of the conversation. 
I had just agreed to become the first woman, to my 
knowledge, to officiate at a Muslim marriage, giving 
the wedding sermon and administering the vows to 
the bride and groom in front of 350 assembled guests. 
Most would be Pakistani and all, undoubtedly, would be 
dressed to the nines. And I had nothing to wear.
Tayyibah Taylor, editor of Azizah magazine, had called 
me the previous week with an intriguing request. A 
friend of a friend was seeking a woman to preside at her 
nikah ceremony, to be held in six weeks’ time in Tampa, 
Florida. She had been looking for months and wasn’t 
having any luck. A few of the academics and activists 
she had contacted were unavailable on the appointed 
day. But most were simply uncomfortable with the idea. 
None had ever seen or heard of a woman performing 
a wedding, and while, in theory, there was nothing to 
prohibit it, no one wanted to be the one to actually break 
the unspoken barrier. Although she didn’t say so in so 
many words, the bride-to-be was getting frustrated: 
it was time for Muslim feminists to put up or shut up. 
Would I do it?
I knew, from my academic specialization in Islamic 
marriage law, that there was no legal obstacle to my 
officiating at the marriage. The role of imam at a wedding 
is ceremonial rather than sacerdotal; as in Judaism, it is 
the words of bride and groom (or their representatives) 
that make the marriage. The presence of an officiant, 
while recommended and customary, is not religiously 
necessary for the marriage to be valid. And, as there 
is no formal ordination of clergy in Sunni Islam, any 
learned person can deliver the wedding sermon and 
oversee the vows.
In the United States, more often than not, it is the 
imam of a local mosque who officiates. But many of 
my male Muslim colleagues are regularly called upon 
to perform marriages; having a professor rather than 
a shaykh lead the ceremony would not be unusual. 
Still, a number of these colleagues have, in addition to 
academic credentials, some semblance of traditional 
Islamic learning. Having never had the benefit of such 
study, I have always been very careful to give analytical, 
rather than normative, opinions when asked about 
controversial issues pertaining to women, marriage, 
and the family. But here I was, being asked to step 
into the role of imam precisely in order to reshape the 
paradigm of Islamic religious authority, for this was the 
bride-to-be’s expressed intention in seeking a woman 
to officiate. Quite honestly, the idea was terrifying. So I 
agreed to consider it.
I was not alone in considering new things; the summer 
of 2004 was a crucial moment for shifting religio-
cultural norms about gender boundaries and female 
authority in Muslim communal life in the United States. 
Hadia Mubarak was elected the first female president 
of the national Muslim Students’ Association, after 
years in which numerous campus chapters have had 
female leaders. Shareda Hosein, a Muslim woman and 
army officer, was seeking appointment as a military 
chaplain, raising issues of who is qualified to wield 
religious authority as well as who is authorized to 
bestow it. Sex-segregation within mosques was being 
debated everywhere (with the vast majority of critics 
of the status quo accepting the separation of men and 
women for prayer, but objecting to the inferiority and 
inadequacy of the spaces allocated to women). And, 
only a few days after my phone conversation, a group of 
Muslim women calling themselves Daughters of Hajar 
held a woman-led, mixed-gender prayer be fore joining 
the communal Friday service at the local mosque in 
Morgantown, West Virginia.
In each of these instances, something important was 
being negotiated. How much can or should historical 
practice shift to reflect contemporary realities? What 
is essential and what can be modified to suit new 
sensibilities? And, always, who has the legitimacy to 
determine the answers to these questions?
In considering whether or not to officiate, I tried to 
set aside this larger context and confront the question 
of whether I was willing to step, no matter how 
temporarily, into the role of religious authority. My 
growing inclination to accept the invitation was less 
about effecting a transformation in gender norms than 
about providing the couple with a wedding ceremony 
that would not make them cringe when remembering 
it. Unlike, for example, the wedding where the well-
meaning Saudi-trained Trinidadian imam told the 
guests, including the bride’s entire extended, non-
Muslim family, that it was the wife’s Islamic right not 
to be hit in the face by her husband. Or the one where, 
in an effort to convey the contractual nature of Muslim 
marriage, the South Asian officiant explained that the 
husband pays his wife a dower as if he were “buying a 
cow from the market.” 
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Although these examples are extreme in their 
offensiveness, and do not reflect the majority of 
Muslim weddings, lesser slights are commonplace. 
At one family wedding I attended, the shaykh recited, 
in Arabic, the lovely verse that begins Chapter 4 of 
the Qur’an, which commands people to “revere your 
Sustainer who created you from a single soul, and 
from it created its mate.” The spell woven by his 
melodious recitation of these uplifting words was 
abruptly shattered when he declared: “And the English 
translation of this is: God created Adam, and out of 
Adam created Eve.” I was certain that, despite my lack 
of formal training, I could do better. Therefore, I agreed 
to discuss matters with the bride-to-be.
When we spoke, she informed me that the couple would 
not be producing a written Islamic contract, relying 
instead on prenuptial agreements and a civil marriage. 
Thus, the public religious ceremony was really about 
the sermon and the exchange of vows in front of the 
guests. The couple and their families wanted, as is 
customary, a brief Arabic sermon, containing the usual 
blessings and Qur’anic verses; a longer English speech 
on marriage; and an exchange of vows between the 
bride and groom. As is permissible in the Hanafi school 
of law followed by the families, neither party would 
use a guardian. The bride intended, and I agreed, not 
to make a big deal out of the fact that a woman was 
officiating, but to let my presence speak for itself.
One issue did present a bit more of a problem: witnesses. 
Most schools of law require two male witnesses to a 
wedding, but Hanafi doctrine allows two women and 
one man. I know that some have attempted to set male 
and female witnesses on an equal footing by appointing 
two men and two women, an option that I suggested 
but the bride rejected, rightly noting that it attempts to 
create the illusion of parity where it does not exist; the 
female witnesses are, in such a case, redundant. The 
bride suggested instead appointing one woman and 
one man. This would, indeed, have made a dramatic 
statement, but one I was not comfortable with. It would 
require not only challenging the consensus of the legal 
schools, but also going against a famous tradition from 
an early authority that a marriage witnessed by only 
one man and one woman was tantamount to adultery. 
We left the question for further reflection; after 
consulting colleagues, I decided to simply invite the 
entire audience to witness the vows.
With most matters settled, I agreed to officiate. We 
made plans to speak again, to discuss the elements 
of the ceremony further, as well as the logistics of 
my travel to Tampa. I ended the conversation with 
the sense of having taken on a weighty task, a bit 
concerned about potentially scandalized community 
reaction and somewhat apprehensive about living up 
to the trust placed in me. These concerns, however, 
were promptly replaced by a more urgent worry: what 
on earth was I going to wear?
Any wedding is part performance. This was going to 
be one hell of a show, not a small, intimate backyard 
ceremony or a contract signing in the mosque after 
Friday prayers, but a hotel ballroom filled to capacity 
with immigrant professionals in wedding finery. I 
needed to look the part. A beard and turban, the usual 
symbols of Islamic religious authority, were out of the 
question for obvious reasons. My usual professional 
clothes, while appropriately modest, were not nearly 
fancy enough; no-wrinkle synthetic fabrics in black 
and charcoal wouldn’t cut it. Whatever I wore had 
to not only convey authority but also be culturally 
appropriate; a business suit also would not do. The 
clear choice was to wear what most of the female 
guests would be wearing: shalwar kameez, a long tunic 
top over baggy trousers with a long matching shawl or 
scarf that can be draped over the head as necessary. 
Since I married someone of Indian ancestry 10 years 
ago, this has become my preferred dress for ceremonial 
and religious occasions. Nonetheless, as imams do not, 
as a rule, wear purple adorned with gold sequins and 
beading, and since every outfit I owned was similarly 
colorful and ornate, I would have to find a more 
suitable ensemble.
Kecia Ali, left, officiating at a wedding ceremony in Tampa, 
Florida, earlier this year.
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A shopping expedition in Jackson Heights, Queens, 
made clear the unprecedented nature of my task. In 
each store I visited, I attempted to explain my unusual 
requirements to the Indian women assisting me. It 
was easy enough to convey why the tunic needed to 
have long sleeves. All I had to say was “for a Muslim 
wedding,” and there was no attempt to talk me into 
anything else, which immediately narrowed my range 
of possible choices by quite a bit. My need for a neutral 
color, matte fabric, and restrained ornamentation, 
however, was not easily accepted, as it seemed 
to conflict with my statement that the outfit was 
for a wedding.
At one shop, I attempted to explain to the Muslim 
proprietress that I was going to be performing the 
ceremony, not attending as a guest. I was met with only 
incomprehending insistence that I needed something 
fancier than the plain outfits I had selected to try on. 
(My intransigence, I suppose, was merely chalked up 
to the fact that I am American and, therefore, ignorant 
about important matters such as weddings.) As she 
proposed one satiny confection after another, I gazed 
longingly at the simple, tasteful cream-colored men’s 
tunic-and-pants outfits lining the walls. Luckily, 
however, I found an appropriate garment in the next 
shop. Made of gray crepe, it was rich enough to be 
suitably fancy. With a pattern of gold and silver wire 
embroidery diamonds down the front of the tunic, it 
was restrained enough to look official. Best of all, the 
two parallel lines of gold embroidery down the front of 
the tunic made it look more like a jacket than a dress. 
It was the closest I could possibly come to masculine 
clothing without going in drag.
With the issue of clothing resolved, I was left to 
concentrate on the ceremony itself. Muslim marriage 
vows are traditionally simple, and in this case, we 
simplified them to almost the bare minimum to suit 
the spouses. The sermon took more work. In most 
American Muslim weddings, the sermon is divided into 
two parts: a brief Arabic introduction, praising God, 
invoking God’s blessings, and reciting a few appropriate 
Qur’anic verses, and a longer sermon in English that 
discusses marriage, especially the rights and duties 
of the spouses. While I could handle the second part 
with some effort, I was not equipped to tackle the first 
alone. I emailed my doctoral adviser, himself a madrasa 
graduate, explaining my situation and asking for 
guidance. Really, what I wanted to know from him was: 
have I gotten myself in way over my head?
His support and encouragement were vastly 
reassuring. Since he knew a standard wedding sermon 
by heart, he didn’t have a “cheat sheet” to provide for 
me, instead referring me to a colleague at another 
university who had worked as an imam in their native 
South Africa. This man responded to my emailed plea, 
sending me photocopies of a long khutbah from which 
I cut and pasted the Arabic text to suit my needs: 
the introductory formulae and three verses from the 
Qur’an. I chose to stick closely to the text, well within 
the range of minor variations in wedding sermons.
Over the next few weeks leading up to the ceremony, 
I practiced repeatedly, knowing that the tone for the 
entire event would be set by how authoritatively I could 
deliver a two-minute speech in Arabic. While most 
of the attendees would not understand the content, 
and therefore the English sermon would be more 
important in conveying ideas, the perceived religious 
legitimacy of the ceremony would be contingent upon 
my conveying linguistic competence.
The English sermon required a different type of 
attention, and a delicate touch. I didn’t want to play 
false to the scripture and proclaim the exact equality 
and sameness of male and female in every detail of 
marriage, nor did I want to engage in a detailed critique 
of Muslim conventional wisdom on gender roles in 
marriage. Instead, I chose to stress certain crucial 
principles, drawing on the verses used in the Arabic 
sermon, which, in addition to the one about the creation 
of the first human being and its mate from a single soul, 
focus on the human obligation to revere God.
I attempted to convey how individual moral 
responsibility and accountability are not extinguished 
by marriage but rather expanded to encompass duties 
to a spouse as well. I noted that marriage is a contract 
in which it is important to outline expectations at the 
outset, but that it is not merely a business arrangement 
consisting of dower payment and cohabitation. I 
pointed out that there is an emotional and spiritual 
dimension to marriage, an intimacy distinct from its 
social function in organizing human life. Above all, 
I stressed that God must remain paramount for the 
spouses, individually and collectively.
The event itself went without a hitch. Few guests knew 
in advance that there would be a woman officiating, 
but no one stood up and attempted to stop the 
ceremony, which had been a niggling fear of mine. 
2 1W E D D I N G S
Only one person approached me afterward with a very 
diplomatically worded query about the validity of a 
ceremony performed by a woman; he seemed satisfied 
by my answer. Apparently, though, there was significant 
controversy in the local community in the wake of the 
wedding—I heard about it from an acquaintance in 
Chicago, who was contacted by someone from Tampa 
to find out if what I had done was “legal.” Most of the 
reaction I got at the reception, from men as well as 
women, was positive. The most frequent sentiment 
seemed to be that, quite simply, times have changed 
and it is a good thing for Muslims to change with them, 
so long as the fundamentals of Islam are upheld.
I have no grand conclusions to draw from this event, 
merely a few small lessons. It reaffirmed for me that 
stretching oneself, professionally and personally, is 
rewarding. It suggested to me that sometimes the way 
to best make change is not to debate endlessly whether 
or not such change is permissible but, after giving the 
matter due consideration, simply to act.
It taught me that scriptural learning and a solid 
command of Arabic are essential to the exercise of 
religious authority—and that having a smashing outfit 
can never hurt.
H A L F  O F  F A I T H
A Wedding Khutbah
K E C I A  A L I  ( 2 0 0 4 )
This sermon was delivered at the wedding discussed in “Acting on a Frontier of Religious Ceremony,” also 
included in this reader. When it was published in Azizah, it was as part of a whole section on marriage. (Azizah 
publisher and editor-in-chief Tayyibah Taylor, may God show mercy to her, was the person who initially reached 
out to me about officiating.) I’ve officiated another half-dozen wedding since, and have tailored my remarks to 
the couple getting married, but the basic beats remain: the spouses in relation to themselves and each other, 
the extended family and community as a source of support (and maybe also friction), and the privilege and 
predicament of humanity as a whole as part of God’s creation, with all that entails. 
This piece first appeared in Azizah, 3:4, Dec 2004/Jan 2005, pp. 29-31 and is republished here in accordance with 
the terms of the original contract.
Suggested citation: Kecia Ali, “A Wedding Khutbah,” in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of Faith: American Muslim Marriage 
and Divorce in the Twenty-First Century (Boston: OpenBU, 2021), pp. 22-25. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42505
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We praise God, we seek God’s help, and we beg 
God’s forgiveness. We seek refuge with God from the 
mischief of our souls and from the evil of our deeds. 
Whoever God guides cannot be led astray by anyone, 
and whoever refuses God’s guidance, none will be able 
to guide. I bear witness that there is no god but God, 
who is One and has no partners, and I bear witness that 
Muhammad is God’s servant and messenger.
We are blessed to be here this evening for the joyful and 
solemn occasion of joining Zan and Tania in marriage. 
Marriage in Islam is of vital importance. The Prophet 
Muhammad, Salla Allahu ‘Alayhi Wa Sallam, said that 
those who marry have completed half of their religion. 
Anyone who doubts the significance of marriage need 
only turn to the Qur’an for a reminder as to its place in 
the divine plan for humanity. God says in the Qur’an: 
“Oh people, revere your Sustainer who created you 
from a single soul, and from it created its mate, and 
brought forth from them both many men and women. 
Revere God, through whom you ask [of one another], 
and [be reverent toward] the wombs that bore you. 
Indeed God is watchful over you” (4:1). 
The brevity of this verse from the beginning of Surat 
Al Nisa is deceptive. It encapsulates in a few short 
lines essential truths about the nature of humanity’s 
relationship to God and the nature of relationships 
among human beings. 
God, as the Qur’an makes clear in this and numerous 
other verses, is the Creator of humankind. Humanity, 
as God’s creation, is ordered to revere God. The proper 
attitude of human beings to God is one of taqwa: 
reverence, piety, fear, everpresent consciousness of 
our Creator. We are reminded that even with regard 
to earthly matters, such as marriage, God comes first. 
Human beings are obligated to our Creator not only for 
our existence, but also for the opportunity to share our 
lives with a spouse whom God also created at that first 
moment of humanity’s existence. 
According to God’s words in these verses, the first 
human being and its mate were created out of a 
single nafs–soul, or self, or substance. This tells us 
something fundamental about humanity: the equal 
status of all human beings as God’s creatures. This 
lesson is reinforced elsewhere in the Qur’an, where 
God describes the division of humanity into nations 
and tribes (49:13) and notes the variations in the 
colors of our skins and the languages we speak (30:22). 
These differences exist, God tells us, so that we “may 
know one another.” They do not establish superiority 
or inferiority. Rather, we are told quite clearly, that 
taqwa is the criterion by which God judges, taqwa, 
which is the focus of the verses that I quoted a moment 
ago (49:13).
This verse in fact commands people to have taqwa 
toward God twice: once as ‘your Sustainer, who created 
you’ and once as the one ‘through whom you ask 
[of one another].’ The two identities are intimately 
interconnected. God created the human being and 
its spouse, and ‘brought forth from them both many 
men and women.’ (4:1) As we are told in another 
verse (25:54), God populates the earth through the 
creation of lineage and marriage relationships, all 
tracing back ultimately to the first human pair. It is 
these relationships that the Qur’an refers to when it 
highlights God’s role as the one through whom we ask 
of one another. The affiliations created by marriage 
are part of the divine plan for humanity, just as it is 
part of the plan for the differences among humanity 
to lead to interaction and knowledge. Our obligation 
to cherish the ties of kinship and mutual obligation 
has significance beyond the purely human level. 
We must remember that our obligations to other 
people—especially our spouses and families—are part 
When Tania and Zan were making their wedding plans, they decided to do something 
different for themselves and hundreds of their guests; they decided to have a woman 
officiate their marriage. Thus, they made a statement about the spiritual equality 
of women and men and about marriage as a spiritual partnership. Knowing of no 
religious reason women cannot officiate marriages, they invited Dr. Kecia Ali, the 
Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow in Islamic Studies and Women’s Studies at Brandeis 
University, to officiate. She accepted, noting that in Islam 'since a wedding officiator is 
basically witnessing the contract agreement, there is no legal reason why females can't 
officiate.' Here is the wedding khutbah delivered by an officiating Muslim American 
woman. All citations are from the Holy Qur'an.
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and parcel of our obligations to God; God created 
humanity with the aim of establishing society based on 
human interaction.
While their vows tonight will create a new set of 
marital duties, Tania and Zan will continue to belong 
to their own kin; they will not cease to be daughter and 
son, sister and brother, cousin, grandchild. They will 
continue to have rights and obligations to the members 
of their own families, and they will have new bonds 
with their kin-by-marriage. Thus, as Zan and Tania 
marry this evening, not only is it important that they 
be aware of their obligations to one another—and their 
families, old and new—but it is also important that 
their families and the larger community of Muslims be 
aware of the claims that this new couple has to support 
and guidance. God is not unaware of the possible 
strains and difficulties of married life, and suggests in 
the Qur’an ways of involving family members in the 
negotiation and settlement of disputes (4:35). (It goes 
without saying that assistance and advice when needed 
and requested are, of course, distinct from meddling.)
It is unrealistic to imagine marriage without any 
conflict; what matters is that when conflict does arise, 
it is settled in a respectful, appropriate, and thoroughly 
God-conscious way. Even the Prophet Muhammad, 
Salla Allahu ‘Alayhi Wa Sallam, had difficulties in his 
personal life on occasion. His resolution of them with 
compassion, discretion, and restraint demonstrates 
God’s assertion that the Prophet is indeed ‘a beautiful 
example’ for Muslims (33:21)—especially Muslim 
husbands. 
In modern American culture, weddings are often 
thought of as being purely about romance, and it is 
admittedly not very romantic of me to discuss the less 
glamorous elements of interpersonal relationships 
on an occasion such as this. But Islamic marriage is 
a contract and, as with any contract, full disclosure 
is required. It is important that those entering into 
marriage do so with their informed consent, aware of 
their own expectations for the relationship as well as 
the expectations of their spouse-to-be.
In marriage, two independent individuals are joining 
in a partnership of sorts. Each remains a sovereign 
person, fully accountable to God for his or her 
behavior. There can be no doubt of God’s commands 
in this regard; God tells us repeatedly that no soul 
can bear the burdens of another (6:164, 17:15, 35:18, 
39:7). However, so long as the marriage endures, and 
we hope and expect that it will be for a lifetime, each 
spouse carries responsibilities to the other. Zan and 
Tania bring different strengths and capabilities to this 
marriage, molded by their own experiences and innate 
qualities. They will share the burdens and the blessings 
of establishing a Muslim household and, if God wills, 
eventually nurturing and raising children who will 
grow up as faithful worshippers of God and productive 
members of their community and society. 
Over the course of what will, God willing, be a 
long marriage, Tania and Zan will share beautiful, 
momentous occasions: the birth of a first child 
(and, many years from now, perhaps a grandchild); 
professional triumphs; anniversaries; moments of 
sheer passion; and sentiments of overwhelming 
love and tenderness. It is a fact of life, however, 
that these moments will be dwarfed in number, if 
not in significance, by the activities of daily living. 
They will have many moments of shared labor, 
quiet companionship, and ordinary conversation. 
I will not pretend that marital bliss is to be found 
through mundane chores, such as folding the 
laundry together. But part of a happy marriage will 
be finding the satisfaction and appreciation for one 
another inherent in these everyday activities and the 
closeness found there.
Having spoken, perhaps too much, about practical 
matters, I want to turn for a moment to more abstract 
and lofty considerations. Just as it is false to think of 
marriage as only a matter for the heart, it is equally 
false to think of it as a dry business arrangement. 
While it is possible to have a marriage that meets the 
bare minimum requirements of the contract, this is not 
what God intends for humanity. There is an emotional 
and spiritual dimension to marriage that must not 
be denied. The Qur’an tells us that God ‘created for 
you mates from among yourself that you may dwell 
in tranquility with them’ and that God ‘placed love 
and mercy between you’ (30:21). These purposes for 
marriage—tranquility, mercy, love—are distinct from 
the broader role that marriage plays in organizing 
society. They pertain to the intimate life of a couple, 
that which transpires between two persons sharing a 
home and a life.
God uses the metaphor of garments to describe the 
relationship of spouses to each other (2:187), and it is 
a particularly apt one. A garment stands between one 
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and the world, protecting one from hostile elements. 
It is, indeed, the closest thing to one’s own self, just 
outside the skin. Tania and Zan, when they make 
their vows in a few minutes, will become each other’s 
closest family.
Nonetheless, and this seems a good place to bring my 
remarks to a close, one must remember that however 
close a husband and wife can be, the Qur’an also 
tells us that God is closer to the human being than 
the jugular vein (50:16). This is a reminder to us that 
even within the confines of marriage, God is, and must 
be, paramount. By keeping God first and foremost, 
and remembering God’s purposes in creating for us 
mates from among ourselves, marriage takes on the 
importance it deserves as an integral part of God’s plan 
for humanity from the very moment of our creation.
H A L F  O F  F A I T H
Rethinking Marriage 
Guardianship: Lessons from 
the Role of  the Wali of  
American Muslim Women
A M I N A H  B E V E R LY  A L - D E E N  ( 2 0 2 1 )
This short article was written for this volume to address a series of questions about the push for marriage on 
those new to Islam, why the guardian—generally an unknown person—is appointed, and what happens after 
marriage when a guardian is needed. While this article does not fully answer all the questions, it hopefully opens 
lines of inquiry.
Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Suggested citation: Aminah Beverly Al-Deen, “Rethinking Marriage Guardianship: Lessons from the Role of the 
Wali of American Muslim Women,” in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of Faith: American Muslim Marriage and Divorce in the 
Twenty-First Century (Boston: OpenBU, 2021), pp. 26-29. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42505
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Life stories, even in a partial telling, are always hard to 
narrate. Experiences have many beginnings, and it can 
be hard to distinguish a new start from the ending of 
what came before. What happens to American women 
who begin the transition to Islam is a wonderful story 
of the newness of a different spiritual life, meeting new 
people from different cultures; on the other hand, it is 
also scary: white, black and Latino women alike feel 
a loss of identity. Women coming to Islam arrive with 
different statuses – some are already married, some are 
widowed, and some are unmarried. All enter cultural 
spaces where there is gender separation, efforts at 
gender surveillance and control, and speculation about 
their previous lives. Culture shock can be especially 
acute when a community is primarily comprised of 
women from other cultural backgrounds with little 
experience with women transitioning to Islam, or 
women who have been Muslim for a while who want 
to forget their initial struggles, who bring lots of 
presumptions about women in American life.  These 
presumptions affect how they receive newly Muslim 
Americans who come into Muslim spaces. They may 
assume that American women are aggressive, sexually 
active, and have loose familial ties. All of this colors 
how the woman who is coming to Islam is perceived 
and builds apprehension about what she will bring to 
the community.
In this article, I want to tell a general story of what 
happens to American women transitioning to Islam 
regarding how they are welcomed, surveilled, and 
generally not protected regarding marriage. I use 
the word transition because a person is choosing to 
become Muslim. The transition is in many ways the 
ending of one personal life and the beginning of a 
new journey. Just as Qur’ān talks about stages of belief 
from being a legal Muslim to a believer to one who 
embodies Islam, the person beginning is moving away 
from much of a former life to a new set of stages. The 
Christian term conversion obscures this gradual shift 
while transition gives the sense of a process. For thirty 
years, I have researched the health and well-being 
of African American Muslim women. There has been 
little examination of transitioning women’s lives, even 
though a significant number face challenging domestic 
situations. In this brief reflection, my focus is on that 
fact that women who become Muslim are effectively 
orphaned and put into the hands of strangers. 
Transitioning to Islam is a series of dislocations for 
many if not most women. At some level, temporarily or 
permanently, women leave family and friends, habits, 
and social haunts to come to dwell with strangers and 
foreigners in unfamiliar places with people of diverse 
socio-economic classes and ethnic groups. The focus is 
often on what to wear rather than spiritual welfare or 
at least, many find it hard to discern what has priority. 
While these shifts happen to both males and females 
who transition, what happens to women is often more 
traumatic, just because they are women. Women give 
up their ideals of femininity for ideals espoused by 
others, who encourage them to wear one-piece cloaks in 
black or dark gray, discourage them from wearing make-
up, and challenge their existing employment and leisure 
time activities. (Never mind that the rules they aim to 
impose on transitioning American women may be 
flouted by younger women born into the community.)
Beginning a transition to an unfamiliar worldview is 
an awesome process in and of itself. American women 
transitioning to Islam encounter unfamiliar cultural 
traditions including gender separation, positioning 
them in a liminal world between Americanness and 
otherness. They are taught that the world of their 
families is the dunya, a world of evil licentiousness 
that they must leave. In some communities, women 
are prevented from family contact while in others, that 
contact is allowed but limited. They are given Qur’āns 
with King James English translations which they can’t 
easily read making getting their own comprehension of 
the faith difficult and their reliance on someone else’s 
interpretation great. Thus, very little is learned about 
Islam beyond prayer and washing before prayer.  Yet, 
all who transition have expectations of the community 
they choose to learn in. They anticipate warmth, 
camaraderie, orientation classes that include learning 
prayers first in English (so they know what they are 
saying), understanding the theological underpinnings 
of Islam, and prayer positions, and so on. Many know 
that there is gender separation during prayer time, but 
it is generally unknown that there is gender separation 
in access to knowledge.
Islam is presented by both males and females in the 
community, in available texts, in Friday talks, and as 
common knowledge to all who inquire as a color-blind, 
class-blind liberation for women, as an equalizer of 
gender relations, and ultimately as a faith tradition 
where believers embark on a path to God as the 
priority. In reality, however, issues of gender and dress 
take priority over faith. What American women often 
see is gender and language segregation.  Women are 
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in the back or upstairs or in another building. New 
Muslims hear little of the Friday talk as many women 
congregants use the time to socialize—sometimes in 
other languages—and tend their children. Women in 
the masjid surveil any unfamiliar women for her dress 
and scrutinize her for any obvious signs of ethnicity. 
Immediately, one sees that the Oneness of God and the 
spirit of community are less important than what one 
wears and which language one speaks.  Most women 
who transition find themselves quietly questioning 
everything while being scared to question anything as 
they may find themselves seeming to question God. The 
disconnect between what is told to the transitioning 
woman and what she sees in the social space does 
indeed raise questions but if asked, the responses 
are often those of blaming lack of faith or knowledge 
or even in some cases being labeled a troublemaker. 
Many women who I interviewed were confused as to 
how Arab or South Asian dress made women closer to 
God.  For African American women, the road is full of 
unspoken presumptions and assumptions and there is 
little focus on faith.
Unmarried women are a danger in all communities. 
Husbands may look at them as potential additional 
wives, while unmarried men look as though they are 
in a meat market. Transitioning women are perceived 
as having too much freedom of movement that is 
not surveilled.  Many African American women 
transitioning to Islam have heard of the “Islamic” 
permission to have more than one wife, but don’t 
think that they are a potential additional wife. That 
men are on the “lookout” for additional wives pushes 
any spiritual yearning to the margin and images of 
a “harem” dominate.  I found several problems in 
all of this. First, adult women continue to be treated 
as children who are surveilled by other women and 
married and unmarried men. They are pushed in 
prayer lines to the “right” position, cautioned in 
bathrooms about the “correct” way to wash by other 
women and sometimes their daughters. Control comes 
from the recitation of hadith materials that the new 
Muslim has little information about. Second, they 
are given little guidance by those considered formal 
authorities beyond how women are to act and when 
they must show deference.  Third, the separation from 
family engenders lack of self-esteem and completely 
renders the woman unable to make reasoned choices. 
Again, there’s the excitement and power of what’s 
new: a transition moves us toward an exciting new 
self; a rupture is of course the breaking of old ties and 
a moment of danger, but it’s also a moment of freedom. 
The novelty, strangeness, and opportunity for spiritual 
fulfillment cloud the mind.
For American women in transition who are married 
to non-Muslim men, an extraordinary amount of 
psychological and spiritual pressure is applied on 
them to immediately obtain a divorce. This is done 
whether these are long standing marriages with 
children or whether the husband is considering Islam 
as his spiritual home. For those who are unmarried, 
pressure is applied as “marriage is half of faith.” Too 
often, women go headlong into marriage with strange 
men as this is perceived as an essential part of this new 
beginning and an opportunity to replace the family 
sometimes lost in the transition.  How is the dramatic 
step of marriage to take place in a community of 
strangers? A guardian (wali) is appointed, usually 
either the imam or a respected man in the community. 
The wali doesn’t know the woman, generally makes 
no effort to meet her family. This woman is essentially 
an orphan in Islam though she has family. The Qur’ān 
commands the protection of orphans and gives 
instructions for their care (IV: 2-10). In the case of a 
woman transitioning to Islam, she is not abandoned 
or left bereft because of war or death necessarily nor 
is she a child but she is orphaned because of the new 
world she is entering without the guidance of parents 
or other relatives. Her person is to be protected from 
those who might prey on her wealth or possessions. She 
should not be married off to men who have not been 
vetted. The Islamic understanding of the role of wali is 
not merely a legalistic requirement to enable a hasty 
marriage. Generally speaking, the wali is a woman’s 
father or grandfather or brother or uncle or even her 
mother or other female relative. The assignment of a 
stranger to take over these duties is unheard of in most 
Muslim countries. In the U.S., it is common and begins 
an often-devastating series of events. 
In practice, the appointed guardian for a newly Muslim 
woman looks around or asks the community about 
unmarried or married men eligible for marriage. 
Investigations of the potential husband’s character, 
sources of income, educational level, Islamic learning 
are often minimal if present at all. The guardian 
strongly suggests someone for the woman to marry 
very quickly after she begins her transition and before 
she “gets her feet under her” Islamically.  Obviously, 
there is little time to get to know the prospective mate 
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since community norms dictate that third parties must 
supervise any conversations. Many women are not 
advised to make a contract, and some who decide to 
do so are even told that it should be short, not giving 
them guidance to think about how their married life 
should proceed. If they do make a contract, there is 
no place to register it. Again, the encouragement and 
pressure is to get married.
The imam or wali is usually uncertified by the 
municipality in which he operates because this is 
considered a regulation of the dunya, so there is no 
need. If those who preside are not registered, the 
contract is hence unenforceable. Weddings are not 
announced with time for family or friends to attend. 
Few attend, the normal wedding feast is absent, 
presents are sparse and the celebratory environment 
is dampened. Many of the women I interviewed were 
married in almost clandestine circumstances – in 
homes, in markets, quickly after Friday prayers and 
so on. The wali then disappears, having performed his 
perfunctory duties without care. How is he a protector 
when there is a problem, or need for consultation?
The role of the guardian is especially important and 
if assumed, it should be understood as an awesome 
responsibility. Every effort should be made to engage 
the woman’s family. Engagement of family is important. 
I prefer female guardians specifically because of the 
aspect of understanding care. Women are more likely 
to take needed steps to get necessary certification 
and registration, to find out about their charges and 
their families, to make marriage contracts that protect 
women, and to remain confidants for the transitioning 
woman. Female guardianship is necessary and critical 
in this process. 
What I would like to see is an acceptance on the part of 
women of a female wali who they feel comfortable with 
and the time to get to know her before being pressured 
or pressuring themselves into marriage. I would 
also like to see a reconsideration of the mahr and its 
current use by husbands to keep women in marriage 
disasters or the demand for its return, a way to leave 
women destitute. A registered contract, guided by a 
knowledgeable female wali, could safeguard a newly 
Muslim bride’s welfare in this and other ways. Many 
of the terms surrounding marriage need to have an 
ethical analysis for the 21st century and reimagining 
and strengthening the role of the wali for transitioning 
women is one place to begin.
Marriage
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Sharia and Diversity: Why 
Some Americans are Missing 
the Point
A S I F A  Q U R A I S H I - L A N D E S  ( 2 0 1 3 )
Islamophobia now puts the average American Muslim in the position of answering all sorts of questions about 
sharia, at a level that is really achievable only by experts in the field. As they try to rise to this impossible 
demand, I have noticed one trap that my fellow Muslims seem to constantly fall into: answering what is “the” 
Islamic rule on something. If you know anything about sharia, you know that there rarely is just “one” answer on 
anything. I wrote this policy report for my friends at the ISPU (Institute for Social Policy and Understanding) so 
that, if nothing else, American Muslims could be able to explain the diversity of thought inherent in sharia - and 
why that is a very good thing.
The executive summary republished here with permission is from the report “Sharia and Diversity: Why Some 
Americans are Missing the Point,” initially published in January 2013 and available in full at ispu.org. 
Suggested citation: Asifa Quraishi-Landes, “Sharia and Diversity: Why Some Americans are Missing the Point,” 
in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of Faith: American Muslim Marriage and Divorce in the Twenty-First Century (Boston: 
OpenBU, 2021), pp. 31-33. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42505
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The lens of state power is not the only way to see 
law. Jewish halakha is one example. The scholar 
created doctrines of Islamic law are another. Both 
are complete systems of law that do not need state 
power in order to govern individual behavior. This 
is why, when American Muslims say that they live 
according to sharia, this does not mean that they want 
government enactment of Islamic law. Their request 
that American law recognize their choice of religious 
rules in their lives is not a demand that American 
law legislate Islamic law for everyone. To think so is 
to fundamentally misunderstand what Islamic law is, 
the fact that it differentiates between God’s Law and 
the human interpretations thereof, and how Islamic 
law operates in practice. Much of the confusion in the 
United States regarding sharia would be untangled if 
Americans could appreciate these realities, however 
unfamiliar.
Sharia is, for Muslims, Divine Law—the Law of God. But 
it takes human scholarly study of scripture to articulate 
and elaborate that Divine Law in the form of legal rules. 
Those legal rules are called “fiqh,” crafted by religious 
legal scholars with a self-conscious awareness of their 
own human fallibility. As a result, there are many fiqh 
schools of law. According to Islamic legal theory, no fiqh 
rule can demand obedience because every such rule is 
the product of human (and thus fallible) interpretation. 
This pluralism allows the divine sharia “recipe” to be 
tangible enough for everyday Muslim use, yet flexible 
enough to accommodate personal choice.
Pluralism in fiqh (human articulation of Divine Law) 
illustrates the dynamic interactive engagement that 
sharia (Divine Law) has had with many different 
human environments. In other words, Muslim religious 
scholars have always treated sharia (Divine Law) as a 
recipe that is meant to be made (with all the natural 
diversity that results from that process), not one frozen 
in pristine condition decorating a kitchen bookshelf.
The enactment of so-called “sharia laws” in Muslim-
majority countries is a modern mutation. Pre-modern 
Muslim governments formally recognized fiqh, but not 
by legislating it as the uniform law of the land. Instead, 
there was a separation of legal authority between the 
realms of fiqh (human articulation of Divine Law) 
and ruler-made laws for public order (siyasa). This 
separation enabled pre-modern Muslim legal systems 
to preserve the pluralism of fiqh and the principle of 
individual personal choice between fiqh schools, while 
still enabling Muslim rulers to make laws in order to 
serve the public good (siyasa). In stark contrast to this 
history, most Muslim-majority countries today have a 
very different constitutional framework, inherited or 
borrowed from the European nation-state model in 
which all law is controlled by the government. Modern 
Muslim legal systems no longer formally separate the 
realms of fiqh (human articulation of Divine Law) and 
state-made law (siyasa). Instead, the only formally 
recognized law in most of these countries is the law 
made by the government. Thus, the phenomenon of 
“sharia legislation” exists not because sharia (Divine 
Law) demands it, but rather, because of a complicated 
series of political events in these countries. 
From the perspective of Islamic legal theory and 
history, there are two major problems with the idea that 
a Muslim government must enact “sharia legislation.” 
First, enacting a collection of (often politically) selected 
rules of fiqh (human articulation of Divine Law) as the 
uniform law of the land undermines the legal pluralism 
that religious communities (Muslim and non-Muslim) 
used to enjoy in pre-modern Muslim legal systems. 
That is, before the legal monism of the nation-state, 
Muslim governments often accommodated a “to each 
his own” approach to religious law that included not 
just the many Muslim fiqh legal schools, but also the 
religious law of Christians, Jews, and others. Second, 
the idea of government codification of sharia (Divine 
Law) contradicts the core epistemology of Islamic 
jurisprudence: that no human can claim to know God’s 
Law with certainty. Thus, when Muslim governments 
enact “sharia legislation” today, they not only reject 
the humility exhibited by centuries of fiqh scholars, 
but also the historical practice of centuries of Muslim 
rulers finding ways to enforce sharia while still 
respecting fiqh pluralism.
Here in the United States, there is no threat to American 
law presented by American Muslims seeking to live by 
sharia. There is also nothing particularly novel about 
some Americans wanting to follow religious laws that 
differ from the law of the land. American Muslims 
are merely the latest of many religious groups in the 
United States whose religious practices have presented 
continuing opportunities for American law to define 
the contours of what religious freedom means in our 
constitutional system that protects the free exercise 
of religion. American courts have never automatically 
dismissed individual requests for legal accommodation 
of religious law. On the other hand, religious freedom 
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in the United States, like all constitutionally protected 
rights, is not absolute. It is weighed against other 
constitutional values and social policies. The main 
tools used by American courts in these cases are 
comity, public policy, and unconscionability. As a 
result, as with the religious practices of all American 
religious groups, American Muslims’ fiqh-based legal 
arguments are sometimes honored by American courts, 
and are sometimes rejected. Simply put, the American 
legal system honors the desire of many American 
Muslims to organize their legal lives according to their 
understanding of sharia (Divine Law), within the limits 
of American public policy. To see this as a threat is to 
mistake religious freedom for religious invasion. 
It is important to realize that one of the themes of 
the anti-sharia campaign in the United States is 
that “creeping sharia” proves the dangerousness of 
multiculturalism. More specifically, the argument 
is that multiculturalism is flawed because it causes 
us to compromise our American values in order to 
accommodate Muslim desires to follow (allegedly 
oppressive and offensive) sharia. In this way, the anti-
sharia controversy is part of a larger conservative-
liberal political debate over the role of multiculturalism 
in America. Appreciating this context is important to 
engaging the topic of sharia in America.
In doing so, it is important for Americans (both Muslim 
and non-Muslim) to stop talking about sharia in a way 
that supports the rhetoric of those who manipulate 
the concept of sharia for political gain. Both within 
and outside of the United States, it is common to see 
the term “sharia” used interchangeably for not just 
the Islamic ideal of Divine Law, but also to refer to the 
fallible rules of fiqh (human articulation of Divine Law). 
Confusing sharia with fiqh is dangerous and misleading 
because it blurs the line between the divine and human 
voice, hiding the self-consciously human process that 
created the fiqh rules and the pluralistic schools of fiqh 
doctrine. 
Conflating fiqh (human articulation of Divine Law) 
with sharia (Divine Law) causes people to assume that 
each fallible fiqh rule represents uncontestable Divine 
Law for Muslims, and that Muslims believe that these 
fiqh rules must be legislated as the law of the land. In 
Muslim circles, this sets the stage for political actors 
to push through their preferred fiqh rule with little or 
no opposition because the Muslim public assumes that 
the rule is divinely-directed, rather than being just one 
of many equally legitimate fiqh choices. This is often 
the technique used to support “sharia legislation” in 
Muslim majority countries today. It is also similar to 
a strategy used by anti-sharia activists in the United 
States whereby a few objectionable fiqh rules are 
selected to argue that sharia itself is offensive. In 
both cases, linguistic sleight of hand is being used to 
manipulate an unknowing public. 
As this report explains, one (or even more than one) 
fiqh rule (human articulation of Divine Law) does not 
define sharia (Divine Law). It suggests the following 
three guidelines to avoid the most common pitfalls 
and misunderstandings that occur in public discourses 
about sharia.
(1) Use the word “sharia” only to refer to the  
concept of perfect, divine Law of God in Islam; 
use the word “fiqh” when referring to the 
humanly-created doctrinal rules created by 
Muslim religious legal scholars as the result 
of their efforts to understand and articulate1 
sharia;
(2) Remember that fiqh (human articulation of 
Divine Law) is pluralistic, made up of multiple 
variations of equally-legitimate schools of law 
and their respective doctrines, all of which are 
available to individual Muslims to choose from 
as they seek to live by sharia (Divine Law);
(3)  Do not refer to the laws in Muslim-majority 
countries (even those claiming to be “Islamic 
states”) as “sharia.” They are merely a 
legislated selection of humanly-created fiqh 
rules; they cannot be said to be conclusively 
dictated by sharia itself.
1 The work of the fiqh scholars to understand and articulate sharia 
should not be described as merely “applying” the sharia. Fiqh 
literature is largely written in an academic and abstract form, 
based on theoretical analysis and hypotheticals. While those 
hypotheticals are based on a reflection of how this would work 
in real life (hence “applying” the scripture to real life), to say that 
religious scholars “apply” sharia would confuse the role of judge 
and fiqh scholar too much. Properly construed, the application of 
sharia is the job of judges who apply the (scholar-created) fiqh in 
individual cases. These roles are largely the same in a common law 
system like the United States, where the judges’ opinions actually 
are the law, but things are very different in a fiqh context.
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Progressive Muslims and 
Islamic Jurisprudence: 
The Necessity for Critical 
Engagement with Marriage 
and Divorce Law
K E C I A  A L I  ( 2 0 0 3 )
This essay, initially published in the Progressive Muslims anthology (2003), represents the first academic fruits 
of my doctoral dissertation (2002) on early Islamic marriage law. It’s a polemical engagement with what I 
term feminist apologetics around provisions of Muslim jurisprudence framed as liberating for women: dower, 
freedom from housework, and conditions in marriage contracts. More sophisticated versions of its arguments 
about contemporary Muslim discourses appear in Sexual Ethics and Islam (2006, rev. ed. 2016) and the fuller 
account of the formative-era jurisprudence on which I based my arguments can be found in Marriage and Slavery 
in Early Islam (2010). Though I stand by its arguments, I regret that my sharpest attacks here target others 
invested in gender justice when upholders of patriarchy deserve our harshest criticism. Nearly twenty years 
later, I’m also struck by my naïve focus on logical coherence rather than practical impact. I remain unconvinced 
that isolated Islamic legal doctrines divorced from their broader context are a viable solution, yet I think it’s 
vanishingly unlikely that a new, internally consistent jurisprudence will develop. For constructive proposal 
that’s deeply critical of my argument, see Asifa Quraishi-Landes’ essay “A Meditation on Mahr” in this reader; 
for a broader egalitarian reimagining of Islamic law, see also the work and wisdom of scholars associated with 
the transnational collective Musawah (musawah.org).
This essay first appeared as a chapter in Omid Safi, ed., Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism 
(Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003), pp. 163-89. It is republished here with permission.
Suggested citation: Kecia Ali, “Progressive Muslims and Islamic Jurisprudence: The Necessity for Critical 
Engagement with Marriage and Divorce Law,” in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of Faith: American Muslim Marriage and 
Divorce in the Twenty-First Century (Boston: OpenBU, 2021), pp. 34-51. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42505
3 5M A R R I A G E
Progressive Muslims have a difficult relationship 
with Islamic law. Many progressive Muslims have 
undertaken alternative close readings of the Qur’an, or 
have delved deeply into ethical and mystical aspects of 
Islam to find teachings that can be used as a cornerstone 
of a progressive Islamic interpretation. But we have 
been reluctant to enter into serious conversations 
about Islamic law, which is generally seen as the realm 
of more conservative scholars. Partially as a result of 
this hesitancy, discussions of Islamic law today tend 
to reflect only different degrees of conservatism and 
fundamentalism. Debates over implementing Shari‘ah 
revolve around issues like the stoning of adulterers 
or amputating the hands of thieves. For those living 
in the Muslim world, negotiations with Islamic law 
as it is enforced through personal status codes are a 
practical necessity. Muslims who live in the West, 
however, encounter Islamic law only to the extent 
that we choose to apply it in our personal dealings. For 
many, that means most especially in matters of family. 
Paradoxically for progressive Muslims, this is the arena 
where traditional Islamic law is thought to be most 
conservative.
Despite the fact that Muslim marriage is not 
generally thought of as a progressive institution, even 
progressive Muslims generally want to get married. We 
do not want our relationships to be bound, however, 
by the strictly hierarchical rules that we assume to be 
enshrined in Islamic law. A few Muslims in the West 
simply leave aside Islamic law in personal matters, 
choosing to abide exclusively by secular laws, which 
tend to be more egalitarian. These couples work to 
keep the spirit of Qur’anic proclamations on the nature 
of marriage alive in their relationships, but do not 
consider its legal pronouncements literally applicable. 
Other progressive Muslims, perhaps most, follow the 
key elements of classical marriage in the wedding, 
but may reduce the dower to a symbolic amount due 
to discomfort with its “commercial” connotations. 
There is an implicit understanding, in these unions, 
that traditional legal rules – such as those allowing the 
husband to take additional wives or to forbid his wife 
from leaving the marital home without permission – 
will not govern the spouses. Both of these approaches 
are based on an understanding of Islamic marriage 
law as inherently biased against women; therefore, it 
is avoided or observed primarily in the breach. Islamic 
law, in this view, does not accurately embody the ideals 
of Islam regarding relations between spouses, which 
are mutuality, respect, and kindness. A third stance, 
however, calls for selective appropriation of provisions 
of classical law, allowing for the spouses to customize 
their marriage contract through the inclusion of 
numerous conditions, generally favoring the wife, 
that modify traditionally accepted rules for spouses’ 
marital rights.
Proponents of this approach argue that, in fact, women 
are guaranteed numerous marital rights by Islamic 
law, some of which surpass rights granted by secular 
Western laws; women simply need to learn how to 
protect themselves by invoking them. The lawyer 
Azizah al-Hibri is the most prominent, though by 
no means the only, advocate for this view, which has 
gained widespread attention in recent years and has 
been adopted by many Muslim women’s organizations. 
It is also quickly becoming conventional wisdom 
among some non-Muslim feminists concerned about 
avoiding orientalist stereotypes surrounding “women’s 
status” in Islam.2
Al-Hibri was recently featured in “Talk of the Town” 
in The New Yorker. There she explained that women 
have rights in Islamic law that are often unknown 
and unutilized, with the right to make stipulations in 
marriage contracts primary among them. According to 
the article,
A woman can secure her right to work 
outside the home at any job she likes; she 
can reassert her right to have her husband 
support her financially, even if she has a job 
or is independently wealthy; she can keep her 
finances separate from his and invest them 
wherever she wishes; she can specify the 
sum of money she expects to receive should 
the marriage end in divorce or should she be 
widowed; she can negotiate the right to divorce 
her husband at will, should he, for example, take 
another wife; [and] she can reserve the right not 
to cook, to clean, or to nurse her own children.3
This picture does not resemble at all the laws 
governing most Muslim women’s marriages today. 
If implemented, however, such rights would seem to 
guarantee women a life of ease and comfort. Further, 
to the extent that these rights can be supported by 
opinions from texts of classical jurisprudence, they 
are more likely to achieve acceptance than attempts to 
rework marriage law entirely, since they can claim an 
“authentic” Islamic pedigree.
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In this essay, I will argue that this approach misses the 
forest for the trees. While its adherents may or may not 
be right about any particular contractual stipulation4 
(and often they significantly overstate the extent to 
which specific conditions are enforceable), they fail to 
address the basic parameters of the marriage contract 
itself and the assumptions it is based on. By focusing 
on isolated rights without paying attention to how they 
are embedded in a system of interdependent spousal 
obligations, al-Hibri and other advocates for women’s 
legal rights implicitly accept the basic structure of the 
marriage contract as understood by Muslim jurists to 
be the divinely sanctioned norm for Islamic marriage. 
However, this framework is not God-given but rather 
was developed by men working at a particular time 
and place, governed by certain assumptions. Before 
we simply accept the traditional legal understanding 
of marriage and move to modify its practice with 
conditions attached to marriage contracts, its basic 
premises must be subjected to sustained analysis and 
careful critique.
One purpose of this essay is to present such an analysis 
of the traditional jurisprudential understanding of 
marriage. I will demonstrate, through an exposition 
of the views of early Sunni jurists, that the overall 
framework of the marriage contract is predicated on 
a type of ownership (milk) granted to the husband 
over the wife in exchange for dower payment, which 
makes sexual intercourse between them lawful. 
Further, the major spousal right established by the 
contract is the wife’s sexual availability in exchange 
for which she is supported by her husband. This 
basic claim, which would have been accepted without 
controversy as an accurate portrayal of the legal 
dimensions of marriage by virtually any pre-modern 
Muslim jurist, is unthinkable today for the majority 
of Muslims, including those who write about Islamic 
law. This portrait of how traditional jurists conceived 
of marriage is a necessary precursor to the evaluation 
of contemporary discourses on marriage in Islamic law 
that I undertake in the second half of this essay.
I will address two types of modern discourses 
on Islamic law: neo-conservative and feminist-
apologist. Both attempt to appropriate the authority 
of traditional Islamic law through various means, in 
each case upholding some of its substantive doctrines 
while setting others aside. Neo-conservative authors 
suggest that the rationale for men’s and women’s 
differing marital rights and duties is the natural 
difference between husbands and wives that results 
from a divinely ordained “complementarity” of males 
and females. Though presenting their views as simply 
restatements of traditional law, these authorities 
allow some rights previously granted to women to 
lapse, since they do not make sense as part of the new 
framework.
Feminist and reformist approaches that take 
women’s rights and needs as their main concern 
make different interpretive moves from those of the 
neo-conservatives. In some cases, they reject juristic 
interpretations and turn instead to the Qur’an and, 
to a lesser extent, the hadith collections as source of 
legal guidance. In this essay, though, I am concerned 
with the way these discourses focus on particular 
substantive rules of jurisprudence. Claiming back 
rights that have recently gone unnoticed or even been 
denied outright, those working from this perspective 
attempt to promote and defend wives’ rights by appeal 
to traditional legal authority. In doing so, however, 
they provide new justifications and interpretations for 
these rights that do not accurately reflect their original 
place in a system of spousal rights and obligations.
In my view, neither contemporary approach profiled 
here accurately or thoroughly engages with traditional 
jurisprudence. To do so would be to acknowledge 
that traditional Islamic legal understandings of 
marriage and divorce are unacceptable from a 
modern perspective. A serious analysis of traditional 
jurisprudential logic leads me to the conclusion that 
a new jurisprudence is required. It cannot be achieved 
piecemeal, or through strategies of patching together 
acceptable rules from different schools. Nor can it be 
sidestepped by an exclusive focus on scripture. There 
is no getting around law; we must understand it, then 
work to replace it. This essay is a preliminary step in 
the direction of comprehension.
A significant amount has been written in the last 
decades on Muslim men’s and women’s marital rights 
and duties, from a variety of perspectives. Despite the 
diversity of views, there is a trait common to most of 
this literature: little attempt is made to distinguish 
between types of norms and sources of authority. 
When authors make claims about what rights “Islamic 
law” (or sometimes simply “Islam”) grants to spouses, 
they might mean Qur’an, or prophetic tradition, or the 
classical jurisprudence of one or more legal schools, 
or even the modern, codified laws of a particular 
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Muslim country.5 If it is traditional jurisprudence that 
is meant, seldom is it specified whether the text is 
from the fourth/tenth century or from the fourteenth/
twentieth century, or whether the view presented is 
the majority view or a minority one, perhaps held by 
only few jurists. Claims that “some jurists” or “many 
jurists” held a particular view are especially difficult 
to investigate. This collapsing of different discourses 
into the category “Islamic law” allows one to claim a 
broad authority for one’s own view without needing 
to specify the source for that authority. By remaining 
so vague, it also prevents others from critiquing 
the claims and being able to weigh independently 
how authoritative they wish to consider a particular 
doctrine to be. And shifting from one set of sources to 
another – taking a majority view from classical Sunni 
jurisprudence when it suits, turning to the Qur’an 
when it doesn’t, and drawing from modern statutory 
reforms when necessary – leaves one open to charges 
of inconsistency.
This essay will use Sunni6 legal texts from the third 
century hijri / ninth century CE to illuminate how 
marriage was understood contractually in traditional 
Islamic jurisprudence.7 My choice of this period 
requires a note of explanation. While the following 
centuries produced important texts – the classical 
works from the fourth/tenth to the sixth/twelfth 
century are particularly significant8 – the literature 
from the formative period of the third/ninth century 
is a manageable body of work, making it possible 
to adequately survey the primary texts themselves. 
Given the importance of the issues under 
consideration, I think it is important to have a 
solid, thorough comparative approach, rather than 
using selected passages from a variety of texts from 
different centuries and different schools, or relying 
on modern summaries of earlier doctrine which may 
misrepresent crucial positions. That said, I think my 
general characterization of the marriage contract and 
its associated rights and duties applies to later Sunni 
texts as well, though in a few minor respects later 
classical doctrines may differ in their particulars from 
those described here.
I want to be absolutely clear to avoid any 
misunderstandings: I am not making any argument 
as to what Islamic marriage ideally should be or what 
the Qur’an or Sunnah says about spouses’ rights. 
Nor should my portrait of legal doctrine be taken 
as a description of Muslim women’s lives, either 
historical or contemporary.9 When I state that Islamic 
jurisprudence grants husbands a type of ownership 
over their wives, I do not mean that ‘Islam’ sanctions 
this, that God intends it, that the Qur’an requires 
it, or that the Prophet approved it. Rather, I intend 
to characterize the system of gendered rights and 
obligations developed by the jurists whose works I am 
discussing.
One basic fact is very important to keep in mind 
throughout: there is not now, nor has there ever 
been, a single, unitary Islamic law. Though Muslims 
agree that the Shari‘ah – God’s law for humanity – 
is complete, infallible, and universal, it cannot be 
known directly but only through the work of human 
interpreters. Historically, these interpreters have been 
the jurists. Their attempts to understand, develop, and 
implement Shari‘ah are human, imperfect, and shaped 
by the constraints of their specific historical contexts. 
This boundary between revealed law (Shari‘ah) and 
jurisprudence (called fiqh in Arabic, which means 
“understanding” or “comprehension”) has been 
obscured in the modern period as nations have 
adopted the term Shari‘ah to describe their legal codes. 
Even before the modern period, the human element 
in the creation of legal rules was often overlooked, 
particularly by non-specialists. Even among the jurists, 
conformity with school doctrine (taqlid) became 
important, and the particular rules themselves took 
on an air of inevitability. However, jurists themselves 
always recognized that it was their efforts that were 
central; the term ijtihad, used to refer to independent 
legal reasoning, refers to striving for results not the 
attainment of correct answers. The jurists knew of 
significant differences between the schools; there is a 
vital literature of dispute and polemic. While one finds, 
at times, disparaging remarks about legal doctrines 
held by other groups of jurists, one also frequently finds 
a disclaimer, most often after the expression of a ruling 
on which there is significant disagreement. The jurists 
state simply, “And God knows best.” There can be no 
clearer recognition of the inability of human reason to 
fully comprehend and implement God’s revealed law.10
Formation of Islamic Laws: Sources, Methods, and 
Juristic Disagreement
The Qur’an was revealed beginning in the year 610 
CE; its revelation continued until Muhammad’s death 
in 632. In addition to general pronouncements on the 
nature of the relationship that should exist between 
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spouses – love and tranquillity, good conduct – the 
Qur’an addressed a number of specific issues relating 
to marriage and divorce. These included dower, a 
payment from the husband to the wife at the time of 
marriage; polygamy; the waiting period to be observed 
following the end of a marriage to determine if the wife 
was pregnant; and various types of divorce including 
unilateral repudiation and divorce for compensation. 
Muhammad also adjudicated in numerous disputes 
himself, establishing precedents separate from, and 
sometimes in tension with, the words of the Qur’an.11 
In the decades following his death, the Prophet’s 
Companions gave ad hoc decisions in cases brought 
to their attention. Some cases were decided in 
accordance with what a Companion recalled to have 
been Muhammad’s practice in similar situations; 
others were based on what they expected he would 
have done in such a circumstance; others simply on a 
sense of community norms. Sometimes, Companions 
drew on the Qur’an as support for their decisions, 
though they differed on the proper understanding of 
numerous passages.
In later generations, into the eighth century, a process 
of recording these decisions and various other types of 
historical accounts from and about Muhammad and his 
Companions was underway. It eventually resulted in 
the compilation of books of traditions (athar, ahadith), 
the most famous of which was the Sahih Bukhari, 
completed in the ninth century. At the same time these 
traditions were being collected, a more systematic 
effort to explore legal issues was undertaken by jurists. 
Schools of law (madhahib, sing. madhhab) formed, with 
a base of shared doctrine and methodology, though 
jurists within each school sometimes diverged from 
the majority opinion on a given topic.12 Today, these 
schools survive as four Sunni schools (the Maliki, 
Hanafi, Shafi‘i, and Hanbali) as well as one primary and 
several smaller Shi‘i schools.
The legal schools of the formative period differed 
substantially on a number of issues related to marriage 
and divorce: how far a father’s right to marry off 
his virgin daughter without her consent extended; 
whether an adult woman had the right to contract her 
own marriage; whether three repudiations pronounced 
at once took effect together or only counted as one 
divorce; whether a minimum dower should be set; 
whether a woman had the right to contractually 
stipulate monogamy or that her husband could not 
take her away from her hometown; and whether a 
woman could stipulate the right to divorce her husband 
under certain circumstances. One should not assume 
that some schools held a “liberal” position and others 
a more “restrictive” one with regard to women’s rights. 
The Hanafi school, which held that adult women were 
free to contract their own marriages without needing 
a male representative (wali) to act on their behalf, also 
held that a woman could not obtain a divorce from 
an unwilling husband on any grounds except total 
impotence or possibly leprosy, and even then only so 
long as the marriage had not been consummated.13 The 
Maliki school provided the most extensive grounds 
for a woman to seek divorce, including failure to 
support and the broad category of “harm” (darar, also 
“cruelty”).
Nonetheless, its jurists permitted a father to marry off 
his never-married daughter against her wishes even 
if she were forty and independently wealthy. Only 
the Hanbalis held that there were consequences if a 
husband violated his contractual stipulation not to 
move his wife from her hometown or to take another 
wife; other schools considered these conditions 
meaningless and unenforceable.
Thus, it is clear that there were significant – and for 
actual women, quite real – implications to being under 
the jurisdiction of one legal school or another; the 
differences between the schools were not, as some have 
asserted, merely in matters of detail.14 Nonetheless, 
there was indeed a shared understanding of the 
contractual relationship of marriage that prevailed 
at that time. This common view was based, in large 
part, on cultural assumptions shared by the jurists 
as a result of their social location in a particular and, 
according to Leila Ahmed, particularly patriarchal 
environment. She has shown that the ‘formation of the 
core discourses of Islam’ including jurisprudence took 
place in an era of hierarchy, social stratification, and the 
widespread practice of slavery. One characteristic of this 
environment was the “easy access” of elite men to slave 
women. She argues that “for elite men in particular, the 
distinction between concubine, woman for sexual use, 
and object must inevitably have blurred.”15
Indeed, the jurists were influenced in their elaboration 
of a system of marital rights and obligations by the 
norms governing slavery. Slavery and particularly 
slave-concubinage were normal and accepted facets 
of social life, and it was assumed by jurists of the 
ninth century that one could usefully draw analogies 
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between marriage and slavery, husbands and masters, 
wives and slaves. At its most basic, the jurists shared 
a view of marriage that considered it to transfer to 
the husband, in exchange for the payment of dower, 
a type of ownership (milk) over his wife, and more 
particularly over her sexual organ (farj, bud‘). As 
evidence presented below will show, it was this 
ownership, while distinct from the outright ownership 
of another’s physical body in slavery, that legitimized 
sexual intercourse between husband and wife. It also 
gave the husband the unilateral right to terminate the 
marital relationship at any time, by repudiating his 
wife for any, or no, reason. As the jurists frequently 
noted, this was analogous to the master’s freedom to 
manumit a slave at any time.
Although marriage contained an element of ownership, 
this ownership was established by a contract that also 
gave rise to other rights and obligations between the 
spouses. These rights were interdependent – a wife’s 
rights were obligations upon her husband and vice 
versa – and strictly differentiated by gender. A wife’s 
most important marital duty was sexual availability, 
in exchange for which she was to be supported by her 
husband.16 The primacy of, and linkage between, these 
particular rights is clearly illustrated in a passage from 
the Umm, the main Shafi‘i work of the period: “Al-
Shafi‘i said: It is among her rights due from him that 
he support her, and among his rights to derive pleasure 
from her [istimta‘a minha].”17
The wife’s obligation to be available to her husband 
was set apart from other types of domestic duties. 
Maliki, Hanafi, and Shafi‘i jurists emphatically denied 
any wifely duty to perform housework. (Ibn Hanbal’s 
responsa do not discuss this topic.) She need not even 
cook for herself, let alone her husband. The words of 
the third-century Hanafi jurist Ahmad b. ‘Umar al-
Khassaf demonstrate this. He was asked, “What if 
she doesn’t have a servant and her husband supports 
her, must she bake bread and labor to prepare [food] 
for herself?” He replied, “If she says, I won’t do it, she 
is not compelled to. Rather, his claim on her is her 
making herself available for her husband [tamkin al-
nafs min al-zawj], not for these tasks.”18 Al-Khassaf 
goes on to contrast the wife’s situation to that of a 
servant, who, if she refuses to perform these services, 
is not due support and may be turned out of the house. 
Al-Khassaf was not alone in this view; rather, he was 
representative. Service is excluded from a wife’s duties 
in the Mudawwana in an unequivocal way: “I said: 
Must a woman serve herself or perform household 
service or not according to Malik? He said: She need 
not serve herself or perform any household service.”19 
Al-Shafi‘i suggested that whether or not a husband had 
to support a servant for his wife depended on whether 
or not “someone like her” was accustomed to serving 
herself; however, he was also adamant that even a 
woman who did not have a personal servant should 
be provided with prepared food and someone to bring 
her water so that she need not go out to collect it.20 In 
all of these cases, the wife’s performance of household 
duties is not expected, and is certainly not a condition 
of her support. Her maintenance is due, instead, as 
a result of her availability to her husband for sexual 
enjoyment.
The husband’s right to derive pleasure from his wife, 
in exchange for his support of her, led the jurists to 
grant him total control over her mobility. A man could 
restrict his wife’s movements in order to keep her 
available to himself, including forbidding her to go to 
the mosque or to visit her parents. The Mukhtasar of 
Shafi‘i jurist al-Muzani notes that a woman’s husband 
even had the legal right to forbid her to attend the 
funerals of her parents or her children, though the 
jurist preferred that he not do so; jurists from other 
schools held similar views.21 A woman who left the 
house without permission would be guilty of nushuz22 
– a term variously translated as “recalcitrance,” 
“disobedience,” or “rebellion.” The Hanafis and Shafi‘is 
agreed that she would lose her right to support so long 
as she remained unavailable to her husband, while 
the Malikis and Hanbalis do not directly discuss the 
suspension of a wife’s maintenance for nushuz.23
For the Shafi‘is, a wife’s sexual refusal while remaining 
at home also constituted nushuz and was grounds for 
suspension of maintenance. For the Hanafis, a wife’s 
sexual refusal was not grounds for loss of maintenance. 
However, this was because she was still considered 
“available” to her husband; he was entitled to force her 
to have intercourse.
If she is in his house but she withholds herself 
from him is maintenance due to her from him? 
It is due…Is it lawful for the husband to have sex 
with her against her will…? It is lawful, because 
she is a wrongdoer [zalima].24
These passages, in addition to illustrating the link 
between maintenance and a wife’s sexual duties to 
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her husband, make clear the extent of a man’s sexual 
rights over his wife according to the early jurists.
These passages, in addition to illustrating the link 
between maintenance and a wife’s sexual duties to 
her husband, make clear the extent of a man’s sexual 
rights over his wife according to the early jurists.
Though the wife had a duty of sexual availability, she 
did not have a right to sex. Though today it is almost a 
cliche´ that Islam recognizes women’s sexuality,25 the 
legal reality in the early texts is that women’s rights 
to sex in marriage were virtually nonexistent. In all 
four Sunni schools, a woman could have her marriage 
dissolved for impotence if the husband proved unable 
to consummate the marriage; she had to complain 
to a judge then wait for a year. In one other case, if 
the husband took a vow to abstain completely from 
sex with her for a period of more than four months 
(ila’), she could seek to have the marriage judicially 
dissolved on that basis if her husband continued to 
abstain after four months had passed according to 
jurists from the Maliki, Shafi‘i, and Hanbali schools. 
(The Hanafis considered a vow of forswearing to result 
in automatic divorce if not broken or expiated during 
the four months.)
However, after consummation, simple abstinence 
without a vow was not grounds for divorce in any of the 
four schools. Ibn Hanbal, when asked about a man who 
had intercourse with his wife one time, declared, “He is 
not impotent, and the couple are not separated. I hold 
this opinion even if he does not have intercourse with 
her again, and she has no right to request him to.”26 
The Maliki texts record the same position, as in this 
passage from the Muwatta’:
Yahya related to me from Malik from Ibn Shihab 
from Sa‘id ibn al-Musayyab that he used to say, 
“Whoever marries a woman and is not able to 
touch (i.e., have intercourse with) her, a deadline 
of one year is set for him. If he touches her, 
[fine], and if not, they are separated.”. . . Malik 
said, “However, someone who has touched his 
wife then avoids her (i‘tarada ‘anha) I have not 
heard that there is a deadline set for him or that 
they are separated.”27
In the Mudawwana, Ibn Shihab states simply that “I 
have not heard [that] anyone [would] separate a man 
and his wife after he touched her, and that is practice 
among us.”28 The Maliki jurists do make one exception: 
if the husband’s total abstinence constitutes deliberate 
or negligent harming of the wife (darar) it may be 
grounds for judicial divorce. (However, if the husband 
becomes impotent or suffers an injury that renders him 
incapable of intercourse, the wife has no such right.) 
This position reflects juristic ambivalence about a 
wife’s right to sex. On the one hand, it is acknowledged 
that depriving a wife of sex can be harmful to her; on 
the other hand, while “harm” is grounds for divorce (for 
the Malikis), lack of sex per se is not. This unwillingness 
to grant wives regular rights to sex is part and parcel of 
the strict separation between male and female rights 
that early jurists maintained.
The jurists did, however, grant the wife a right to 
a portion of her husband’s time, subject to certain 
limitations. A man’s duty to divide his time among his 
wives did not prevent him from traveling or spending 
a portion of his time with his concubines instead of 
his wives. A woman had no absolute claim on his time, 
but rather only claim to equal treatment with her co-
wives. A man with more than one wife had a duty to 
allot his nights between them equally, and very strict 
rules governed how he was to make up missed turns.29 
Some jurists recommended that he have sex with them 
all regularly, but despite this, there was no penalty for 
a husband who did not. Al-Shafi‘i voiced the consensus 
view when he stated that the husband’s “division (of 
time) is based on staying, not having sex.” He added 
– apparently unaware of the irony – that “intercourse 
is a matter of pleasure, and no one is compelled to it.” 
Of course, he meant that no man is compelled to it; 
women’s continual sexual availability was a condition 
of their support, and “refusal,” again in al-Shafi‘i’s 
words, was nushuz.30
I have shown that if the wife failed in her duty to be 
sexually available, the jurists agreed that she would 
lose her right to support. However, in the case where 
the failure to perform an obligation was the husband’s 
– if he could not support her – the jurists were divided 
on the consequences. If she could borrow in his name, 
or liquidate his assets to provide herself with support, 
she was permitted to do so.31 However, even if he 
were unable to support her and had no property upon 
which she could draw, Hanafi jurists refused to grant 
her dissolution no matter how long the non-support 
persisted.32 In sharp contrast, Shafi‘i jurists allowed a 
wife to seek judicial divorce after as little as three days 
of non-support.33 Furthermore, during the three days 
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he was not supporting her, she was allowed to leave 
the house without her husband’s permission in order 
to obtain what she needed through work. This vast 
difference in these two schools’ treatment of the non-
supporting husband (the other Sunni schools fall in 
the middle of the spectrum between these opposites34) 
illustrates clearly that early Islamic jurisprudence was 
not monolithic. On topics such as this, some positions 
were quite favorable to women, and others were 
anything but. Nonetheless, these specific rules were 
all embedded within a system of rights and obligations 
based on the premise of male support for female sexual 
availability.
Contemporary Discourses: Neo-conservatives
The neo-conservatives are the most prominent faction 
in debates over the proper legal and social rights of 
Muslim women today.35 Their views are represented in 
publications subsidized by the Saudi government and 
organizations like the Jamaat-i Islami, and distributed 
as pamphlets and booklets in mosques and conferences 
of Muslims everywhere; they are likely to be the most 
influential group in mosques in the West. Though 
they often support adherence to Islamic law, they do 
not have the political zeal of the fundamentalists, 
nor are they seeking a return to a pristine, original 
law. Rather, they support the continued enforcement 
of law as developed by jurists through the classical 
period and, in its transformed form, by legislatures 
in Muslim nations. I have lumped together in this 
group both those with traditional religious education 
(the ‘ulama) and those non-specialists – far more 
numerous – whose support for Islamic law is a matter 
of principle, but whose understanding of the law is 
derived from contemporary notions. Even though 
there are some differences between these groups that 
might warrant separate consideration, I treat them 
together in part because in both cases the discourses 
with which Islamic law is explained and justified take 
on a decidedly non-traditional tone. Neo-conservative 
authors may believe in adherence to classical legal 
doctrines (though, as will be seen below, this is not 
always the case), but they justify them with language 
that is, more than anything else, Victorian.
This phenomenon can be seen clearly in a treatise on 
nushuz by Saalih ibn Ghanim al-Sadlaan, a professor 
from the College of Shari‘ah at Muhammad ibn Saud 
Islamic University in Riyadh. While the author is clearly 
trained in the doctrines and methods of jurisprudence, 
and his study draws on these sources, he adopts a tone 
of biological determinism that is alien to classical 
fiqh discourses:
The woman is naturally conditioned and created 
by Allah to perform the functions of pregnancy, 
giving birth, and taking care of the internal 
affairs of the house. Man, on the other hand 
has been endowed with more physical strength 
and clearer thought and he is, therefore, more 
befitting to be the leader of the household and 
the one responsible for providing the means of 
livelihood, protecting the family and bringing 
about security and continuance in the family.36
While the notions of male superiority and headship 
of the family, and even of men’s greater intellectual 
and physical capacities, are consonant with earlier 
jurisprudential treatments of spousal rights, the 
link the author draws between women’s capacity 
for childbearing and their duty to “tak[e] care of 
the internal affairs of the house” is not merely a 
restatement of traditional jurisprudential views. 
Rather, this formulation assimilates early fiqh rules 
about male support to a male breadwinner / female 
housewife model that is more in keeping with ideas 
about 1950s America. As the previous section has 
shown, this model is inaccurate to describe the early 
jurists’ rationale for male support of their wives. In 
the case of this particular work, despite the adoption 
of non-traditional rhetoric, the legal doctrines 
presented regarding its main topic, nushuz, are 
generally in keeping with the provisions of traditional 
jurisprudence. However, with regard to a woman’s 
responsibility for “taking care of the internal affairs of 
the house,” Al-Sadlaan departs from the established 
views of early jurists. His brief mention of this point 
illustrates a much larger phenomenon: in many cases, 
what is advocated by the neo-conservatives as the 
“traditional” Islamic view is not in fact historically the 
position adopted by the early and classical jurists.
The neo-conservative treatment of housework as 
well as women’s work outside the home illustrates 
clearly the differences between early fiqh doctrines 
and contemporary apologia for them. Two examples 
suffice as evidence. The first is from Marriage in Islam: 
A Manual by Muhammad Abdul-Rauf.37 First published 
thirty years ago, and now in its seventh printing, its 
chapter “A Happy Conjugal Household” gives listings of 
husbands’ and wives’ duties, which include the following: 
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A husband is responsible for the protection, 
happiness and maintenance of his wife. He is 
responsible for the cost of her food, clothes 
and accommodation. Although she may have 
to cook, he has to buy her the raw materials 
and cooking and kitchen facilities, as may be 
required and applicable.38
The management of the household is the wife’s 
primary responsibility. She has to take care of 
meal preparation, house-cleaning and laundry. 
Whether she undertakes these tasks herself or 
has them done under her careful supervision, it 
is her task to manage them in the best interests 
of the family. She may expect some cooperation 
from her husband, but this should depend on 
what he can afford to do. What is important 
is the mutual goodwill and love which will no 
doubt stimulate each party to alleviate the 
burden of the other as much as possible.39
Not only do these passages assign to women the 
task – meal preparation – that earlier jurists most 
emphatically exempted her from performing, it sets 
up an explicit relationship between the husband’s 
support of his wife and her responsibility to do cooking 
and other household chores. However, the author 
hesitates a bit: he must pay for food; she may have to 
cook it. Rather than declaring outright that the wife 
has to perform the listed services (a term he studiously 
avoids), Abdul-Rauf states that she must “take care” of 
these “responsibilit[ies]” and “manage” these “tasks.”40
My second example is drawn from the much-read 
Woman in Shari‘ah by ‘Abdul Rahman Doi, a text 
frequently used by English-speaking Muslims as an 
authoritative resource on Islamic law.41 Doi, making 
extensive use of biological and “natural” arguments 
for women’s place in the home and society, avoids any 
hedging around women’s domestic duties. He states, 
“When a wife is not employed the household becomes 
her first occupation. By household is meant the 
rearing of children and all domestic services required 
for maintaining a clean and comfortable habitation.” 
Doi goes further, however, touching on the subject of 
women’s work. He reserves for the husband the right to 
prevent his wife from working – acknowledging, though 
not explicitly, the authority legally granted to the 
husband to prevent his wife from leaving the marital 
home for any reason. Yet he departs from traditional 
jurisprudence when he states that if a man allows his 
wife to work, “Any gain from work realized by the wife 
belongs to the family and cannot be considered as her 
personal property.”42 In traditional doctrine, there is no 
marital property regime; the jurists never countenance 
a married woman’s obligation to support herself, let 
alone her husband or children.
These few examples demonstrate that neo-conservative 
interpretations diverge from the traditional model 
in several ways, generally to women’s detriment. 
The majority of North American Muslims rely on 
pamphlets and quasi-scholarly books such as these, 
which claim to present authoritative and authentic 
information, for their knowledge of Islamic law.43 It is 
against this backdrop of pseudo-traditional doctrine 
that the feminist and reformist discourses to which I 
now turn must be understood.
Contemporary Discourses: Femnist Apologetics
A number of authors concerned with promoting Muslim 
women’s rights in matters of marriage and divorce 
have discussed women’s legal rights “in Islam.” These 
authors oscillate between, on the one hand, upholding 
specific rules as an example of how Islamic law protects 
women and, on the other hand, critiquing traditional 
jurisprudence when patriarchal assumptions lead the 
jurists to unreasonable decisions.44 In the latter case, 
these reformers turn to the Qur’an to challenge, often 
quite persuasively, juristic interpretations. However, 
I am concerned here with their attempts to defend 
the basic precepts of traditional jurisprudence on 
marriage.
In seeking to counter both stereotyped portrayals of 
women’s legal rights and the negative consequences of 
neo-conservative interpretations, these authors point 
to provisions of classical law that guarantee women 
certain protections. These doctrines serve as evidence 
that Islamic law is not unremittingly patriarchal. They 
also provide practical guidelines for Muslim women 
seeking to ensure more egalitarian marriages for 
themselves. Both goals are laudable, and the strategy 
of promoting detailed marriage contracts is, in the 
short term, potentially quite effective at securing 
for women rights that are ignored today. However, 
there are two serious flaws in this approach. First, 
the strategy of including contractual stipulations 
is not, jurisprudentially, nearly as straight-forward 
as it is often made out to be. Second, and far more 
importantly, adding conditions onto a contract does 
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not change its basic essence. I will address the validity 
of stipulations first.
Among the clauses al-Hibri suggests women can 
include in their marriage contracts are some rights 
that accrue to women anyway according to traditional 
jurisprudence (such as to be supported by her husband 
or to not have to cook or clean) and some that are only 
hers if agreed upon in the contract (such as to work 
outside the home).45 In this latter category are the oft-
mentioned stipulations that a husband will not take 
any other wives or will not relocate his wife from her 
hometown. Al-Hibri writes that
In fostering change, the Qur’an resorts to 
what has been known as recently in the West 
as affirmative action. In a patriarchal society, 
even a general declaration of equal rights is 
not sufficient to protect women. Consequently, 
divine wisdom gave women further protections. 
Paramount among these protections is the 
ability of the Muslim woman to negotiate her 
marriage contract and place in it any conditions 
that do not contradict its purpose. For example, 
she could place in her marriage contract a 
condition forbidding her husband from moving 
her away from her own city or town.46
The Qur’an, it should be pointed out, does not refer 
to stipulations in the marriage contract. So Al-Hibri 
is using the phrase “divine wisdom” to describe the 
jurisprudential doctrine of stipulations. However, 
according to Maliki, Hanafi, and Shafi‘i jurists of the 
formative period, the stipulation that the husband will 
not move his wife from her hometown is completely 
void; the Hanbali jurists alone allow it.47 Even in the 
Hanbali case, the wife is given a choice as to whether 
or not to divorce her husband in this circumstance; 
she is not allowed to bind him to remain with her 
in her town. My discussion here will focus on the 
related issue of stipulations against polygamy, 
illustrating that the current discourses about these 
stipulations misrepresent the provisions of traditional 
jurisprudence on the subject. I will further argue that 
even if this provision can be satisfactorily formulated 
so as to be legally binding, it still fails to address the 
underlying inequities in spousal rights.
When a contemporary author mentions putting a 
condition in the contract that the husband will not 
take another wife, or that she has a choice to divorce 
him if he does so, she or he is lumping together two 
entirely different mechanisms for ensuring the wife’s 
“right.” The first is a simple contractual stipulation; 
the second is conditional delegated divorce. According 
to Maliki, Hanafi, and Shafi‘i texts from the formative 
period, contractual stipulations that a husband will 
not take additional wives (or any concubines) are 
meaningless.48 For the Hanbalis, if the husband breaks 
the condition by taking an additional wife, the first 
wife has the option to divorce him.49 However, in none 
of these cases is the validity of the second marriage 
affected.
The second mechanism is more potent. In this type 
of stipulation, the husband delegates his power of 
repudiation to the wife if he performs a certain action. 
Thus, a husband can state in the contract that “If such-
and-such occurs, your affair is in your hands.” If the 
wife learns that the condition has come to pass, she 
has the option to divorce him.50 There is difference of 
opinion on whether such a choice is only good during 
the particular encounter where she learns of it or 
whether she retains the right even after that meeting so 
long as she has not had intercourse with her husband. 
For the Hanbalis, however, a woman can lose her right 
to divorce by having intercourse with her husband even 
if she did not know that the event giving her the right to 
divorce had taken place: “If her husband has intercourse 
with her, the wife in question no longer has the option 
of separating from him, regardless of whether she was 
aware of her option before the act of intercourse.”51 In 
this case, under Hanbali law, a woman who had not put 
a stipulation in her marriage contract that her husband 
would not take an additional wife, but rather relied 
on delegated divorce at a later date, would lose her 
freedom of choice if her husband simply concealed the 
second marriage long enough to have intercourse with 
the first wife. (Remember that she is legally obligated 
to have intercourse with him whenever he desires.)
There is one additional way that a wife can attempt to 
regulate her husband’s taking of another wife: through 
having him pronounce a suspended repudiation. For 
all of the schools, if the husband makes an oath of 
repudiation conditional on his taking a second wife (“If 
I marry again, you are repudiated”) the repudiation is 
effective. As a practical matter, when a woman has no 
other option for assuring her right to be separated from 
a polygamous husband, this conditional repudiation 
can be a useful strategy. But what makes the strategy 
possible is the unfettered nature of a man’s right to 
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repudiation. His repudiation automatically takes effect 
when he marries again simply because of his absolute 
right to repudiate his wife. The same would be true 
if he said, “If you ever speak to so-and-so, you are 
repudiated” (or “If I ever speak to so-and-so . . .”) or 
even “If it rains on Tuesday, you are repudiated.” To 
hold up a woman’s right to divorce on her husband’s 
taking another wife as an example of how Islamic 
law protects women’s rights ignores the specific legal 
rationale for validating such a divorce. It occurs in a 
context in which the woman has no way to protect 
herself from an unwanted repudiation, which is valid 
without her consent, participation, or even knowledge.
I have demonstrated that insuring against polygamy 
through a condition in the marriage contract is not 
the simple affair it is made out to be by contemporary 
authors. Yet even if one could find a way to construct 
stipulations against polygamy in a binding manner, 
it would not address this basic imbalance in men’s 
and women’s marital rights, or the definition of 
the marriage contract as being unilaterally in the 
husband’s domain (fi yadihi). There is no condition that 
can restrict the husband’s right to repudiate his wife 
at any time, for any reason or no reason at all. Raga’ 
El Nimr acknowledges this, in an apologetic piece that 
differs only subtly from the views put forth by Abdul-
Rauf, but does not explore its implications.52 For El 
Nimr and others who stress women’s protections in 
Islamic law, however, the dower serves that function 
by acting as practical deterrent or an economic safety 
net. I now turn to a consideration of how dower (mahr 
or sadaq) is understood in these discourses. Some 
stress its economic importance, while others suggest 
that a large deferred dower provides a disincentive 
to capricious repudiations, since the balance will 
become due at divorce. El Nimr considers that dower 
is intended “to safeguard the economic position of 
women after marriage.” Drawing from Qur’anic verses 
on dower, El Nimr argues that dower is a critical means 
through which women can secure their well-being. She 
writes that “The object is to strengthen the financial 
position of the wife, so that she is not prevented, for 
lack of money, from defending her rights.”53
Al-Hibri likewise stresses the dower’s importance for 
women, providing a slightly different description of its 
purpose:
Mahr, therefore, is not a “bride price” as some 
have erroneously described it. It is not the 
money the woman pays to obtain a husband 
nor money that the husband pays to obtain a 
wife. It is part of a civil contract that specifies 
the conditions under which a woman is willing 
to abandon her status as a single woman and 
its related opportunities in order to marry a 
prospective husband and start a family.54 
In comparison, the Maliki jurists of the formative 
period express a quite different role for the dower, 
stating that a free woman “is due her dower, and her 
vulva [bud‘uha] is not made lawful by anything else.”55 
Nor do the jurists shy away from considering the dower 
a price. Indeed, Al-Shafi‘i explicitly uses the term 
“price” (thaman) on numerous occasions for the dower, 
stating that “dower is a price among prices.”56 Various 
discussions in the Umm illustrate that dower is “a price 
for the vulva” (thaman al-bud‘),57 and that “a woman’s 
fair dower is the fair value of her vulva” (qima mithl al-
bud‘a mahr mithlaha).58 The commercial aspects of the 
marriage contract are unremarkable for the jurists. For 
example, in discussing a situation where a slave was 
specified as the wife’s dower, Al-Shafi‘i states that “she 
sold him her vulva for the slave” (ba‘athu bud‘aha bi 
‘abd).59
I do not give these examples to prove that marriage 
was a sale, for the jurists also made analogies that 
differentiated marriage from sales in particular 
respects. I simply want to demonstrate that jurists 
of the formative period did not have any hesitation 
whatsoever in using the terminology of sales and 
purchases to discuss marriage. The discomfort with 
these comparisons is our own, and was not shared by 
the pre-modern jurists. The explanations of dower 
given by Al-Hibri and El Nimr gloss over the logic 
and language of traditional jurisprudence, accepting 
its substantive rules but providing them with more 
palatable interpretations.
As with dower, Al-Hibri and El Nimr champion 
women’s exemption from domestic duties in 
traditional jurisprudence, but provide a new rationale 
for it. In these discourses, a woman’s lack of duty to 
cook or clean is an example of her marital rights. El 
Nimr writes that
With regard to domestic duties, Islam has relieved 
women of all manual drudgery. According to 
strict Islamic injunctions, it is not obligatory 
for a woman to cook the food for her husband 
4 5M A R R I A G E
or children, or to wash their clothes or even to 
suckle the infants. A woman can refuse to do any 
of these things without this being made a ground 
of legal complaint against her. If she undertakes 
these duties, it is an act of sheer grace.60
While with regard to dower, El Nimr turns to the 
Qur’an for her explanation, here she refers only to 
“strict Islamic injunctions” – meaning, undoubtedly, 
jurisprudence. Though she makes the point forcefully 
that women do not have household or childcare 
duties, she does not offer any explanation of what 
responsibilities they do have as wives or why it is that 
they are exempt from the obligation to perform these 
services.
Al-Hibri’s treatment of the same subject offers a 
glimpse into her interpretive strategy:
Islam also views marriage as an institution 
in which human beings find tranquillity and 
affection with each other. It is for this reason 
that some prominent traditional Muslim 
scholars have argued that a woman is not 
required to serve her husband, prepare his 
food, or clean his house. In fact, the husband 
is obligated to bring his wife prepared food, 
for example. This assertion is based on the 
recognition that the Muslim wife is a companion 
to her husband and not a maid. Many jurists also 
defined the purpose of the marriage institution 
in terms of sexual enjoyment (as distinguished 
from reproduction). They clearly stated that a 
Muslim woman has a right to sexual enjoyment 
within the marriage.61
Al-Hibri, like El Nimr, is correct in her characterization 
of the traditional jurisprudential position that a wife 
has no obligation to do household chores (though she 
perhaps underestimates how prevalent this position 
was, attributing it only to “some prominent traditional 
Muslim scholars”). Seizing on the view that women 
are not required to do housework, Al-Hibri argues that 
this indicates that Muslim women were recognized to 
be “companions” to their husbands rather than maids. 
However, for the early jurists, as discussed above, 
wives were bound to provide service, but sexual rather 
than domestic.
The wife’s sexual responsibilities are entirely sanitized 
by Al-Hibri’s next statement that “Many jurists also 
defined the purpose of the marriage institution in 
terms of sexual enjoyment.” This phrasing obscures 
the reality that sex in marriage was almost exclusively 
a female duty and a male right. While it was 
recommended that a husband satisfy his wife sexually, 
women had no enforceable rights to sex. Indeed, Al-
Hibri’s assertion here about women’s right to sexual 
enjoyment is undercut by her later statement that 
“some traditional jurists gave women the right to 
seek judicial divorce if they had no conjugal relations 
with their husbands for more than four months.”62 
Apparently, of the “[m]any jurists” who “clearly stated 
that a Muslim woman has a right to sexual enjoyment 
within the marriage” only “some” considered that 
a husband’s abstention for more than four months 
constituted grounds for separation. Indeed, even this 
overstates the case; four months, as my discussion 
of the formative period jurists indicated, is only the 
relevant period of sexual abstention where a husband 
has completely forsworn his wife; it does not apply to 
cases of abstention without a vow.
Critique and Analysis
The early and classical Muslim jurists had a clear logical 
system underpinning their conception of marriage 
and the interdependent rights of spouses within it. 
The basic purpose of marriage was legitimizing sexual 
intercourse: the jurists formulated an interdependent 
system of spousal rights that put the wife’s support and 
the husband’s right to sex at its center. This system was 
predicated, at a very basic logical level, on an analogy to 
slavery and other types of ownership. Furthermore, its 
specific rules were based on the widespread availability 
of slave-servants. Thus, the jurists’ debate was not 
over whether women were required to maintain their 
husbands’ homes, cook, and clean, but rather whether 
the husband had to support only one of his wife’s 
servants or more than that. Admittedly, this likely bore 
little resemblance to reality for the majority of Muslim 
women. But it served as a basis for the elaboration of 
many different rules that are unintelligible if removed 
from this framework and held up independently as an 
example of what “Islam” guarantees women.
Neo-conservative authors, even as they press for the 
observance of certain substantive rules that are the 
product of early fiqh, balk at using the commercial 
terminology and analogies to slavery that were part of 
the jurists’ accepted language. While often upholding 
the spousal rights that were agreed upon in that model, 
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they provide new rationales for them, as can be seen in 
their discussions of a husband’s duty to maintain his 
family. For the early jurists, “a husband must maintain 
his wife, whether she is rich or poor, for restricting 
her for himself so that he may derive pleasure from 
her [bi habsiha ‘ala nafsihi li’l-istimta‘a biha].”63 The 
jurisprudential rationale for a husband’s support of 
his wife is entirely separate from the rationale for 
any person’s support of other relatives, including 
minor children or parents. For the neo-conservatives, 
however, a man’s duty to support his family is part 
and parcel of his male nature that makes him fit for 
earning a living and supporting his “dependents.” No 
distinction is made between wives and children. The 
wife’s role is conceived of in a complementary fashion: 
her nature makes her suited for caring for the home 
and children. In the process, certain traditional female 
rights (such as a wife’s exemption from housework) 
tend to fall by the wayside, as they are incompatible 
with the new understanding of male and female roles 
in marriage. When women’s advocates seek to resurrect 
these rights, they do so by appeal to the authority of 
traditional jurisprudence. Like their neo-conservative 
antagonists, however, they frame these rights in a 
different conceptual vocabulary than that originally 
used by the jurists.
Feminist discourses that seek to promote more 
egalitarian Islamic laws are, undoubtedly, strategically 
useful. In particular, highlighting women’s legal 
exemption from housework or childcare is a useful 
corrective to neo-conservative discourses that presume 
wives have an obligation to perform these services 
because of a natural aptitude for them. Likewise, the 
attempt to promote the inclusion of conditions in 
marriage contracts governing the husband’s taking of 
additional wives or the wife’s right to work and keep 
her earnings can be an important means of setting 
forth the spouse’s expectations for the marriage. 
This appeal to traditional legal views, however, is not 
without its perils. Though potentially quite effective in 
securing for women rights that are not respected today, 
it runs the risk of further cementing the authority of 
the traditional opinions. With regard to women’s work 
outside the home, while traditional jurisprudence 
rejects a man’s right to take any of his wife’s earnings, 
it upholds, as I have noted, his right to prevent her from 
working entirely – indeed, to forbid her from leaving 
the home at all. Some would suggest that a condition 
in the marriage contract would resolve that; it is an 
iffy proposition with regard to traditional law.64 Even 
where conditions can be made enforceable, and where 
rights can be upheld, the feminist rhetoric of women’s 
marital rights in Islamic law distorts traditional legal 
rationales – if not its substantive doctrines – at least as 
seriously as does the neo-conservative discourse.
Al-Hibri, El Nimr, and others fail to grapple with the 
way that the specific rights they point to as evidence 
of women’s legal protections are part of a larger 
logical understanding of what is being contracted 
for in marriage. If women reserve the right not to do 
any household service or childcare, and to be entirely 
supported by their husbands, while at the same time 
being free to pursue whatever work they choose, and 
maintaining sole control over their earnings from 
that work, what rights does the husband have? What 
responsibilities does the woman have in this situation? 
What is the basic aim of marriage, in either case? If the 
husband no longer supports his wife and no longer 
controls her mobility, then what is the point, legally 
speaking? Such a marriage no longer serves the purpose 
for which it was regulated according to traditional 
jurisprudence: ensuring a woman’s sexual availability 
in exchange for male support. If it is a different type 
of marriage, then it needs a different type of law. Half-
measures to make the best of an existing situation are 
insufficient. It is necessary to question the traditional 
model that obliges a husband to support his wife and 
grants him the right to control her movements in 
return and expect sex at his whim. This will require a 
radical rethinking of Islamic marriage, beginning with 
a fresh approach to the Qur’an, above all.
A number of scholars, including Al-Hibri, have 
undertaken this effort to flesh out a new exegesis of 
sacred texts as a means of arriving at an alternative 
view of relations between the sexes in society, including 
in marriage. Their work is important, and challenges 
the androcentric nature of traditional interpreta-
tions. Al-Hibri turns to the Qur’an in those cases 
where traditional law does not offer a resolution to the 
problems she sees. Others such as Riffat Hassan, Amina 
Wadud, and Asma Barlas have focused on the Qur’an to 
the exclusion of jurisprudence. Their ground-breaking 
studies have inspired a willingness on the part of other 
progressive Muslims to address legal issues through 
new approaches to the Qur’an.65 In and of itself, there 
is nothing wrong with such an approach; indeed, the 
Qur’an must be at the center of Muslim piety and 
thought. However, in focusing so single-mindedly on 
the interpretation of the Qur’an, discarding centuries 
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of jurisprudential texts as irredeemable, progressive 
Muslims run the risk of leaving the field of jurisprudence 
entirely to those trained in its methods and committed 
to its traditional assumptions. Scriptural exegesis, no 
matter how sophisticated, is not a legal methodology; 
the Qur’an is not a law book. Though the Qur’an does 
contain specific commands and prohibitions as well as 
moral and ethical guidance, it does not provide explicit 
regulations covering all possible circumstances. 
Some means of applying its provisions to the nearly 
infinite cases that arise among Muslims will always be 
necessary. The battle for egalitarian Muslim marriages 
will be fought on numerous fronts, and jurisprudence 
will undoubtedly be one of them.
Progressive Muslims cannot afford to ignore 
jurisprudence. There is a need for a thorough appraisal 
and analysis of the rules and methods of traditional 
jurisprudence. Such analysis will demonstrate, as 
I have done in part in this essay, that its doctrines 
are entirely inadequate to serve as the basis for 
laws governing Muslim families, communities, and 
societies today. However, it should also illustrate the 
phenomenal intellectual effort that went into creating 
the logical systems that produced law to govern 
millions of Muslim lives through the centuries. I would 
even venture to say that the legal method used by the 
jurists is basically sound, including the use of analogy. 
The issue is the assumptions from which they began, 
including the notion that marriage can be usefully 
compared to slavery or to commercial transactions. 
This does not mean, however, that doctrines should 
be simply modified, piecemeal, until we come up with 
something we can live with. Rather, whatever elements 
of traditional jurisprudential method are used, the 
process of regulating marriage and divorce will have 
to begin anew. Qualified Muslims must begin working 
to shape new laws, beginning from new assumptions 
– including those that feminist and progressive 
Qur’anic scholars have brought to the fore. The most 
critical of these insights is that men and women are 
ontologically equal, and that ultimately our equality as 
human beings in the sight of God matters more than 
any distinctions based on social hierarchy.
Conclusion
Azizah al-Hibri posits that the Islamic marriage 
contract “is a vehicle for ensuring the continued well-
being of women entering matrimonial life in a world 
of patriarchal justice and inequality.”66 I agree that it 
can be; a large deferred dower is often successfully 
used as a disincentive to hasty repudiation, for 
example.67 Certain other stipulations may secure rights 
that would otherwise be unenforceable. However, 
this formulation fails to address the complicity of 
jurisprudential institutions and doctrines in, at the very 
least, perpetuating the patriarchy and inequality that 
make such measures vital. The husband’s unrestricted 
right to unilateral repudiation, for example, is not a 
necessary interpretation of scripture and prophetic 
tradition, yet traditional jurisprudence has affirmed 
his right to exercise it while denying women any 
parallel privilege. Since men have this unilateral 
power, contractual stipulations and practical strategies 
such as deferred dowers become crucial for women, a 
means of negotiating a patriarchal terrain. But given 
that jurisprudence itself is largely to blame for the 
state of affairs that requires women to implement 
these “affirmative action”68 strategies, praise for the 
protections it extends to those women knowledgeable 
and powerful enough to invoke them seems misplaced.
Acknowledging the deeply patriarchal and 
discriminatory elements in Islamic jurisprudence is not 
cause for despair. It does not mean accepting that God 
intends Muslim women and men to live in hierarchical, 
authoritarian marital relationships. On the contrary, as 
I have illustrated, a thorough exploration and analysis 
of traditional jurisprudence will reveal the extent to 
which its rules are seriously flawed; they cannot be 
Divine. The role of human agency in the creation of 
these laws is evidenced by the diversity of legal views 
as well as the creation of a system of male marital 
privilege and sharply differentiated spousal rights 
that does not simply emerge wholly formed from the 
Qur’an. This system is the result of an interpretation, 
indeed of numerous acts of interpretation, by particular 
men living and thinking at a specific time. Their 
jurisprudence is shaped not by any malicious misogyny, 
or so I choose to believe, but rather by the assumptions 
and constraints of the time in which it was formulated. 
Our contemporary recognition that the traditional 
scheme of marriage law is compromised beyond repair 
liberates us to pursue a new jurisprudence, one based 
on assumptions that do not liken women to slaves or 
marriage to purchase. A marriage law that foregrounds 
the mutual protectorship of men and women (Q. 9:71) 
rather than male providership (Q. 4:34), or that focuses 
on the cooperation and harmony of spouses inherent 
in the Qur’anic declaration that spouses are garments 
for one another (Q. 2:187), can represent a starting 
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point for a new jurisprudence of marriage. The result 
will be a closer –but still only human, and therefore 
fallible – approximation of divinely revealed Shari‘ah 
than what currently exists. And God knows best.
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unwilling, non-supporting husband was dealt with not by 
changing the school’s position, but by appointing a deputy judge 
from another legal school to pronounce the divorce. For an online 
bibliography of works on women, gender, and Islamic law, see 
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for fornication.
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wa ma yajibu laha min dhalika,” 33.
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23 One fifth/eleventh-century Maliki text suggests that Ibn al-
Qasim (d. 191/806–7), the main authority for Malik’s views in the 
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fi ’l-abwab,” 241–2; Mukhtasar al-Muzani, K. al-Nikah, “Ajal al-‘innin 
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Ihya’ al-Ma‘arif al- Nu‘maniyah, 1965), K. al-Nikah, “Bab al-rajul 
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improves it (i.e., the separation) is not rescinded. He does not 
possess the right to return to her during the waiting period, unless 
she wishes with a new marriage.” Al-Umm, K. al-Nafaqat, “Bab al-
rajul la yajidu ma yunfiqu ‘ala imra’atihi,” 5:132.
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Nimr in her article, discussed in the following  section. Despite its 
generally accurate portrayal of various legal doctrines across the 
Sunni schools, the book has a few significant errors and numerous 
minor ones. Mistakes include: failing to acknowledge traditional 
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in those events they do discuss. See Spectorsky, Chapters, 206–7, 
219–20.
51 Spectorsky, Chapters, 206. Ibn Hanbal makes this statement when 
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stipulate in the marital agreement that she, too, will have the right 
to divorce or keep the marriage bond only so long as she remains 
the sole wife.” El Nimr does not explain how it is that “if she wishes 
to restrict his freedom in this regard . . . she is legally allowed to do so” 
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issue before a panel of male “experts.” She had stipulated in her 
marriage contract that she was to attend medical school. Her 
husband, however, was objecting now that she sought to do so. The 
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sociological studies. Today, the use of deferred dower is widely 
accepted in many parts of the world, and has been for centuries, 
as studies based on Ottoman court registers attest. Indeed, 
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A Meditation on Mahr, 
Modernity, and Muslim 
Marriage Contract Law
A S I F A  Q U R A I S H I - L A N D E S  ( 2 0 1 3 )
From the moment I first learned that the fiqh on marriage contracts uses the template of a contract of sale it 
has bothered me. Why didn’t they use partnership contracts instead?  We have plenty of fiqh on partnership 
contracts. But I wasn’t a specialist in contract law, and I never had time to do any further research on it, so I just 
let it simmer. And anyway, I found enough tools in the existing fiqh on marriage contracts to help women protect 
themselves against things like unwanted divorce and polygamy. So when I and my feminist Muslim lawyer 
friends advised women on this topic, those are the tools we gave them. But then, my good friend and editor of 
this volume, Kecia Ali, went and trashed our strategy!  In her chapter in the 2003 book “Progressive Muslims,” 
Kecia complained that the strategy of finding feminist uses of Islamic family law did not go far enough— “missing 
the forest for the trees” she said!  As far as I was concerned, she had thrown down the gauntlet. It took me ten 
years (having babies and getting tenure tends to have that effect on people), but eventually I picked it up. When 
another dear friend, Marie Failinger, convinced me to be part of her book of interfaith women writing about law 
and religion, I went back to my thought experiment of “what if we used a partnership contract model instead” and 
worked out my answer to Kecia’s challenge—along with a darn good defense of our original strategy.
From: Feminism, Law, and Religion edited by Marie A. Failinger, Elizabeth R. Schiltz, and Susan J. Stabile, © 2013 
by Ashgate Publishing Company. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group. 
Suggested citation: Asifa Quraishi-Landes, “A Meditation on Mahr, Modernity, and Muslim Marriage Contract 
Law,” in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of Faith: American Muslim Marriage and Divorce in the Twenty-First Century (Boston: 
OpenBU, 2021), pp. 52-67. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42505
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Introduction
“Be a bit strategic,” I advise the young bride. 
“Think about whether you might someday 
want to be a stay-at-home mom—you could 
set your mahr (dower) so that you won’t have 
to be completely financially dependent on your 
husband at that time.”
“But that still feels like I’m putting a price 
on myself,” she answers. “It just makes me 
uncomfortable. I would rather just make my 
mahr something symbolic and leave it at that.”
I have had a version of this conversation with many 
different people as I have engaged the topic of Islamic 
family law as both an academic and activist over the 
years. It has always frustrated me when women, like 
the bride here, casually dismiss the mahr in apparent 
disregard for its women-empowering potential. 
Quranically-required of every valid Muslim marriage 
contract, the mahr provision designates some property 
to be given (or promised) to a bride upon marriage, and 
Islamic property law protects it as exclusively hers, not 
to be used by anyone (including the men) in her life. 
For these reasons, a substantial mahr can provide a 
woman with financial independence during marriage 
or give her the ability to leave a bad one. I have long 
felt that women who casually dismiss the mahr could 
be dangerously limiting their future life choices, just 
because it doesn’t feel right.
On the other hand, these women do have a point. For 
a bride, but not a groom, to be paid some financial 
sum as part of a marriage contract does seem, at some 
level, like the woman is selling herself. This is certainly 
better than being sold, but not by much. As many have 
noted, classical Islamic jurisprudence often used the 
term “price” to describe the mahr, and Islamic marriage 
contract law was specifically based on the model of a 
contract of sale. Even more disturbing, in order to work 
out the doctrinal details of Islamic marriage law, early 
Muslim jurists often analogized marriage contracts to 
slavery, and especially to contracts for the purchase of a 
female slave. The gendered background presumptions 
that accompany this analogy permeate nearly every 
aspect of Islamic legal doctrine on marriage, affecting 
not only the mahr at the beginning, but also the rights 
and responsibilities of the parties during a marriage, 
and their respective access to divorce at the end.
The intertwining of slave sale contracts in the 
jurisprudence of Islamic marriage law is why Kecia Ali 
has argued that the strategy used by Muslim women 
activists to find feminist uses for classically-established 
Islamic legal doctrines like the mahr is fundamentally 
flawed. It “misses the forest for the trees,” she argues, 
because it “focus[es] on isolated rights without paying 
attention to how they are embedded in a system of 
interdependent spousal obligations” (Ali 2003: 164)—a 
system flawed by historical norms about slavery and 
sexual autonomy that no longer hold true today. She 
therefore urges a wholesale rethinking of the whole 
paradigm of Islamic marriage law to better fit modern 
sensibilities and practice.
I agree with Kecia Ali—up to a point. I believe that 
the sales contract was indeed an unfortunate choice 
for framing Islamic marriage contract law, and that 
its inherent problems were further exacerbated by 
the development of Islamic law in a historical context 
where slavery (especially concubinage) was socially 
acceptable. But I do not have quite as much criticism 
as she does for the Muslim women’s rights activism 
that works within the existing doctrine, and I will 
explain why below. Nevertheless, I agree with Ali 
that the slavery framework and its resulting doctrine 
are not dictated by scripture, so we are not obligated 
to perpetuate them today—especially when their 
historical contexts have so little in common with how 
we now think about marriage, women, and sexuality. 
Thus, it is not only theoretically possible but also 
appropriate to ask what sort of alternative model could 
be used to create a different scheme of Islamic family 
law for today. In this chapter, I will briefly describe 
what I think could be a better doctrinal model for 
Islamic marriage law, and point the way toward how it 
could be developed further by more qualified Muslim 
jurist-scholars. Despite her urging for a new paradigm, 
Kecia Ali does not offer any of her own ideas about 
what that might look like, so it is difficult to know if 
she and I would agree upon the same solutions.
In a nutshell, I think a workable alternative would 
be to use partnership, rather than sales, as the 
framework for Islamic marriage contract law. I believe 
that applying the well-established (and recently 
re-energized) principles of Islamic partnership law 
to Muslim marriage contracts would have several 
advantages over the current sales-based framework, 
including eliminating several traditional rules that 
have been harmful to women. Among other things, 
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some of the existing rules that would disappear under 
a partnership model include: the lack of mutuality 
between husband and wife, legal tolerance of marital 
rape, and a husband’s exclusive right to unilateral 
divorce. A scheme of Islamic marriage law based 
on partnership contracts would also fit better with 
modern attitudes about marriage, mutuality, women, 
and individual agency. As such, it would support the 
sharia-based approach of Muslim women’s rights 
activists more effectively than the current strategies 
that sometimes require uncomfortably stretching and 
pulling outdated doctrines to fit modern sensibilities.
But my enthusiasm for a paradigm shift to this 
alternative model for Islamic marriage law is tempered 
by this caveat: paradigm shifts are not easy. They 
usually require disentangling emotional connections 
and long-held patterns of behavior, and these changes 
usually require much more than a good theoretical 
argument. So, while as a legal theorist, I would 
wholeheartedly support new Islamic marriage law 
based on a partnership contract model, the activist 
in me is concerned about the pragmatic realities of 
making it stick. Simply put, no matter how perfectly 
developed it might be, not everyone will be convinced 
to switch to this new scheme of marriage law. I 
therefore end this chapter with a brief discussion of 
what I think are the real-life challenges to introducing 
such an alternative model, and what I think should be 
done in light of these realities.
Sharia-based Muslim Women’s Rights Activism: 
Pros and Cons
I have recently written about the work of Muslim 
women’s rights activists who operate from a sharia-
mindful perspective, commenting on why I believe this 
approach is often more effective than that of secular 
feminists working for Muslim women’s rights (Quraishi 
2011). One advantage of the sharia-mindful approach is 
that much of its starting point is uncontested by even the 
most conservative and traditional of Muslims. Rather 
than dismissing all Islamic law as patriarchally biased, 
these scholars and activists take the more complicated 
route offending those parts of established Islamic 
legal doctrine that can be harnessed and proliferated 
to pursue and protect women’s rights. Because they 
come from uncontroversial and established rules that 
already have persuasive weight with the vast majority 
of practicing Muslims, this approach can provide 
Muslim women with immediately effective tools for 
empowerment. This has a much more direct impact 
in individual women’s lives than the much longer 
(and often unsuccessful) projects aimed at reforming 
Islamic legal doctrine that is harmful to women.
As it turns out, these activists have identified quite a 
few rules within established Islamic law that can be 
used to empower women. For example, recognizing 
and protecting a woman’s right to own (and inherit) 
property in her own name has been a distinguishing 
feature of Islamic law among the world’s legal systems 
for centuries. All the classical schools of Islamic law 
agree that a woman’s property is exclusively her own—
no one can assert any legal claim over it, including her 
male relatives. (Those familiar with women’s rights 
under common law will recognize that this Islamic 
rule is quite a bit more feminist than the property 
rules that applied to English and American women 
until not too long ago.) Further, Islamic law also sets 
aside the mahr as a specific allocation of property 
available to every married Muslim woman. Because 
it is Quranically-mandated, Muslims often speak of 
the mahr in sacrosanct tones, making it a powerful 
tool for a Muslim woman to achieve financial security 
and independence—often the most difficult sort of 
independence for women to acquire. Whether saved or 
invested at the beginning of a marriage, or deferred to 
be paid in the event of divorce or widowhood, a well-
calculated mahr could give an otherwise financially-
dependent wife the ability to initiate divorce or survive 
life on her own. (And accessing one’s mahr is often a 
quicker and more reliable way to set up one’s financial 
life than waiting for court-ordered alimony and/or the 
division of marital property assets.) Moreover, a large 
mahr deferred to the time of divorce could also be used 
to deter a husband from exercising his established 
Islamic legal right to unilateral divorce (talaq) against 
his wife’s will.
There are also other ways for women to protect 
themselves against the impact of traditional Islamic 
marriage rules that favor men. One emphasized by 
many sharia-based Muslim women’s rights activists 
is the marriage contract itself. Under established 
Islamic legal doctrine, a Muslim marriage contract 
can include stipulations that alter the otherwise 
default rules of Islamic marriage law (rules that often 
disadvantage women). For example, a contract could 
include a stipulation limiting the husband’s ability 
to take another wife or it could give the wife equal 
access to divorce. It might even specify that the wife 
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is not expected to do household cooking and cleaning, 
reflecting the established rule that a wife has no 
Islamic obligation to do housework (Quraishi and 
Syeed-Miller 2004). Muslim women’s rights activists 
today regularly point to this old Islamic legal principle 
to counter the arguments of those who insist on a 
gendered division of household labor. They also point 
to the wisdom and foresight of classical Islamic law in 
holding that, if a wife does perform such work, it may 
be financially compensable. This rule could be crucial 
in the distribution of assets upon the divorce of a stay-
at-home wife and breadwinning husband—especially 
where community property is not an option.
All of these examples take the approach of using 
existing Islamic doctrine, rather than emphasizing its 
reform, to improve the lives of Muslim women. I have 
seen the effectiveness of this approach in my work with 
and observations of Muslim grassroots organizations 
over the years. The use of established Islamic legal 
doctrine was instrumental, for example, in the legal 
advocacy strategies chosen by lawyers defending 
women against adultery charges in Nigeria and the 
way in which Pakistan’s adultery laws were ultimately 
amended in 2006 (Quraishi 2011). The effectiveness of 
this approach explains why many Muslims emphasize 
Prophetic practice (rather than secular law) to condemn 
domestic violence in their communities and why 
average Muslim women and girls assert their right to an 
education by appealing to Quranic verses rather than 
to international declarations of the rights of the child. 
Simply put, Islamically-based arguments for women’s 
rights give a religious edge to rights claims that secular 
and reform arguments cannot. Thus, it is not surprising 
that Muslim women’s activists appropriate traditional 
Islamic legal concepts like the mahr to help empower 
Muslim women. This strategy appeals to, rather than 
challenges, the religious sentiments of even the most 
conservative Muslims and legal scholars and thus faces 
less opposition than feminist legal reform efforts. This 
is why promoting Islamic legal education for Muslim 
women has become a high priority for many sharia-
based Muslim women’s rights organizations. Fluency 
in established Islamic legal doctrine, it is believed, is 
crucial to giving Muslim women the necessary tools to 
fight for their rights (Quraishi 2011).
On the other hand, this strategy comes with a 
weakness. As Kecia Ali has argued, selectively 
emphasizing and giving feminist rationales to some 
parts of classical Islamic law fails to really engage with 
the jurisprudence as a coherent whole (Ali 2003). In 
other words, it may be dangerous to emphasize only 
the woman-empowering aspects of established Islamic 
law without adequately warning that many of these 
rules come with not-so-empowering side effects and 
caveats. By not telling the whole story, this approach 
runs the risk of leaving Muslim women vulnerable to 
unexpected consequences when the rest of the law 
comes into play. For example, many of the stipulations 
that a Muslim woman might include in her marriage 
contract are enforceable only in the Hanbali school of 
law. And even when a stipulation is recognized as valid, 
many schools offer very limited relief for its breach—
and very rarely is it specific performance. Thus, in 
most schools of Islamic law, a marriage contract 
stipulation that a husband will remain monogamous 
does not entitle a wife to end her husband’s marriage 
to a co-wife, but rather, it only gives her grounds for 
divorce in the event that this happens. Having the 
freedom to choose between divorce and polygamy is, 
of course, not a meaningful choice for most women, 
and is especially shocking to those who believe they 
have protected themselves against such a predicament 
in their marriage contract.
Even the mahr is not as sacred as one might expect 
from its Quranic origin. According to established 
Islamic jurisprudence, whether or not a wife may 
keep her mahr upon divorce depends upon the type 
of divorce. A wife’s mahr is safely hers if her husband 
exercises his right to a unilateral divorce (talaq). But a 
wife-initiated divorce quite often results in a forfeiture 
of mahr. Established Islamic law provides two ways 
for a wife to initiate and secure a divorce: 1) extra-
judicially, with the consent of her husband (“khul’ ”) 
or 2) by proving sufficient grounds before a judge 
(faskh). It is generally assumed that in a khul’ divorce, 
a wife returns her mahr. (Some men take advantage of 
this situation. A husband who would like to initiate a 
talaq but does not want to pay the mahr might make 
life so unbearable for his wife that she requests a khul’ 
divorce, which he then agrees to when she forfeits her 
mahr.) The last type of divorce, faskh, could protect a 
wife’s mahr, but this requires her to prove adequate 
grounds (i.e., fault of the husband), the sufficiency of 
which are to be decided by a judge, and some schools of 
Islamic law make this virtually impossible.
The practical implication of all this is that, while the 
current sharia-based strategies may be successfully 
encouraging Muslim women to take advantage of some 
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established doctrine for feminist reasons, sometimes 
these women face surprising disappointment when they 
attempt to enforce their understandings of their rights. 
The strategy is vulnerable because the jurisprudential 
theory that created the rules in the first place does 
not match the feminist rationales promoted by those 
focusing on the woman-empowering provisions. This 
is why Kecia Ali argues that more is needed than 
selective appropriation of some apparently favorable 
aspects of established Islamic law. Part of the problem, 
she argues, is that the methodological background to 
most established Islamic marriage law is so out of step 
with contemporary sensibilities that it is downplayed 
or ignored not only by modern Muslim feminist 
activists, but also by popular Muslim discourse 
generally (Ali 2003: 166). To take her argument further, 
unless these background presumptions and theories 
are brought into the light of contemporary discourse, 
they may prove to be the Achilles’ heel of sharia-based 
Muslim women’s rights advocacy. As a proponent of 
sharia-based Muslim women’s rights work, I take Kecia 
Ali’s critique seriously. To respond, I will describe what 
I think would be a better model for Islamic marriage 
law, but also note some potentially serious obstacles 
to its success. In order to explain why I think my 
suggested alternative would be an improvement over 
the current law, I will first review the existing rules 
of Islamic marriage law, including those aspects that 
are downplayed by sharia-minded women’s rights 
activists.
Islamic Marriage Law Today: Jurisprudential 
Theory and Presumptions
Most Muslims today either are not aware, or do not like 
to emphasize, the theoretical presumptions embedded 
in the Islamic jurisprudence of marriage law because 
they are quite far from contemporary sensibilities. 
Established Islamic marriage contract law uses the 
contract of sale as its basic conceptual framework—a 
model which leads to some uncomfortable conclusions 
about what is being sold and the role of women’s 
agency in that sale. Even more out of step with 
modernity is a historical context in which slavery and 
concubinage were socially acceptable. Because of their 
presumption that a man may legally have sex with his 
female slave, classical Muslim jurists draw an analogy 
between a marriage contract and a contract for sale of a 
concubine, using this analogy to work out the doctrinal 
details of the respective rights (sexual and otherwise) 
of a husband and wife. This analogy is supported by 
juristic interpretation of some Quranic verses to mean 
that there are two (and only two) situations in which 
sexual activity is Islamically licit: in marriage and 
with a female slave. Theorizing about what could be 
the commonality between these two situations, these 
jurists come to the conclusion that some sort of male 
ownership (the Arabic term is “milk,” meaning control 
or dominion) is instrumental in legitimizing Sexual 
activity. As Kecia Ali explains in her detailed study 
of the subject, “a comparison [i]s drawn between the 
dominion imposed by a husband through which his 
wife is caused to surrender her sexual self and the 
sovereignty established by the master [over his slave]” 
(Ali 2010: 15). Established Islamic jurisprudence 
therefore often describes marriage as a type of sale, 
with the item being purchased being a wife’s sexual 
organs. There are qualitative differences between the 
rights of a wife and a female slave, of course, and the 
jurists do carefully lay these out, but nevertheless, the 
concept of male ownership of women’s sexual parts 
becomes an important part of the traditional juristic 
understanding of what makes sex licit in Islam.
I would like to note that I, personally, am not 
convinced that sex with one’s female slave is approved 
by the Quran in the first place. My own reading of the 
relevant Quranic texts has always led me to a different 
conclusion than that held by the majority of classical 
Muslim jurists. (My alternative reading is untested, so 
I will not elaborate on it here except to say that I think 
it is plausible to read the critical Quranic phrase “what 
your right hands possess” as referring not to slaves 
but to some form of preliminary marital arrangement, 
such as we might today say someone has “pledged 
their hand in marriage.”) But setting aside my personal 
skepticism about whether the Quran allows sex with 
female slaves, I believe it is important to understand 
the role that this concept played in the development 
of Islamic jurisprudence on marriage contract law. 
Once we appreciate the jurists’ train of thought, it is 
then possible to ask productive questions about how 
much of the established doctrine of Islamic marriage 
law is still necessary today and how to most effectively 
construct meaningful alternatives.
The slavery analogy is distasteful today, but it is not 
illogical. If one begins with the contract of sale as the 
base model for marriage contract law, then we can 
ask, what sort of sales contracts are most analogous 
to marriage contracts? It does not take much thought 
to conclude that contracts involving human beings as 
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the subject of sale make a much better analogy than 
contracts for the sale of bushels of wheat or horses. 
After all, a horse cannot complain to authorities that 
he is being mistreated and a bushel of wheat cannot 
assert that it no longer wants to be owned. But under 
Islamic law, a slave can do both things. Add to this 
a presumption that the purchase of a female slave 
includes the right to have sex with her, and it is quite 
understandable why the idea of ownership became 
important to jurists trying to work out the respective 
rights in a marriage contract.
The slavery analogy and the sales contract model 
directly impact several areas of traditional Islamic 
marriage law that have a particularly negative impact 
on women. I will take up three of these here: mahr, 
marital support, and divorce.
Mahr
If we begin with the presumption that both marriage 
and slavery make sexual relations with a woman lawful, 
then it is natural to ask what these two situations have 
in common. One of the most obvious is that both 
involve some sort of payment—for a slave, it is the 
purchase price, and for a wife, the mahr. Thus it came 
about that juristic discussions of mahr “depend on and 
further the conceptual relationship between marriage 
and sale” (Ali 2010: 49). Mahr comes to be thought 
of as the “price” of access to a woman’s sexual parts, 
which are then “owned” by the husband.
Moreover, this “ownership” is specifically gendered—
only males may own this sort of property. This provides 
an explanation for the juristic belief that women 
who owned male slaves do not likewise gain sexual 
access to them by virtue of the purchase price of the 
male slave. As the classical jurist Shafi’i put it, “The 
man is the one who marries and the one who takes a 
concubine and the woman is the one who is married, 
who is taken as a concubine. It is not permissible to 
make analogies between things that are different” (Ali 
2010: 178). In other words, although women are fully 
capable property owners in Islamic law generally, the 
type of ownership that makes sexual relations licit 
is considered to be different—it is available only to 
men. Moreover, this type of ownership is something 
that a man held with exclusivity. With its allowance 
of polygamy but not polyandry, Islamic law allows 
men to have more than one legal sex partner, but 
only allows women to legally have sex with one man 
(in a given time period). There is some logic to this 
as well, considering the ambiguous paternity issues 
involved when a woman has multiple sex partners. 
In communities where wealth, status and power were 
so strongly affected by paternalistic lines, it is not 
surprising to see legitimate sexual relations tied not 
only to male control, but to exclusive male control.
Marital Support (Nafaqa)
Classical Muslim jurists draw a parallel between a 
husband’s obligation to pay mahr at the start of a 
marriage, and his obligation to pay for basic support 
(“nafaqa”) during the course of a marriage, and both 
are connected to the licitness of sexual activity. As 
the jurists conceive things, the mahr makes a woman 
initially sexually available to a husband, and the 
nafaqa enables continued sexual access to her during 
the marriage. Support and sexual access thus become 
inextricably linked in Islamic marriage law: if a 
husband provides his wife with adequate food, shelter 
and clothing, she has no right to deny him sexual 
access whenever he so desires. If he fails to provide 
such maintenance, she is not obligated to make herself 
sexually available to him. In short, “for Muslim jurists 
sex is a husband’s right and support is a wife’s right” 
(Ali 2010: 94—121).
This leads to many related doctrines commanding 
wifely obedience that can be quite disturbing to 
modern sensibilities. Not only does this doctrine 
of sexual availability mean that a wife’s mobility is 
severely dependent upon her husband’s consent, 
but it also has serious implications for marital rape. 
Because a husband’s right to have sex with his wife 
is conditioned solely on his payment of support, 
her consent is irrelevant. The idea of marital rape is 
thus conceptually virtually impossible in this legal 
paradigm. Indeed, despite significant Islamic literature 
stressing the importance of attending to a woman’s 
physical desires and sexual pleasure (including 
orgasm), the idea of marital rape is nevertheless an 
oxymoron in classical Islamic jurisprudence. It just 
does not fit in a system where the legality of sexual 
activity is based not on consent of the parties but upon 
male dominion and payment of financial support.
Even short of rape, there is not much room for sexual 
mutuality in a system of marital rights built upon a 
male-ownership view of sexual licitness. Traditional 
Muslim jurists discuss a woman’s right to sexual 
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activity within marriage, but her rights to sexual 
access to her husband (and even to non-sexual 
companionship) are virtually unenforceable. Indeed, 
these jurists think of sex as “the husband’s right and 
not his duty,” so it makes little sense to compel him 
to do it. Thus, a Muslim wife’s right to sexual pleasure, 
though morally acknowledged in the scripture and 
literature, is legally meaningless. Because established 
Islamic jurisprudence fundamentally views marriage 
as an exchange of lawful sexual access for dower and 
continued sexual availability for support, it does not 
require any mutuality in sexual rights. This is why 
Kecia Ali argues that without rethinking the entire 
premise of this system, Muslim women activists 
focusing on such mutuality will always be left with an 
unenforceable ideal, rather than tangible legal rights 
to sexual equality (Ali 2003).
The topic of marital support exemplifies the problem 
with selectively emphasizing only women-empowering 
parts of established Islamic law. As mentioned earlier, 
it has become popular for Muslim women’s rights 
activists to point out that classical Islamic law does 
not require a wife to do housework. This is true, but 
tells only part of the story. A husband’s marital support 
obligation is not considered compensation for a wife’s 
performance of household chores, but it is considered 
compensation for her making herself sexually 
available to her husband. That very important caveat 
is not conducive to the picture of marital respect 
and mutuality that modern Muslim women activists 
want to portray. But without fully acknowledging it, 
the advocacy approach appears under-theorized and 
incomplete, and ultimately vulnerable.
Divorce
Keeping in mind that established Islamic marriage 
law is based on a paradigm of male ownership of 
sexual access, it is not difficult to understand why 
the established legal doctrine gives a husband, but 
not a wife, the right to unilaterally end a marriage. 
The jurisprudence conditions the legality of sexual 
activity upon a husband’s (or slaveowner’s) exclusive 
ownership of the sexual bond, which means he must 
have unilateral control over the termination or 
continuation of that bond. Kecia Ali summarizes the 
doctrinal landscape this way:
The strict gender differentiation of marital 
rights, the importance of women ‘s sexual 
exclusivity, and above all the strict imposition 
of rules about unilateral divorce, however 
contested in practice, all facilitate and flow from 
the key idea that marriage and licit sex require 
male control or dominion (Ali 2010: 181).
Indeed, the very meaning of the word “talaq,” (“release”) 
evokes parallels with the dominion involved in slavery. 
A talaq divorce “frees” or “releases” a wife, much as a 
slave is “free” or “released” in manumission, and jurists 
regularly use this analogy in their descriptions of 
unilateral divorce. Thus, the mahr enslaves a married 
woman’s sexual self just as a slave comes to be owned 
through a purchase price, and talaq frees her from that 
bond just as manumission frees a slave.
Such a scheme does allow for limited wife-initiated 
divorce. Khul’ divorce fits within the male-owned 
paradigm of marriage because it cannot happen 
without the husband’s consent. To be sure, khul’ is 
more empowering to women than divorce law in other 
systems where women could not initiate divorce at all, 
and it does honor the concept of marriage as a bilateral 
contract to which she is a party. But jurisprudentially 
speaking, khul’ is still conceptualized in the language 
of sales in a way that does not portray marriage itself 
as a mutual relationship. According to the classical 
jurists, in talaq, the husband relinquishes his control 
over his ownership of the wife’s sexual organ, and in 
khul’, the wife buys back ownership over herself by 
compensating her husband (usually by returning her 
mahr) in return for a divorce. Put even more starkly, 
talaq is analogous to manumission of a slave and khul’ 
is analogous to “kitaba,” the Islamic legal doctrine 
by which a slave contracts to pay for his or her 
emancipation. Both require the husband’s/ master’s 
consent, and both require the payment of some sum 
from the wife/slave for release.
Modernity and Legal Reform
Virtually all of the presumptions that formed the 
jurisprudential backdrop for Islamic marriage law are 
no longer held today. There is now a near universal 
consensus against slavery among the world’s Muslims, 
as is evident from the absence of substantial Muslim 
resistance to laws abolishing it throughout the 
world. Indeed, the very fact that Muslims today seem 
uncomfortable with the analogy between marriage and 
slavery itself illustrates how much norms have changed 
since the formative period of Islamic jurisprudence, 
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when the analogy seemed to be a natural, almost 
self-evident one. It is unthinkable among most 
contemporary Muslims that a husband would have a 
female slave with whom he could have unlimited sex. 
In fact, both educated and lay Muslims routinely ignore 
the classical jurisprudence allowing concubines, often 
stating categorically that Islam allows sexual relations 
only in one situation: marriage.
Not quite as pervasive as the aversion to slavery, but 
nevertheless a significant shift from earlier norms are 
the changes in Muslim attitudes about mutuality in 
marriage and the role of women in society. Although 
equality is a contested concept, Muslims around 
the world nevertheless speak of marriage in terms 
of reciprocal and complementary rights and duties, 
mutual consent, and with respect for women’s agency. 
Polygamy is tolerated in some Muslim circles, but 
the idea of male ownership of a wife’s sexual parts in 
marriage would strike most contemporary Muslims 
as inappropriate and probably offensive to a healthy 
sexual relationship.
Many point to Muslim scripture and classical literature 
to support these ideals of mutuality—and there is 
significant material to work with. But formalizing 
these attitudes in enforceable rules is much more 
difficult. So, while Muslims generally disapprove of 
the idea of a husband forcing his wife to have sex, it 
is nevertheless difficult to find widespread Muslim 
consensus that marital rape should be a crime. This 
is because a wife’s sexual availability is embedded in 
mainstream Muslim understandings of the rights and 
obligations of marriage. In fact, many who contest the 
general concept of wifely obedience will nevertheless 
tolerate it in the context of sexual access. Similarly, 
while Muslims routinely speak of marriage as a contract 
based on the mutual consent of both spouses, most 
Muslims do not contest the idea that Islamic law gives 
husbands exclusive right to unilateral divorce. Thus, 
while many areas of state-enacted family law in Muslim 
countries have changed in response to public pressure 
for women’s rights (such as raising the minimum 
age of marriage), there is strong social resistance to 
the abolition of things like polygamy or unilateral 
talaq divorce. Kecia Ali argues that this is because 
these aspects of Islamic marriage law are inextricably 
intertwined with the jurisprudential background that 
relies on the analogy of marriage and slavery—and that 
is something no one wants to talk about (Ali 2006: 43, 
51). In other words, because the paradigm of the male 
ownership tie is so fundamental to the theoretical 
foundation of all Islamic marriage law, any women’s 
rights work (legislative, social activist, or otherwise) 
that does not take this into account will always be 
limited in how much it can ultimately accomplish.
The obvious question, then, is this: is it possible to 
create a different scheme of Islamic marriage law, 
one that is better suited to modern sensibilities and 
not based on presumptions about slavery and male 
ownership of female sexuality? This question involves 
two issues. First is the question of Islamic law reform 
generally: is it possible to challenge existing Islamic 
legal doctrine at all, or is this religiously set in stone? 
Second, if such change is theoretically possible, what 
could a new Islamic law of marriage look like? I will 
take up the first question here and the second question 
in the following section.
Sharia Basics and the Challenges of Reform
Is Islamic legal reform possible? Can established 
Islamic religious law be challenged without offending 
the divine? The answer may surprise those unfamiliar 
with the foundations of Islamic jurisprudence, and the 
fact that Islamic law is based on an epistemology that is 
self-conscious of its own human fallibility. In brief, the 
key principle is exemplified in the difference between 
“sharia” and “fiqh.” “Sharia,” usually translated as 
“Islamic law,” represents the idea of ultimate justice, 
the idea of God’s divine directions about the ideal 
way to live—thus, “God’s Law.” Muslim jurists use 
ijtihad (legal interpretation) to elaborate the doctrinal 
details when they are not obvious from the scriptural 
sources (the Quran and Prophetic narratives). What is 
significant about ijtihad is that it is a self-consciously 
fallible process. The jurists performing ijtihad to 
create legal rules recognized that in doing so, they 
were human beings struggling to articulate divine 
will, and therefore their conclusions could be, at best, 
only probable articulations of God’s Law. No one could 
claim with certainty that his or her answers were “the 
right answer,” at least in this lifetime. That is why they 
use the term “fiqh”—which means “understanding”—
for the doctrinal rules of Islamic law.
Moreover, there are a variety of fiqh rules on the 
same topics. Because the legal scholars could claim 
only probable correctness for their conclusions, they 
all recognized that they had to respect the differing 
conclusions of their colleagues as possibly correct. In 
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other words, as long as it is the result of sincere ijtihad, 
any fiqh conclusion qualifies as a possible—and thus 
legitimate—articulation of sharia. This is why sharia, 
as a body of tangible law, is inherently and unavoidably 
pluralistic. Eventually, the variety of fiqh opinions 
coalesced into several definable schools of law, each 
with equal legitimacy and authority for Muslims 
seeking to live by sharia. In short, for a Muslim, there 
is one Law of God (sharia), but there are many versions 
of fiqh articulating that ultimate Law here on earth 
(Quraishi 2008).
In contemporary discourses, especially in a legal 
advocacy setting, it is very important to keep the 
two terms fiqh and sharia distinct. Sloppy use of the 
term sharia can (and does) generate unnecessary 
resistance to what otherwise would be legitimate 
and uncontroversial assertions. It is unnecessarily 
provocative to advocate, for example, changing or 
reforming sharia, because this implies that God’s 
Law is not itself already perfect, a suggestion likely 
to generate resistance from many Muslims. But 
advocating a change or reform of fiqh is quite a 
different matter, because fiqh is fallible, and in fact its 
many manifestations already reflect the consideration 
of a variety of different social norms. In short, sharia 
(God’s Law) cannot be questioned by Muslims, but our 
understandings of sharia— namely, the fiqh rules—are 
always open to question.
This brings us directly to the question of reform. Are 
all the fiqh rules set in stone or can they be changed? 
At the most basic theoretical level, the answer seems 
simple—and encouraging: all existing fiqh rules are the 
product of ijtihad, and because ijtihad is fallible, they 
can be challenged by any alternative ijtihad. But things 
get a bit more complex when we look at the details. To 
fully understand what is fixed and what is negotiable 
in the existing fiqh corpus requires detailed knowledge 
of the ijtihad that produced each fiqh rule. More 
specifically, it is important to know the methodological 
pieces of the ijtihad analysis that created it: what was 
textually ambiguous and what was not, what was the 
reasoning behind using some prophetic narrations but 
not others, and what other jurisprudential tools were 
used and why.
There are many ways in which new fiqh rules can be 
made. One of the easiest is where the jurisprudential 
tools used in the past relied on a social context that has 
changed today in relevant ways. In these cases, simply 
applying classically-established ijtihad methodologies 
in the new changed circumstances will produce a new 
fiqh rule. But it is important to realize that this way of 
arriving at a new rule is not legal reform in the sense 
of changing established Islamic legal theory. Rather, it 
is an example of how a new rule can naturally result 
when the same tools are employed in a new context. 
For example, the tool of maslaha (public good) happens 
to be one that is extremely responsive to changing 
circumstances. If one is faced with a problematic fiqh 
rule that directly relies on a historical evaluation 
of the public good, that rule can be easily changed 
if the relevant public good has changed. There are 
other jurisprudential analytical tools with a similar 
built-in potential to generate new fiqh rules without 
posing any major upheaval to Islamic legal theory. 
For example, qiyas (analogical reasoning) requires 
fiqh scholars to identify the cause (‘illa) of an original 
textual rule before expanding it to new cases. In the 
body of classical fiqh doctrine, there can be a diversity 
of opinion on those causes and thus what analogies 
are appropriate and why. That diversity could continue 
today, with contemporary fiqh scholars identifying and 
applying a different cause—and thus reaching a new 
fiqh rule—for an established scriptural text.
Turning now to the issue at hand, Islamic marriage 
law, Kecia Ali has done a careful job of laying out 
how the analogy to slavery and concubines played a 
pivotal role in the development of traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence on marriage and marriage contract law 
(Ali 2006, 2010). That analogy was not scripturally-
directed. It was created by fallible jurists who saw 
similarities between these two situations that led them 
to use this analogy in working out the doctrinal details 
of marriage law. These perceived similarities were 
largely based on social and philosophical realities of 
their time that no longer hold true today. Slavery and 
concubinage have fallen out of practice, and indeed, 
out of the moral compass of most Muslims. Moreover, 
new pervasive attitudes about mutuality in marriage 
make the idea of a husband’s ownership of his wife’s 
sexual parts surprising and offensive to many Muslims 
today. Thus, it would not be too radical a reform to 
re-think the slavery analogy. Jettisoning the analogy 
between marriage and concubinage does not challenge 
the use of analogy as an Islamic jurisprudential tool 
altogether, but rather just suggests that this particular 
analogy was based on social circumstances that are 
no longer appropriate today. This suggests that new 
ijtihad (Islamic jurisprudential reasoning) on Islamic 
6 1M A R R I A G E
marriage law that does not presume an analogy to 
slavery is possible, and could create different doctrinal 
rules than those summarized above. Moreover, if done 
thoroughly and well, it would carry just as much validity 
as the existing traditional doctrinal scheme. That is 
because Islamic law requires tolerance and respect for 
all ijtihad conclusions, no matter how diverse.
But there are two important caveats to the 
viability of any new theory of Islamic marriage law. 
Jurisprudentially-speaking, the success of a new legal 
scheme is dependent upon: 1) the expertise of those 
performing the new ijtihad and 2) the impact of past 
consensus. The first criterion is fairly obvious: without 
proper training in ijtihad, a scholar’s fiqh conclusion will 
not garner the status of probability that gives it validity, 
and ijtihad expertise is no small accomplishment. 
Many prerequisites of language, legal reasoning, and 
knowledge of context must be mastered before a 
scholar can even begin to extrapolate legal doctrine 
from the sharia source texts. The complex, layered, 
soul-searching process of Islamic jurisprudential 
analysis is not for amateurs, no matter how well-
intentioned or socially conscious they might be. But 
once one is an expert, whatever one produces deserves 
to be respected as a legitimate articulation of sharia, 
no matter how innovative the conclusions. Thus, the 
success of any new Islamic marriage law will depend 
very largely on the ijtihad qualifications of the legal 
scholar(s) creating it. Without appropriate training in 
established Islamic legal theory, their conclusions are 
likely to lack credibility in the general Muslim public, 
as well as the juristic community whose doctrine it is 
challenging.
The second caveat—the impact of past consensus—
is a bit more complicated and potentially more of an 
obstacle. Consensus, a core idea in established Islamic 
legal theory, can have a drastic impact upon the 
staying power of individual fiqh rules. To put it briefly, 
Islamic jurisprudence is built upon the multiplicity of 
many different schools of fiqh doctrine, but if there 
is unanimous agreement of all qualified jurists of a 
given age, that agreement has a higher status than an 
average fiqh rule. According to Islamic legal theory, 
consensus transforms a fiqh rule from mere probability 
to certainty—the same epistemological status as the 
Quranic text. In the world of Islamic jurisprudence 
consensus can thus change a fallible human opinion 
into certain truth, binding upon all. This means that 
creating new Islamic legal doctrine is not so simple a 
matter as just engaging in new ijtihad, because Islamic 
legal theory did not allow new ijtihad on questions that 
had already been answered by scholarly consensus. 
For brand new questions never before presented 
(such as those presented by modern bio-ethics and 
technology), this is not a problem, for no classical jurist 
could have imagined the possibility of, say, in vitro 
fertilization or the use of the internet for conducting 
business. But it is a harder one for age-old issues such 
as a woman’s access to divorce, or sexual availability of 
wives, where changes in social understandings make 
classical rulings inappropriate or even oppressive, 
but the legal questions have nevertheless been asked 
and answered by past jurists. In short, the doctrine of 
consensus means that, if consensus was reached in the 
past, the field is not open to new interpretations of the 
same questions by new ijtihad taking into account the 
realities of our time, perspectives, and circumstances.
One way out of the grip of this dead hand of the past 
would be to radically reform Islamic legal theory 
altogether to argue for changing or even deleting the 
classical doctrine of consensus to allow new opinions 
even in the face of settled past conclusions. This 
would be an extreme move, one that would risk losing 
supporters that might otherwise support reform done 
within the existing jurisprudential rules. To reject 
consensus would be to reject a foundation of Islamic 
legal theory— that jurisprudential scaffolding upon 
which all Muslim jurists stand to craft their legal rules. 
Purging one part of the methodological structure 
might render all of it vulnerable to change or deletion, 
and might thereby create intolerable foundational 
challenges. In the aftermath, how would contemporary 
Muslim scholars decide which of the existing tools 
would stay and which would go? Would new ones be 
added, and how? Would it even still be Islamic law if it 
were grown from such a different set of roots? These 
are obviously very big questions to which there are 
no ready answers. That is why many reformers choose 
paths of reform that do not involve such destabilizing 
questions, such as working within the existing structure 
of classical Islamic legal theory—using them to update 
and even correct mistakes in the positive law, while 
still maintaining those established foundations.
Frankly, I have not done enough research on the role 
of consensus in established Islamic marriage law to 
know if it played a significant role in solidifying the 
doctrinal rules discussed here. I do not know, for 
example, if it was asserted that there is consensus 
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that male ownership is the basis of sexual licitness, 
let alone on the doctrines emerging from that concept 
(unilateral divorce, sexual availability of wife, etc.). 
But, given the pervasiveness of these concepts and 
the similarity of doctrinal rules across the schools, it 
is certainly possible that this is the case. If so, then 
there is a powerful dead-hand-of-the-past consensus 
challenge with which contemporary Muslim marriage 
law reformers must deal.
But if it is possible to get past the obstacle of consensus 
in established Islamic marriage law—and I personally 
hope that it is—I can imagine one possible approach 
that modern Muslim jurists could pursue to create an 
alternative scheme of Islamic marriage law, one that is 
not based upon an analogy to slavery and concubinage. 
The alternative, as I see it, lies in the Islamic law of 
partnership contracts.
A New Model for Islamic Marriage Law: The 
Partnership Contract
Could Islamic marriage contract law proceed from a 
different basis than the sales contract and the analogy 
to owning a female slave? I believe the answer is yes. 
There is an established body of Islamic contract law 
that seems to me quite well-suited for the subject 
of marriage and which would fit much better with 
contemporary sensibilities about marital respect and 
harmony, women’s agency and the aversion to slavery. 
That body of law is the field of Islamic partnership 
contracts, a field that not only has historical pedigree 
going back to the earliest periods of Islamic legal 
practice, but also has commanded vibrant new 
attention, because it is instrumental in contemporary 
thinking about modern Islamic finance (El-Gamal 
2006).
While I do not claim to be an expert in the Islamic 
contract law, let alone the nuances of partnership 
contracts, my review of this field indicates that it may 
be a fruitful area for new ijtihad on marriage contract 
law. To summarize, Islamic law regarding partnership 
contracts is based on several primary features that 
are useful for modern marriage contracts. Partnership 
contracts recognized under Islamic law depend on all 
the parties’ continuous concurrent consent, in both 
the continuation of partnership and the terms imposed 
on each party. In addition, each party has to contribute 
something to the partnership—whether it is capital, 
labor, or something else. Beyond these generalities, 
there are many specific types of partnership contracts 
recognized in Islamic law, and the rules governing them 
vary across the schools. As an example of one doctrinal 
scheme, the Hanbali school (probably the simplest 
system) requires that partners agree 1) to assume 
relations of mutual agency and at times suretyship, 2) 
to contribute work, credit, or capital, or combinations 
of all three, and 3) to share profits in predetermined 
percentage shares. In addition, each partner binds 
the other partners in dealings with third parties and 
is liable for any infractions. Perhaps most significant 
for our present purposes, partnership contracts are 
revocable at will by any partner and terminate with the 
death of any partner (El-Gamal 2006).
There are three basic principles that are deemed to 
be essential to all partnerships, and cannot be varied 
even by the parties’ agreement. These are 1) they 
are revocable at will, 2) losses are borne by partners 
in proportion to their shares of ownership of capital, 
and 3) profits must be shared by percentage, not in 
fixed sums. These three principles, too complicated to 
fully describe here, stem from Islamic legal doctrine 
prohibiting interest and speculative transactions (the 
underlying purpose being to prevent unfair advantage 
by capitalizing on future uncertainties) (Vogel 1998).
Given these basic parameters, I believe that Islamic 
partnership contracts are better suited to be the 
base theoretical model for modern Muslim marriage 
contracts than the current sales contract model. If 
we take seriously the principle—recognized by even 
classical jurists—that both husband and wife are 
parties to the contract, then partnership contracts 
are a logical framework for thinking about marriage 
contracts. Moreover, marriages vary widely between 
couples and contexts, and there are many different 
types of partnership contracts recognized in 
established Islamic law. This facilitates a variety of 
choices by spouses wishing to tailor their marriage 
contract to individual circumstances. For example, 
a limited partnership ‘inan) is one where each of the 
partners contributes both capital and work, whereas in 
a silent partnership (mudaraba), some of the partners 
contribute only capital and the others only work; in a 
labor partnership (abdan), the partners contribute only 
work, and in a credit partnership (wujuh), the partners 
pool their credit to borrow capital and transact 
business with it. (Each of these simple models could be 
combined to form more complex types of partnerships.) 
Given the infinite diversity of marriage styles, using 
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partnership contracts as the basis for Islamic marriage 
law is a very useful platform for couples to tailor their 
marriage contract to reflect their own unique financial, 
work, and life circumstances.
Another benefit of a new scheme of marriage law based 
on partnership contract law is that it would preserve 
the existing structure of marriage as a contract, and 
merely shift the contract type from that of sales to 
partnership. Thus, although it would not follow the 
existing jurisprudence based on sales and slavery 
contracts, a new partnership-based model of Islamic 
marriage law would not stray too far from established 
Islamic jurisprudence as whole, because it would draw 
from existing, well-established principles of a different 
area of Islamic contract law.
In sum, I believe that the Islamic law of partnership 
contracts is eminently well-suited to be the basis of 
new ijtihad for Muslim marriage law, because it would 
facilitate new rules honoring mutual spousal respect, 
including in sexual relationships, and the concept of 
women’s agency. As I am not a specialist in Islamic 
contract law, I cannot fully work out the details here, 
but I can offer some preliminary suggestions on how 
this model could offer positive changes in some areas 
of existing Islamic marriage law that are harmful to 
women.
Licitness of Sexual Activity
As theorized in established Islamic jurisprudence, 
sex is made licit in marriage by a husband’s payment 
(initially the mahr, and over time, marital support) 
by which he acquires exclusive “ownership” over the 
wife’s sexual parts. As summarized above, this concept 
is directly related to the juristic analogy of marital 
sex to sex with a female slave: in both cases, payment 
makes sex lawful by analogy to a “sale” of sexual access. 
But what if the analogy to a sale contract is not used? 
What if the payment part of the marriage contract—
the mahr—was not the price of sexual licitness, but 
rather, incidental to it?
In other words, what would make sex licit if marriage 
contracts are viewed through a partnership, not a 
sales, lens? The most obvious answer seems to lie 
in the core element of any contract—the mutual 
agreement of the parties. Even in established Islamic 
marriage law, the idea of consent of the parties is a 
crucial factor in establishing the validity of offer and 
acceptance of a marriage contract, and the payment of 
mahr and maintenance are only additional (required) 
components of that contract. Perhaps, then, mutual 
agreement could be considered the core element to 
the validity of a marriage contract, and thus the basis 
of the licitness of sexual activity within that marriage. 
This seems to me to be the most logical answer, and the 
most responsive to the idea of marriage as beginning 
with the mutual consent of autonomous human agents.
Basing the licitness of sex on mutual marital 
agreement also honors modern sensibilities about the 
nature of healthy sexual relationships. The classical 
scheme, by basing the licitness of sex on male control 
and ownership, easily leads to situations of women 
becoming sexual objects—mere receptacles for the 
male sex drive. Despite Islamic moral exhortations 
otherwise, existing Islamic law does not protect sex as 
a mutual act where agency and consent of both parties 
is essential. Today, the idea of treating women as sex 
objects is socially unacceptable. It is understood as 
harmful to women, to relationships, and to society in 
general. A partnership model of marriage contracts 
would facilitate a clear break from the destructive 
outdated idea of sexual licitness based on male 
ownership and exclusive control, looking instead to 
mutuality and consent.
This new concept of sexual licitness would also 
eliminate legal tolerance for marital rape. In a 
partnership model of marriage contract, marital 
support would no longer be a payment in exchange 
for the sexual availability of the wife, but rather, a 
bargained-for negotiation reflecting an agreement 
of mutual financial and labor responsibilities within 
a marriage. Because a husband’s payment of support 
would no longer be the basis of the licitness of sex 
within the marriage, a financially-supported wife 
would no longer be obligated to be sexually available 
on demand. Sexual rights would be based on mutuality, 
respect and companionship, rather than male 
ownership and payment.
Mahr
This brings us specifically to the topic of the mahr. If, 
under a partnership model, mahr is not payment for 
access to a woman’s sexual parts, then what purpose 
would it serve? Would it even still be important in a 
scheme of partnership-based marriage contracts? I 
believe that the mahr should remain an important 
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element of Islamic marriage contracts, even under the 
partnership model, but not for the same reasons as 
imagined in the sales model. The mahr is specifically 
designated in the Quran and Prophetic narrations 
as important, so I think it should be taken seriously. 
The scriptural sources are silent, however, on the 
reasons behind the mahr, so we are left to speculate 
on this question. The idea that the mahr is payment 
for licit sexual access in established jurisprudence is 
one speculation by classical jurists based on their own 
social context and analogies that seemed appropriate 
at the time. But we are not obligated to agree with their 
speculation.
Once we eliminate the idea of the mahr as consideration 
for sexual access, then some interesting new insights 
open up. One thing that is striking in the Quranic 
verses on mahr is the suggestion that it is a type of gift 
rather than a bargained-for consideration. In contract 
law, consideration always involves a mutual exchange 
of something. But gifts are given freely, not exchanged 
for something else. On the other hand, because it is 
commanded by the Quran, a mahr is not purely a gift 
either. Instead, it seems more like an effect or incident 
of the contract, automatically and externally imposed 
upon the parties by law—in this case, the Law of God. 
I imagine it to be similar to the fair labor statutes and 
rules of consumer protection in American law in that 
these are legislated to automatically attach clauses 
to some routine contracts in order to protect parties 
likely to be vulnerable.
While special protection to women as the vulnerable 
parties in a marriage contract might seem sexist to 
some, I do not find it offensive that the Quran would 
take into account the biological and social realities 
that can put women at a financial disadvantage. That 
is, there are natural limitations on many women’s 
working hours due to childbearing, infant nursing 
and child rearing, for those who choose to do so. 
Add to these facts the historical realities of gender 
discrimination in the marketplace, many of which are 
still true today, and the gendered power imbalances 
that cause women specific financial disadvantages 
are hard to ignore. (To take just one contemporary 
example, an American Muslim woman might find good 
use for her mahr in simply funding post-partum time 
off from her job, given the lack of federally required 
paid maternity leave in the United States.) In sum, I 
find it quite logical to imagine that the Quranic verses 
require mahr in order to provide a type of “fair labor” 
tool by which women could neutralize the potential 
biological and social disadvantages they might face 
during their life.
Then again, not every woman becomes a mother, and 
not every woman needs help in attaining financial 
independence. Accordingly, the mahr requirement 
allows for individualized tailoring to respond to each 
woman’s unique circumstances. The substantive 
content of each mahr is highly negotiable—it can 
be anything of value, ranging from a substantial 
financial sum to a symbolic token. (The Prophetic 
traditions mention several creative, non-monetary 
mahrs, including one man’s conversion to Islam, and 
another’s teaching his wife a chapter of the Quran.) 
Those women who do not feel they will need this tool 
can tailor their marriage contract accordingly. But for 
those who do, it is a powerful tool that, because of its 
Quranic source, cannot be easily dismissed by those 
around her.
In sum, whereas the classical jurists spent very little 
time thinking about the practical realities that the mahr 
serves in a woman’s life, a new ijtihad of marriage law 
could benefit from the insights provided by women’s 
activists (Muslim and non-Muslim) chronicling 
the financial disadvantages that women regularly 
face. Seen in this light, the mahr is, like consumer 
protection law, a legally mandated incident of every 
marriage contract that reflects a higher legal principle 
that must be respected by the contracting parties. This 
understanding of mahr could eliminate the feeling of 
“selling oneself’ with which many brides associate it.
Marital Support
The mahr is not the only aspect of the marriage contract 
that could be tailored to a couple’s individualized needs 
under a partnership model. Because marital support 
would no longer be the basis for a male-ownership 
concept of sexual licitness, there would also be no 
automatic presumption that the husband must be the 
breadwinner. Spousal maintenance would instead be 
a mutually bargained for provision of each marriage 
contract. I see several social advantages to this 
increased flexibility in spousal financial obligations. 
First, it fits the reality that every marriage is different, 
and each spouse may have different skills that don’t 
always translate well to the husband-as-breadwinner 
default model. What if, for example, the husband 
is an artist who gets paid in large lump sums every 
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few years, but the wife has the skills to bring home a 
regular monthly paycheck? Or the husband prefers 
to be the primary child-rearer and the wife’s job pays 
more anyway? The partnership model allows spouses 
to negotiate these roles rather than operate against 
default presumptions that do not fit their lives.
Given the many types of partnerships recognized 
in Islamic law, there are a variety of legally ready-
made choices for spouses deciding how to allocate 
services and property contributions to their marital 
household. For example, one couple might create an 
‘inan (limited) partnership marriage contract where 
both spouses agree to contribute both capital and labor 
(“labor” being defined as either an income-creating job 
or household work and childrearing, or both). I would 
imagine this scenario would work well for a marriage 
in which both spouses plan to earn an income, but in 
unequal or unpredictable amounts. The traditional 
stay-at-home-parent scenario, on the other hand, 
seems more suited to a mudaraba (silent) partnership 
where one partner contributes labor and the other 
contributes capital. In each case, Islamic partnership 
law would provide further details on how the profits 
and losses should be borne by each party. (In the case 
of the ‘inan, the spouses need not contribute equal 
amounts of capital and they may determine the profit 
shares as they like, but losses should be borne in 
proportion to the capital contributions. In a mudaraba, 
Islamic partnership law provides that the spouse who 
provides the capital is liable for all losses, and the non-
capital-providing spouse bears no losses (except in 
losing his/her labor), and is not entitled to any capital 
profit until the capital-providing spouse has recouped 
his or her investment, and then only in the agreed 
percentage. An even more flexible marriage contract 
might use the model of an abdan partnership, in 
which both parties contribute only work, and Islamic 
partnership law holds that such partners are free to 
agree upon their relative shares of ownership of the 
partnership capital, and are obliged to share losses 
accordingly. And, again, all these simple models could 
be combined to create more complex combinations of 
marriage arrangements.
Finally, marriages mutually arranged under the 
partnership model would more powerfully include 
many contract stipulations that currently have only 
limited enforceability under existing Islamic marriage 
law. There is nothing inconsistent with the partnership 
model, for example, if a husband and wife were to agree 
that their marriage will be monogamous and create 
enforceable consequences for breach of this provision.
Divorce
Perhaps the most significant change that would 
occur in Islamic marriage law by switching to a 
partnership model would be the equalization of 
access to divorce. Because Islamic partnership law 
is based on the fundamental principle of all parties’ 
continuous concurrent consent to the continuation of 
the partnership, this means that in Islamic marriage 
law based on partnership contracts, both spouses 
would have the right to end the marriage at will. 
Thus, both husband and wife would have a unilateral 
right of divorce (except in the Maliki school, which 
would require mutual consent). This very powerful 
doctrinal change would honor modern sensibilities 
about women’s agency and correct the uneven, 
often manipulative power that traditional Islamic 
marriage law allows husbands to wield against their 
wives in a time of divorce. It would also complete 
the disentanglement of the idea of male ownership 
as central to the legitimacy of marital relations that 
exists in established marriage law.
Because it would be so drastic a change from centuries 
of established Islamic marriage law, mutual spousal 
rights to unilateral divorce might prove to be a rather 
hard sell in Muslim publics. Indeed, exclusive male 
access to unilateral divorce has been one area that 
has been extremely resistant to legislative change in 
modern Muslim-majority countries, largely because 
so many believe it is a fundamental aspect of Islamic 
marriage law. But the idea of women exercising 
talaq divorce is not itself unheard-of in established 
jurisprudence. Even under existing Islamic marriage 
law, a woman can acquire a “delegated” talaq right 
from her husband, usually documented in her marriage 
contract (Ali 2009). This “delegated divorce” option has 
in fact garnered a lot of attention from contemporary 
Muslim women’s activists encouraging Muslim women 
to preserve this right for themselves in modern Muslim 
marriage contracts. What the partnership model 
of marriage contracts would do, then, would be to 
eliminate the gendered preference of the unilateral 
divorce right. Instead of automatically giving it to 
husbands (and allowing it to wives only through 
delegation from their husbands) the partnership model 
would give both spouses this right equally (or under the 
Maliki school, both would be limited by a requirement 
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of mutual consent). This is possible because (contra 
the sales model) male ownership of the marriage tie 
would not be the central legitimizing feature of a 
partnership-based Muslim marriage contract.
Moreover, equalization of access to divorce means that 
under the partnership model of marriage contracts, 
there would no longer be any need for a doctrine 
of woman-initiated divorce (khul’) and the sharp 
doctrinal differences between it and male-initiated 
unilateral (talaq) divorce. Whether or not a woman 
keeps her mahr would thus have nothing to do with 
whether or not she initiated the divorce. With the mahr 
being disentangled from the idea of payment for sexual 
access (and the return of mahr in a khul’ divorce being 
described as a wife “buying herself back”), a woman’s 
mahr would be controlled only by the mutually-agreed 
terms of the marriage contract. Similarly, judicial 
divorce (faskh), if it existed, need not focus on fault 
or grounds for divorce committed by the husband, but 
rather, could become more like third-party mediation 
of asset division and other logistical needs of divorcing 
parties, whenever a couple is in need of such assistance.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have briefly sketched out how a new 
scheme of Islamic marriage law based on Islamic 
partnership law might work. If such a doctrine were 
fully developed and implemented, it would enable 
women-empowering rationales to flow logically with 
the doctrinal rules, rather than at cross-purposes to 
each other, as occurs now. The result would likely be 
a vast improvement in the situation of many Muslim 
women as well as the strategies employed by sharia-
based women ‘s rights activists. However, I am also 
aware that not everyone would welcome such a new 
scheme. First, it may not be considered legitimate 
according to the jurisprudential boundaries of 
acceptable Islamic law reform, and thus would not be 
respected by religious authorities with the strongest 
influence on the general Muslim public. Second, many 
Muslims (jurists and laypersons) see no need for 
reform in the first place, and are quite satisfied with 
established fiqh doctrine on marriage as it is. Thus, it 
is inevitable that, no matter how solid the reasoning, 
a new partnership model of Islamic marriage law will 
only ever appeal to a part of a given Muslim audience.
From this fact, I take two lessons: 1) fiqh diversity 
means that the new has to tolerate the old, and 
2) it is always good to have a back-up plan. The first 
lesson is simply this: the same ijtihad principle that 
would give legitimacy to a new partnership-based 
doctrine also gives legitimacy to the existing sales-
based doctrine. The fallible nature of both old and new 
doctrinal schemes means that both must be allowed 
to exist. This preservation of doctrinal diversity is, in 
my opinion, one of the most powerful attributes of 
Islamic jurisprudence, because it facilitates choice. 
That means that there is no way to excommunicate or 
officially eliminate the established scheme of Islamic 
marriage contract law, even if a new scheme is crafted. 
That new scheme would simply exist alongside the 
existing scheme in the marketplace of fiqh, and modern 
Muslims would have the freedom to choose between 
them.
Given that first lesson, the second becomes even more 
important. Despite my enthusiasm for the prospect 
of a new partnership-based Islamic marriage law and 
what it could do for Muslim women, I have to ask: 
what is the back-up plan if this new model (if and 
when it is created) fails to take sufficient hold? Do 
we use the imperfect strategies developed under the 
established Islamic marriage law, or do we hold out 
until we can convince more Muslims to adopt the new 
and improved model? The dilemma feels similar to 
that faced by American proponents of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) to the United States Constitution 
in the early 1980s when it failed to be ratified by the 
last deadline. Given that the ERA provided clearly-
stated coherent constitutional protection for women’s 
rights, should these activists have held out until 
it could be proposed again, or was it better to use 
the not-as-ideal Equal Protection doctrine of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to work for gender equality? 
The activist in me leans toward doing the best we can 
with what we have, although the theorist in me much 
prefers the cleaner, more coherent path of new ijtihad 
and fresh legal reform. A back-up plan provides us 
something to use in the interim before an alternative 
scheme of Islamic marriage law can be created (and 
even afterwards, for those Muslim women choosing 
to follow the traditional scheme). This means that the 
strategies currently employed by sharia-based Muslim 
women’s rights activists may be the only tools available 
to provide some modicum of mutuality and equality in 
Muslim marital rights right now. These strategies may 
not be, as Kecia Ali points out, as theoretically clean as 
a fully-formed alternative model of marriage in Islam, 
but they have the advantage of being immediately 
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effective in those limited areas where they can help 
women.
This brings us back to the mahr, and my advice to modern 
Muslim brides (and grooms). Yes, the jurisprudence that 
equates mahr with the “price” of female sexual access 
is disturbing, and thus it is understandable that many 
Muslim women opt out of including a substantial mahr 
in their marriage contracts. However, I believe that 
this knee-jerk rejection of mahr is shortsighted. Why 
let inappropriate and outdated juristic presumptions 
about sexuality rob women of what could be a very 
powerful tool for financial independence? I believe 
that strategic use of the mahr should be part of a back-
up plan for women’s empowerment under existing 
doctrine, and it will have an even more powerful role 
in women’s agency if it is part of a partnership scheme 
of marriage law that is developed in the future.
So, to Kecia Ali’s challenge for a new model, I answer 
“yes, there is a better way,” and I have laid out here 
my ideas of what that way could look like. The legal 
theorist in me, the ERA supporter in me, would love 
a brand new doctrinal scheme along this model to 
become the Islamic norm. But the activist in me warns 
that if this doesn’t happen, we must not abandon the 
needs of the many women living within the classical 
model. That is why I believe the current approach of 
sharia-based Muslim women’s rights activists, no 
matter how much Kecia Ali points out its ideological 
mismatch with established law, should nevertheless 
be respected and understood for the pragmatic good 
that it does, working within the existing paradigm. 
But I also believe that Kecia Ali and I share a hope 
for a future where such back-up plans are no longer 
necessary. 1
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Afterword from Polygyny: 
What It Means When African 
American Muslim Women 
Share Their Husbands
D E B R A  M A J E E D  ( 2 0 1 5 )
Polygyny is a story of Black women and Black love. It acknowledges that legal, cultural, and religious 
understandings of the Islamic marriage institution in a Muslim minority context continue to significantly impact 
the lives of Muslim women as well as communities in which marriageable men are in short supply and women 
outlive those who remain. (A lengthy chapter is devoted to “The Islamic marriage institution” in Jamal J. Nasir, 
The Status of Women Under Islamic Law and Modern Islamic Legislation, 3rd edition [Leiden: Brill, 2009]. That 
“data pertaining to rates of marriage among Black women register a distinctive social reality,” is a key theme in 
Dianne M. Stewart, Black Women, Black Love: America’s War on African American Marriage [New York: Seal Press, 
2021].) This is a story that speaks in generalities to maintain the anonymity of my subjects and in specificity to 
visibly link multiple-wife marriage among African American Muslim women to the heterosexual dyadic unions 
of other Muslims in the U.S., whereby both forms of household organization regulate relationships, resources, 
status, and identity. While Islam extends conditional permission to husbands to take up to four wives, their 
successful application depends upon the dynamic and evolving nature of communal exegesis and attention to 
otherwise declared private matters. My current project on Muslim widows serves as a fitting sequel to Polygyny 
in that both works interrogate interpretations of the Qur’an by twenty-first-century Muslims. This conclusion of 
the first book-length treatment to explore the embodied experiences of African American Muslim women who 
share their husbands focuses on a single story, one that reinforces the importance of spousal transparency and 
transgenerational support in healthy marriage formation regardless of form and the deficiencies inherent in 
communal practices that do not center the health and wellbeing of women and children.
This afterword is part of Polygyny: What It Means When African American Muslim Women Share Their Husbands 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2015) and is republished here with permission. 
Suggested citation: Debra Majeed, “Afterword” from Polygyny: What It Means When African American Muslim 
Women Share Their Husbands, in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of Faith: American Muslim Marriage and Divorce in the Twenty-
First Century (Boston: OpenBU, 2021), pp. 68-75. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42505
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Muslim Womanist Praxis and Polygyny
It’s taboo for people to talk about polygamy, at 
least  in front of the parties involved, because of 
the assumptions  that the first wife is distraught, 
that the first marriage is on the rocks, or that 
the second wife doesn’t care about the first. 
Rabi'a, blog post
As a womanist, I routinely ask the “So what?” of my 
scholarship. That is, I strive to link my intellectual 
explorations to practical applications that can benefit 
the communities and subjects I study. This is one way I 
attempt to give back to those who share their feelings, 
experiences, and lived realities with me. I wrote 
Polygyny with the hope that the musings within might 
lead to broader conversations and expanded initiatives 
about marriage and family life that could educate and 
empower women like Karimah, with whom I first began 
to reflect on multiple-wife marriage. I am pleased to 
say that such reflection is under way. Void of a unified 
direction that the association of Imam Mohammed 
is willing to embrace, however, the inequities that 
I observed will continue. As Mignon Jacobs has 
discerned, “Relationships define the well-being of a 
community and reflect its ideologies.”1
From the start, I have been aware that some women 
resist becoming Muslim or aligning themselves 
with the association of Imam Mohammed because 
of practices like polygyny that they consider to be 
undesirable.2 I have been concerned about where and 
in what manner Muslim women could be situated at 
the forefront of dialogues that involve them. How, 
I have wondered, can African American Muslim 
women bring their experiences of living Islam into the 
process of theological interpretations and practical 
applications of them? While I neither condone nor 
promote polygyny, I do support its decriminalization. 
I do realize that it is here and practiced by African 
American Muslims. Thus I feel, as Imam Mohammed 
has directed, that his community needs to confront it 
and marriage as a whole to enhance Muslim family life. 
Here, I begin to theorize about what a Muslim 
womanist praxis might begin to look like if the subject 
were multiple-wife marriage. I have no definitive 
answers. Still, while these recommendations reside at 
the reflection stage, they do speak to the findings of 
this pro-woman, pro-family study.
It should be of no surprise that I am guided by my 
sources here as well as throughout the study. I take 
full advantage of a single source—the final interview 
subject for this book. Rabi'a has been a dear colleague 
for several years. When she began to home-school 
her children shortly after the birth of her first son, 
we drifted apart; our encounters became limited to 
occasional and chance conversations in the hallways 
of annual conferences. That said, I always thought she 
had the perfect academic position, a nice home in a 
geographical region with great weather, the support 
of one of the strongest mosque communities in the 
nation, and a wonderful marriage. I envied her, as did 
many others. But when we reconnected as publication 
of this book neared, I was reminded of the real reason 
I so admired her and continue to do so today. Rabi'a 
takes her faith seriously and lives it transparently, with 
a regular mix of vulnerability, honesty, and expectancy. 
In telephone conversations and email correspondence, 
we caught up recently. I quickly discovered that Rabi'a 
gave birth to her third child in 2013; her husband, 
Waleed, took a second wife two months later. Only 
now has Rabi'a been ready to talk with me about 
the experience of living polygyny. She called our 
conversations therapeutic; I received them as a fitting 
way to offer a few final thoughts.
Now in their thirties, Rabi'a and Waleed have been 
married for nine years. This is her first marriage, his 
second. From the start, Waleed was open about his 
interest in multiple-wife marriage if the opportunity 
emerged and if Rabi'a agreed. Like Rabi'a, he was 
concerned about women in their mosque who desired 
marriage but were unable to find suitable mates. Rabi'a 
was convinced that her husband was “the type of person 
who could do” polygyny, that he was emotionally, 
physically, spiritually, and financially mature enough 
to take on the additional responsibility. More 
important, Rabi'a characterized her husband as one 
who is faithful to Allah. So, together they studied the 
authoritative sources of Islam, talked to acquaintances 
living polygyny, and prayed—a lot, as other couples 
have done. As they did, Rabi'a reminded Waleed of two 
of her more earthly preconditions for living polygyny: 
at least seven years of marriage to her and an annual 
income of $100,000. Having met both within eight 
years, Waleed approached Shakirah, a woman Rabi'a 
agreed would be potentially a good co-wife. Rabi'a was 
not surprised to learn of Shakirah’s first question to 
Waleed: “What does Rabi'a think?” 
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My encounters with Rabi'a and other sources for this 
book have prompted a number of recommendations 
regarding multiple-wife marriage, especially for five 
constituencies: mosque communities nationally, those 
who officiate at nikah ceremonies, women about to 
marry, women who desire to live polygyny, and men 
who are about to live polygyny and their current spouses.
First, I recommend a widespread process of engagement, 
dialogue, and education on the forms of marriage 
permissible in Islam and their application in the 
secular United States. While the findings of this study 
reveal a wide array of perceptions, contradictions, and 
paradoxes, one theme is undeniable: many people live 
polygyny without the backing of the Qur’an or the 
tradition of the Prophet, and they do so to the detriment 
of themselves and others. It is equally evident that no 
consensus exists among Muslims globally, locally, or 
within the community of Imam Mohammed on the 
purpose, benefits, and responsibilities associated with 
marriage as an institution established by G’d. By this I 
mean that a Muslim woman from Peoria, Illinois, may 
encounter different ideas about her marital rights in 
general or in reference to polygyny specifically if she 
moves from the Midwest to the South, for example. 
Furthermore, many imams and religious leaders are 
divided on the legality of polygyny in the United States 
and other countries where multiple-wife marriage is 
prohibited by civil law. For antipolygyny leaders, the 
equality prescribed by the Qur’an is unobtainable 
for co-wives in marriages that are unregistered with 
civil courts. These women do not have access to legal 
spousal rights in the event of divorce or the deaths of 
their husbands. Perhaps a series of monthlong events 
that occur at the same time in every willing mosque 
and are facilitated by women and men could help 
dispel the many myths about the single most important 
framework for family development. Such initiatives 
about marriage and family life could be incorporated in 
various forums (Friday congregational prayers, sisters’ 
circles, brothers’ classes, Sunday taleem, special events, 
and so forth). Those who say they follow the leadership 
of Imam Mohammed (and others) would benefit from 
clarity on a number of crucial issues, like timing, the 
importance of written marriage contracts, and notice 
to current wives.
I recommend discussions about children and mental 
health issues, too, with particular attention devoted to 
how to Islamically prepare children for marriage and, 
if necessary, for divorce. A recent focus group for a 
project on female religious authority reminded me of 
the urgency of the latter. There, nine African American 
Muslim women gathered weeks before Ramadan 
2014 to respond to a video about Amina Wadud that 
focused on the woman-led prayer movement. Quickly 
the discussion turned to scripture and the importance 
of waiting on Allah for direction in life decisions. 
Suddenly, a burst from a thirty-eight-year-old woman 
interrupted the otherwise pleasant discussion, 
revealing the painful life her mother endured for years 
after her husband took a second wife. It was clear to all 
that the experience adversely altered the mother’s and 
daughter’s perceptions of themselves and their Creator. 
“My mother died waiting on Allah,” the woman said, 
emphasizing the word “waiting.” This woman did not 
feel her mother received the necessary care from her 
community, and she is still wrestling with G’d about 
the treatment of her mother. Thus, for this woman, her 
mother’s wait extends beyond death.
I suggest an expansion of Imam Mohammed’s nine 
guidelines to require some level of oversight of 
imams and others who officiate at nikahs, regardless 
of marriage form, and formal instruction on the road 
to healthy marriage for male and female Muslims. 
Perhaps some of his leaders who coordinate workshops 
and forums on family life around the country 
could take more visible and joint leadership in this 
endeavor. Already at work are Maryam Muhammad of 
Charlotte, Imam Faheem Shuaibe of Oakland, Imam 
Khalil Akbar of Charlotte, Imam Ronald Shaheed of 
Milwaukee, Munirah Habeel, Imam A. K. Hasan, and 
Debra Hasan of Los Angeles, and Ndidi Okakpu of 
Chicago, among others. Endeavors such as the Healthy 
Marriage Initiative organized by SHARE (Services for 
Human Advancement and Resource Enhancement) 
Atlanta add to the mix of opportunities that could be 
contexualized around the country. Linking these efforts 
with other activities nationwide might spearhead the 
formation of a database of contacts and resources by 
one of these groups that any American Muslim could 
access. Drawing upon the expertise of female health 
professionals, sociologists, and theologians could 
prove useful as well. 
Second, I would recommend requiring local mosques 
and Islamic organizations to keep track of marriage 
registrations (both civil and religious) of couples 
affiliated with them, even nikah-only unions. In the 
absence of an ordained member of the clergy, any 
knowledgeable Muslim can officiate at a wedding; those 
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providing this service have been overwhelmingly male.3 
The lack of transparency in this area has contributed to 
a number of secret ceremonies. Perhaps the handbook 
for imams that Imam Rabbani Mubashshir of Chicago 
has been charged to draft by the Conveners of the 
Midwest Region will include attention to the roles and 
responsibilities of female guardians, those who assist 
in the negotiation of marriage contracts and those who 
conduct marriage ceremonies.  
I certainly am not an advocate for American family 
law or civil courts, in which petitioners of divorce 
are required to publicly appear and testify to 
personal details in the presence of strangers. I must 
acknowledge, however, that women whose marriages 
are registered with the state have access to legal 
judgments that carry enough weight to induce most 
men to comply. Without communal involvement or 
enforcement, women living polygyny and divorce in 
Muslim-minority areas are on their own when they may 
be most in need of care and protection. Yes, women in 
Muslim countries can be—and many are—vulnerable, 
too. But in the United States, a marriage license enables 
the state to investigate the status of potential spouses. 
No doubt, this would mean state intrusion, but it could 
also mean state protection of women and children. For 
those opposed to civil involvement, a similar process 
could be developed for religious-only ceremonies. In 
this study I have discovered that polygyny leaves open 
the possibility of incredible manipulation; a process 
of recourse could help ensure gender equality and 
social justice.
The third recommendation is one I intend for women 
whose husbands are considering taking additional 
wives. Rabi'a and other women living polygyny have 
chosen to exercise their agency by stating in their 
contracts what type of marriage theirs will be. In 
addition, Rabi'a and her husband discussed the matter 
privately and with Shakirah, who was about to enter 
her second polygynist union. The three also sought 
advice from knowledgeable and respected community 
members, marriage therapists, and family law experts. 
Engaging in such a process could help some women, 
like those living polygyny of coercion, avoid the pitfalls 
of unhealthy family dynamics. Rabi'a said she had to 
learn that “just because he’s taken a second wife doesn’t 
mean he doesn’t care about you.” She had to admit that 
what she felt distinguished her from all other women, 
being the only mother of her husband’s children while 
he is married to her, could change one day.
Among the pieces of advice Rabi'a received was this: 
“Focus inward because this journey is yours, not your 
husband’s, sister’s, friend’s . . . yours.”4 Even with good 
advice, however, Rabi'a is quick to acknowledge that 
living polygyny isn’t a simple journey:
Know that this is potentially a sad situation….
To prefer someone over you, you have to have a 
certain type of relationship with Allah, a certain 
way of seeing, not the average way. You have 
to see for the next life. You don’t always see 
through Allah’s eyes.
When you’re having these apprehensions [that 
accompany polygyny], it’s because your heart is 
occupied with other than Allah.5
Finally, Rabi'a cautions women not to say “yes” or 
“okay” when they mean “no.” It is every woman’s 
Islamic right, she and others say, to choose not to 
live polygyny even if the wife thinks her husband is 
approaching the practice according to the dictates of 
Islam. “Believe that there is something in this for you,” 
Rabi'a adds. “If he’s a good man and he really loves you, 
now he’s trying to please you even more.”
My fourth recommendation is directed to women who 
desire to marry and to live polygyny. Findings in this 
study suggest that justice and a peaceful existence are 
more likely when first and potential subsequent wives 
communicate prior to any multiple-wife marriage. 
Rabi'a suggests that others do what Shakirah did: 
reflect upon the likely journey of the husband’s current 
wife, talk with her about her feelings, and share one’s 
own. The two women ideally would explore potential 
issues such as the likelihood of additional children, 
managing family outings and special celebrations, 
explaining the marriage decision to others. They would 
ask questions like “Can he really afford this?” They 
would not proceed if the first wife or wives disapprove. 
The prospective wife would be mindful, too, that while 
he is negotiating a new union with her, his current wife 
or wives may be renegotiating their contracts. In the 
end, if women want for each other what they want for 
themselves, my subjects say, justice and the fear of 
Allah should be their yardstick.
This study reveals the benefits of a fully public nikah for 
second, third, and fourth wives. On this front, I find the 
link of acknowledgement to responsibility articulated 
by Lamisha and Rabi'a instructive. Making vows public, 
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particularly in the presence of a husband’s current wife 
or wives, can add legitimacy to all his marital decisions, 
my sources say. But even if they choose not to attend, 
nikahs should be conducted with the awareness, if not 
approval, of all current spouses.
I acknowledge that this recommendation differs from 
the qualifications outlined by Imam Mohammed. But 
he taught his students to have minds of their own, 
fully aware that each individual is responsible for 
her behavior before Allah. Rabi'a wrote this in her 
private blog:
When you do something like this, you do it for 
God. You do it to please God, to be in God’s 
favor, to receive God’s love, to be one of God’s 
favorites. Because, as the Qur’an states, God 
loves those who prefer others above themselves, 
God loves those who are patient, God loves those 
who put their trust in Him, God loves those who 
carry out the most beautiful acts.  
I realized about a month before my husband’s 
wedding that cultivating a friendship with 
my co-wife would make things easier for me 
particularly because we see each other all of the 
time in our mosque community. Both of us are 
active and loved members of the community. We 
have pretty much the same friends, though our 
closeness to these friends varies. Since people 
were going to be watching us, it would be best, I 
realized, to make those moments in the mosque 
or other community spaces as comfortable as 
possible, and forming a friendship with my co-
wife would make a difference. And it has!6
Obviously for Rabi'a, Shakirah, and others living 
polygyny of liberation or choice, women who choose 
their form of marriage and are involved in the selection 
of subsequent wives position themselves to enhance 
their marriages and their personal well-being. This 
means taking “the higher way.” Rabi'a has embraced 
this concept and found the words of one religious 
leader especially encouraging. She e-mailed them to 
about a dozen close family members and friends with 
whom she has shared her “life situation”:7
Some of the ulama say ahsanahu means that 
when Allah calls you to the higher way, you take 
that way. You don’t take the low way, even if it 
is acceptable. You take the high way. This is the 
time when Muslims have to rise above their ego, 
have to rise above their tribalism, rise above 
their own self identity, rise above their own 
images of worth that they put up higher than 
the din [deen] sometimes.8
Rabi'a says, “My heart was agitated about my life 
situation” some days, as the other women informants 
likewise have acknowledged. She says she gains 
strength in knowing that “this situation is really all 
about me and my journey to Allah.”9
The fourth and fifth recommendations are related, 
but the latter is directed specifically to men. As the 
strongest examples of living polygyny with any 
semblance of justice demonstrate, a man who desires 
to live polygyny must realize that courting or engaging 
in conversations with prospective wives with the full 
knowledge of his present wife or wives is the key to 
an Islamically strong and healthy marriage. It also is 
important for men to strive to legitimize subsequent 
unions with the immediate family of their potential 
wives. Waleed, for example, chose to communicate his 
rationale first to Rabi'a’s family and then to his soon-
to-be in-laws:
Rather than being excited, I am rather cautious 
and concerned, for Rabi'a, for Shakirah and also 
the impact on my sons. The major reason that 
more men do not even consider [polygyny] is 
because it is a serious responsibility; our faith 
has strong consequences for men who do not 
treat their wife/wives with fairness and justice. 
Additionally, there is the financial responsibility 
that most men would not or could not handle 
appropriately.
While I realize that polygyny is not the answer 
for creating healthy relationships in our 
faith community and beyond, it is one option 
available to the Muslim community to ensure 
that women have husbands to support them and 
children have fathers (stepfathers) to assist in 
guiding them. Looking back, I wish a courageous 
brother chose this path with my mother who 
was single and faithful for the last twenty years 
of her life.10
Interestingly, Waleed’s father is a polygynist who took 
a non-Muslim woman as his second wife but cautioned 
his son to forgo the practice due to the timing: Waleed 
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approached Shakirah when Rabi'a was pregnant with 
their third son. He and Shakirah exchanged vows 
when the youngest son of Waleed and Rabi'a was 
two months old.
Finally, I recommend the removal of communal 
acceptance of marriage ceremonies that occur without 
the knowledge of a husband’s current wife or wives. In 
other words, transparency needs to be woven into the 
process so that at least the local mosque community is 
aware of the commencement and conclusion of marriage 
contracts. This might mean that some men would be 
encouraged to adjust their timing or discouraged from 
entering polygyny at all. It may be prudent for them to 
contemplate the psychological, spiritual, and physical 
restrictions on their current wives, such as illness and 
pregnancy, that may limit the options women believe they 
can exercise. Such reflection might motivate some men to 
forgo polygyny or to delay taking additional spouses until 
their current wives are free to fully exert their agency, 
as Waleed’s father encouraged him to do. I would argue 
further that this is what Nasif, the father of Naim, means 
by “orientation.”
I would characterize the approach of the imam who 
conducted the nikah for Waleed and Shakirah as 
particularly instructive. Like some other women 
living polygyny do in this circumstance, Rabi'a 
chose to attend the event. During the ceremony, the 
officiating imam announced her agreement before the 
community and prior to the exchange of vows between 
Waleed and Shakirah. The imam explained the road to 
living polygyny he established together with the three 
of them. His expectations included Rabi'a’s presence 
at one of three premarital counseling sessions he 
required Waleed and Shakirah to attend. Rabi'a says 
she encouraged Waleed and Shakirah to make their 
marriage public and is convinced the officiating imam 
would not have conducted the wedding without her 
agreement. Making Waleed’s marriage to her co-
wife public helped position it on an equal plane with 
her own, Rabi'a says, and provides space for family 
members to verbalize their concerns.
As is common with many African American Muslims 
living polygyny, Rabi'a’s extended family included non-
Muslims. In fact, her mother, Hanan, also a Muslim, 
shared the news of her son-in-law’s impending 
marriage, paying particular attention to acknowledge 
her daughter’s role and perspective. Her e-mail read, 
in part:
Rabi'a is alright with her husband taking on 2nd 
wife, even though we know that it will not be an 
easy path, but God willing, a steeper path where 
Allah will shower a lot of Blessings and Mercy 
on them in this world and in the next. Marriage 
is a very important institution in Al-Islam. Our 
tradition states that you complete half of your 
religion through marriage. Each wife will be 
known publicly and equally as Waleed’s wife 
and not as a mistress. The relationships are 
honored in the sight of Allah. In most cases, the 
women have separate households and the man 
has to equally share his time between the two. 
This will be the case for them.  
Polygyny is not the norm in our religion, but 
allowed. Allah states through the Qur’an that 
the man has to be just to all of his wives. If 
he cannot be just, then he is only allowed one 
wife. One imam stated that if polygyny is done 
appropriately it can be a Mercy and a beautiful 
thing. If it is done inappropriately, it will be a 
messy thing. All three people involved, Rabi'a, 
Waleed, and Shakirah are special people of 
high morals and Muslim character and are 
good candidates for this situation, God willing. 
It takes a lot of courage and responsibility. 
They all want to please Allah and obey Allah. 
They are looking for the good that Allah has 
in it for themselves, the families involved, and  
the community.
We also understand and believe that Allah (God) 
only wants Good for the believer and we trust in 
that, and we trust in Him. Our immediate Muslim 
families (of Rabi'a, Waleed, and Shakirah) have 
been in many discussions about this upcoming 
event. There are mixed feelings amongst us as 
to be expected, but we have tried to honestly 
address our concerns, doubts, and well wishes 
openly. This has been therapeutic.11
The journey of Rabi'a, Waleed, and Shakirah continues, 
as do those of many of the sources in this book. 
Ultimately, the expectations of Qur’anic justice remain 
whether one enters monogamy or polygyny. Muslim 
men and women alike must acknowledge that the 
marriage and divorce processes they embrace in the 
United States are part of their religious and cultural 
identities.12 Together, they have the power, authority, 
and agency to decide the meaning of these processes 
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for themselves and for their future. My hope is that 
this book is received as one tool to help foster the good 
that Allah intends for all of our relationships.
1 Mignon R. Jacobs, Gender, Power, and Persuasion: The Genesis 
Narrative and Contemporary Portraits (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academics, 2007), 15.
2 See Dawn-Marie Gibson and Jamillah Karim, Women of the Nation: 
Between Black Protest and Sunni Islam (New York: New York 
University Press, 2014), 190.
3 Scholar and activist Kecia Ali, among other women, was asked 
and consented to officiate at a nikah in 2004. She records her 
reflections of the experience in “Acting on a Frontier of Religious 
Ceremony.” (Reproduced in this volume)
4 Rabi'a, e-mail conversation with author, July 17, 2014.
5 Rabi'a, interview with author, July 18, 2014.
6 Rabi'a, blog post used with permission. This is a private site for 
which either a link sent by the author or a password is needed. 
Those with access to the blog are Rabi'a’s family and friends who 
are aware of her household arrangement. 
7 In an earlier e-mail, Rabi'a refers to Eckhart Tolle’s use of the 
phrase “to distinguish between our life and the situations that 
come up in life (so we don’t identify our essence with a temporary 
situation)”; Rabi'a , e-mail conversation with author, July 18, 2014.
8 Rabi'a, e-mail reflection shared with author, July 28, 2014.
9 Rabi'a, e-mail conversation with the author, July 21, 2014.
10 Waleed, e-mail shared with the author, July 17, 2014. Waleed gave 
permission for Rabi'a to share with me the e-mail he sent to the 
family of his fiancée on the eve of their wedding.
11 Hanan, e-mail message shared with the author, July 18, 2014.
12 For a fuller discussion on marriage and divorce in the West, see 
Julie Macfarlane, Islamic Divorce in North America: A Shari’a Path 
in a Secular Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Divorce
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Specific Issues in 
Muslim Divorce
Z A H R A  A Y U B I  ( 2 0 0 6 )
This article from the Georgia State Bar’s Family Law Review serves as a brief primer for non-Muslim lawyers 
who are not familiar with Islamic law issues that might arise in Muslim divorces involving parties who want 
to incorporate laws from Islamic jurisprudence in their civil divorces. Muslims seeking divorce might find it 
useful to share it with their lawyers if they are interested in pursuing Islamic legal terms in divorce. It, like 
“Negotiating Justice” which is also included in this reader, arose from a research project on the intersections of 
civil divorce and Islamic divorce in the American context at a time when there was little published on the topic, 
other than Asifa Quraishi-Landes and Najeeba Syeed’s “No Altars,” also republished here.
This article originally appeared in The Family Law Review: A Publication of the Family Law Section of the Georgia 
State Bar (December 2006, pp. 1-5) and is republished by permission.
Suggested citation: Zahra Ayubi, “Specific Issues in Muslim Divorce,” in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of Faith: American 
Muslim Marriage and Divorce in the Twenty-First Century (Boston: OpenBU, 2021), pp. 76-79. https://hdl.handle.
net/2144/42505
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There are are an estimated four to six million Muslims 
in the U.S. and approximately 50 thousand reside 
in the state of Georgia. With the American Muslim 
population growing, U.S. courts have begun to rule on 
cases in which parties invoke Islamic law, and Muslim 
divorce laws in particular. Some courts have supported 
the use of traditional law or dispute resolution of the 
involved parties to settle their affairs using their own 
traditions, if they so desire.1 Increasingly, judges have 
made decisions on issues related to religious divorce.
These decisions have been, at best, inconsistent from 
case to case and, at worst, unjust, unduly favoring one 
party because the information on Muslim divorce law 
presented by expert witnesses or by one or both parties 
is incomplete, conflicting or inaccurate.2 Muslim 
divorce cases are similar to other American cases in 
that parties put forward any argument that will further 
their desired outcome and the usage of Islamic law is 
one way of doing that.
The most common issues related to Islamic law that 
emerge in Muslim civil divorce cases are: securing an 
Islamic divorce for the wife; mahr (dower paid directly 
to the wife or deferred); and division of marital assets 
and custody according to Islamic law. Often Muslim 
couples consider civil marriage a separate entity from 
the nikah (Muslim marriage contract) or religious 
marriage in the “eyes of God.” Divorce too can have 
similar dual, civil and religious, nature for Muslims 
who do not want civil law to exclusively determine 
their divorce terms.
Before discussing divorce, I will briefly describe 
how the Shari`a (Islamic law), which is made up of 
injunctions derived from the Qur’an (revelation) and 
hadith (reports of the Prophet Mohammed’s words 
and actions), can be used to represent different bodies 
of law. Today many scholars and lay Muslims include 
in their use of the term “Islamic Law” not just the 
Shari`a, but also fiqh (classical jurisprudence derived 
from Shari`a and local customs). Medieval jurists 
engaged in establishing the laws of fiqh expanded 
upon the Qur’an and hadith via four main schools of 
Sunni thought and two major schools of Shi’i thought. 
Although there are variations among these schools, 
contentions that arise in interpreting Islamic law 
are generally based on questioning the applicability 
of the classical fiqh in modern times because of its 
diverging doctrines, potentially sexist interpretations 
of Qur’an and hadith and outdated assumptions. It 
is important to note that Muslims in divorce courts 
may use the term “Islamic law” to imply verses of the 
Qur’an, hadith, fiqh, legislation from their countries of 
origin, or any combination of these. Although Islamic 
law is defined by the fiqh for many Muslim men and 
women, some American Muslim women who are 
concerned with adherence to religion, turn to gender 
egalitarian interpretations of the Qur’an and hadith 
to establish divorce terms in their favor that are also 
rooted in religion. However, women who do not have 
access to egalitarian literature, but insist on settling 
the divorce using Islamic laws over civil laws, are in 
danger of acquiescing to sexist interpretations of 
classical fiqh, which men or other women may put 
forward. It is because of these unresolved differences 
in interpretation of Islamic law and differences in 
adherence to Islamic law within the American Muslim 
community that proposals for establishing Islamic 
tribunals similar to the Beit Dins for Orthodox Jewish 
communities have become controversial and are seen 
as potentially unfair to women, even though making 
Islamic legal claims may be more understood in such 
a venue.
A common primary Islamic legal concern that arises in 
civil courts directly from the nature of Islamic divorce 
law, is securing religious divorce for the wife. Talaq is 
unilateral divorce in which a husband verbally, or in 
writing, repudiates his wife. Pronouncement of talaq is 
followed by a waiting period for the wife, during which 
the couple can reconcile and remain mar-ried. However 
once the waiting period expires, a couple is irrevocably 
divorced. If a husband divorces his wife, then takes 
her back during the waiting period, only to divorce her 
again, he may only take her back once more; a third 
repudiation is irrevocable. American Muslim men 
seeking divorce are usually able to pronounce talaq 
either before or after the civil divorce process.
By contrast, women have limited access to Islamic 
divorce. Traditionally, they may declare a khula 
(irrevocable female initiated divorce), but they must 
elicit consent from their husbands to end the marriage. 
Alternately they may seek judicial divorce in which a 
qadi (Islamic court judge) can dissolve the marriage on 
grounds proven by the wife that may include abuse, 
impotence, insanity or incarceration of the husband.
In the absence of an Islamic court system in the 
U.S., some women equate a civil divorce decree as an 
Islamic judicial divorce; others who seek religious 
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divorce, in addition to civil divorce, are able to 
substitute an imam for a qadi by either asking an imam 
for a religious divorce decree or religious permission 
to divorce in civil court. But some who believe that 
Islamic courts and qadis cannot be replaced by civil 
courts or imams, must either convince their husbands 
to pronounce talaq or give consent for khula in order to 
be religiously divorced. Therefore, for some American 
Muslim women, obtaining a religious divorce becomes 
a challenge in which divorce attorneys may involve 
themselves; like in some orthodox Jewish circles where 
established religious law is followed in addition to civil 
law, husbands can be reluctant to consent to religious 
divorce if civil divorce procedures have been initiated 
by wives—perhaps to keep them in limbo. (In Jewish 
law this is known as the Agunah problem). Some 
divorce attorneys have begun to include a stipulation 
of religious divorce in settlement offers as a potential 
remedy, but these measures are not always successful.
A second issue of contention is finances. In traditional 
fiqh, there is no concept of marital wealth. Husbands 
and wives do not share wealth, earnings or inheritance; 
however, wives are entitled to maintenance from their 
husbands for their living expenses. Both parties can 
use this fact of Islamic law during divorce to make 
very different arguments. Many American Muslim 
women do financially contribute to the household 
despite the separation of wealth in Islamic law and 
view their claims on martial assets as legitimate, but 
still hold that men’s claims on their earnings in the 
event of divorce unislamic. By the same token, women 
feel it is unislamic when men ignore laws of fiqh and 
verses from the Qur’an, which indicate that women are 
entitled to an equitable divorce and compensation.3 
Men’s counter argument generally involves the 
separation of wealth in Islamic law as a reason to 
ignore any due compensation. Many American Muslim 
women who claim a right on marital assets either 
do so because of their own contribution to martial 
wealth or by citing religious injunctions that entitle 
them to compensation in return for taking care of the 
household and child rearing.
The mahr can be an extension of disputes over finances. 
For many women, especially those not earning, the 
mahr signifies security money, which wives keep for 
themselves even in the event of talaq (a woman usually 
has to return the mahr in the event of a khula). However, 
in common practice in the U.S., the mahr has not been 
high enough to function as security money or has been 
promised, but not paid. Therefore, many women are 
only able to claim their mahr in the event of divorce 
and have attempted to do so through the civil divorce 
process. Some men (and women) have misunderstood 
this common practice to mean that mahr is a sum to 
be paid only in the event of divorce, rather than as a 
marriage dower to be paid at the wedding. Capitalizing 
on this misunderstanding of mahr, some men have 
made claims in civil court that the mahr is the only sum 
they are responsible to pay the wife according to Islam, 
especially if the mahr they agreed upon at the time of 
the wedding was symbolic (such as a gold necklace) or 
some other low amount. The inaccurate understanding 
of mahr is another example of how misinformation 
of religious law may be used to dismiss women’s 
legitimate civil and religious claims on marital assets.
Finally, another, but less common, allusion to Islamic 
law in civil divorce cases involves child custody. Because 
differences in legal opinion among the schools of fiqh 
are most apparent in this matter and since custody can 
be contested in a traditional Islamic system, custody 
battles over children in Muslim divorce cases usually 
resemble those in other American divorce cases. 
Litigants using Islamic law for determining custody 
may dispute over different rulings for male and female 
children, depending on their respective ages and 
when custody transfers from one parent to the other. 
Regardless of the school of thought, the assumption 
behind these particular laws is that staying with a 
particular parent at a particular age is presumed to be 
in the best interests of the child.
Even though Muslims have their own traditions in 
divorce, Islamic law is cited to various degrees in 
Muslim divorce cases depending on the religious 
orientation of the parties involved, or sometimes the 
number of generations their families have lived in the 
U.S.; still, many Muslim couples do not discuss Islamic 
law at all as they feel state laws prevails over religious 
law. Because pressing Islamic legal claims in civil 
divorce may work to women’s disadvantage, knowing 
the basic issues in Islamic divorce law and how biased 
inter-pretations against women could be easily passed 
off as a couple’s traditional method of settling divorce 
is important, especially when there are disputes over 
which set of laws, Islamic or civil, should be applied.
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1 Asifa Quraishi and Najeeba Syeed-Miller. No Altars: A Survey of 
Islamic Family Law in the United States. Islamic Family Law US 
Case Study. (2002) http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/cases/USA.htm
2 Qaisi, Ghada G. “A Student Note: Religious Marriage Contracts: 
Judicial Enforcement of ‘Mahr’ Agreements in American Courts” 
Journal of Law and Religion. Vol. 15, No. 1/2 (2000-2001), 67-81.
3 Verses 2:231, 2:241, 65:2 from the Qur’an
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No Altars: A Survey of  
Islamic Family Law in the 
United States
A S I F A  Q U R A I S H I - L A N D E S  A N D  N A J E E B A  S Y E E D  ( 2 0 0 4 )
When I was still a graduate student and there were about only five Muslim law professors in the country (I’m not 
exaggerating), one of them called me up with a project. Abdullahi An-Na’im was working on a book on Islamic 
Family Law around the world and he wanted me to work on the chapter about the United States. I remember 
actually chuckling out loud when he said “United States” – after all, how much could there be?  Turns out, not 
only was there plenty for an article, but this turned out to be one of the most important areas that directly 
affects American Muslims. And it is an area that most American Muslims know nothing about. Once I realized 
how big the topic was, I brought in my good friend Najeeba Syeed, an expert in arbitration and mediation, as 
my co-author. There is a lot to be learned from studying these cases (hint: don’t call your kitab a “pre-nuptial 
agreement”!). The chapter ended up so informative for women’s issues that it ended up not in An-Na’im’s global 
compilation, but instead in Lynn Welchman’s edited volume on Women’s Rights and Islamic Family Law.
This chapter was originally published as Asifa Quraishi and Najeeba Syeed-Miller, “No Altars: A Survey of 
Islamic Family in the United States” in Lynn Welchman, ed., Women Rights and Islamic Family Law (London and 
New York: Zed Books, 2004), pp. 179-219. Used by kind permission of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.
Suggested citation: Asifa Quraishi-Landes and Najeeba Syeed, “No Altars: A Survey of Islamic Family Law in the 
United States,” in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of Faith: American Muslim Marriage and Divorce in the Twenty-First Century 
(Boston: OpenBU, 2021), pp. 80-110. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42505
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Introduction
The family unit has long served as an organizing 
system for both social and legal regimes. The 
mechanisms to contract a marriage, raise one’s 
children, or dissolve a family are now basic elements 
of any well-developed legal framework. Central to the 
establishment of a family law system is the recognition 
that it will be invoked most often when a conflict 
occurs between those who are related to each other 
through the family unit. Indeed, those who focus on 
family law issues find that ‘the legal system is perhaps 
the most obvious manifestation of the value which 
society places on institutionalized mechanisms for 
conflict resolution’ (Kressel 1997: 48). Religion has 
also played a role in defining family interactions and 
their social consequences. In addition to preserving 
the future of a religious tradition, the concept of the 
family contributes to the development of religious 
law, because the complex financial, social and legal 
relationships in the family structure demand constant 
attention and regulation. Moreover, the intimate 
nature of family relations often triggers the desire for 
religious sanction of one’s actions, and most religions 
have filled this need well. Islam is no exception. 
Muslim jurists’ fiqh addresses critical aspects of family 
life in various detail, from the requirements of a valid 
marriage to mechanisms for divorce, and a variety of 
questions in between.
Muslims in the United States are in a complex position 
when it comes to applying family law, because they are 
governed by two sets of relevant rules, one religious 
and the other secular: Islamic law governs the family 
relations of those Muslims who want to validate 
before God their most intimate relations, while, 
simultaneously, United States law binds them through 
simple territorial sovereignty.1 Considering their 
religious identities important enough not to sacrifice 
at any secular altar, many Muslim couples are asserting 
their Islamic legal rights in American family courts 
and, as a result, the law surrounding Muslim marriages 
is becoming an important and complicated part of the 
US legal landscape.
Part III surveys the application and perception of 
Islamic family law in the United States, and the impact 
of living in this intersection of legal authority on 
Muslim families and communities. In the first chapter, 
‘Islamic Family Law in American Muslim Hands’, we 
address the intellectual and social discourse of US 
Muslims on Islamic family law topics, paying special 
attention to key issues of concern and debate and 
providing a brief overview of the sources of information 
available. In the following chapter, ‘The Muslim Family 
in the USA: Law in Practice’, we examine the practices 
of Muslims in conducting their marital lives in the 
USA, leading to a review in Chapter 12 of court cases 
involving Muslim marriage and divorce litigation in 
the United States, drawing general conclusions where 
possible with regard to the attitudes of US courts. 
The final chapter puts this study in broader context 
by addressing the theoretical roots of the current 
US Muslim experience. Special attention is given 
to uniquely US-based efforts to interpret and apply 
Islamic norms and values in everyday lives. Looking 
at both academic and grassroots work, this review also 
points the reader in the direction of future trends and 
goals, including potential community-based efforts 
to address Islamic family law issues not satisfactorily 
resolved in formal American courtrooms.
This section will stand out from the overall project 
(surveying global Islamic family law and directed by 
Abdullahi An-Na'im) of which it is a part, because it 
deals with Muslims as a minority population in a non-
Muslim state, presenting findings about the use of 
Islamic family law in places where it is not officially 
enforced by the state. The reader should thus keep in 
mind that most family issues involving Islamic law 
in this minority population are handled informally 
through internal mechanisms (family, community 
leaders, close friends, etc.), because Islamic law per 
se is not enforceable by state authority in the USA. 
Some cases do rise to the level of formal litigation in 
US courts, as will be seen, but the cases discussed in 
Chapter 12 may be unrepresentative of all applications 
of Muslim family law even within the formal court 
system, and are most probably not representative of 
applications of Islamic family law in the country as a 
whole. Nevertheless, despite its limitations in terms 
of space and scope, this study aims to provide the 
reader with a basic overview of how Muslims in the 
USA discuss topics of Islamic family law, the way it 
impacts on their lives directly, how the judicial system 
addresses its Muslim minority in these most intimate 
family issues, and, ultimately, what might be expected 
in the future from this unique community.2
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TEN: Islamic family law in American Muslim hands
Authority figures
To understand the wide variety of applications of 
Islamic family law that we will encounter in this 
study, it is important first to realize that the Muslim 
population in the USA is made up of a complex and 
continuously changing demographic. Of the estimated 
6 to 8 million Muslims in the United States, about half 
are immigrants from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, 
Europe - literally, all over the world.3 The other half 
is indigenous — meaning not only African Americans 
and European Americans, but also Native Americans 
and Latinos, as well as second- and third-generation 
children of immigrant parents. Moreover, of all the 
above ethnicities, any number can be converts to Islam 
or raised in the faith from birth.
This wide range of backgrounds is fertile ground for 
the pluralism of Islamic law (its ikhtilaf structure of 
simultaneously valid differing opinions)4 and results in 
a healthy diversity of ideological perspectives among 
Muslims in the USA. Thus, we find Muslims on all sides 
in debates around topics such as polygyny, gender 
roles and adoption, to name just a few.5 In finding a 
legal opinion to apply in their own lives, individuals 
can choose between the guidance of local Muslim 
scholars, community leaders, activist organizations, 
or their own personal interpretive efforts on a given 
question. Obviously, this plurality of sources creates 
a wide variety of applications of marriage and divorce 
procedures in the Muslim community - applications 
surveyed in more detail below.
Another wrinkle in US Muslim family law practices 
stems from the structure of authority in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Because there has never been an official 
church certifying individuals to speak on behalf of the 
religion, the field is open for any dedicated Muslim to 
seek to act as imam and lead a community. In a large 
Muslim society, there are usually societal checks to 
help maintain a sufficiently qualified cadre of these 
spiritual leaders. Even further, in Muslim countries 
with a formal system of Shari'a-based family law in 
place, as well as private pious and learned individuals 
available to guide the individual petitioner, there are 
likely to be state-recognized and sometimes state-
appointed muftis to issue guidance on issues of law, 
and state-appointed judges to apply it. In the USA, 
however, where there are no such checks, the quality 
of imams tends to run the gamut, and many take their 
place with little or no training in critical leadership 
areas (such as Islamic jurisprudence, relevant US law 
and the workings of the US legal system, or counselling 
and mediation skills).6 The impact of this phenomenon 
on the application of Islamic family law in the United 
States is significant, because it is to these imams that 
many go for Islamic marriage and divorce proceedings 
— proceedings that end up having varying validity under 
both US and Islamic law, depending on the imam. For 
example, many imams will not officiate at an Islamic 
marriage ceremony unless the couple has a valid state 
marriage licence first, or the imams will themselves be 
qualified to officiate marriages under the laws of the 
state, thus ensuring the secular validity of the Muslim 
marriage, but not all imams concern themselves with 
secular law and procedure. New Jersey attorney Abed 
Awad (interviewed in 2000) reports that some mosques 
in New York and New Jersey officiate Muslim marriages 
without any civil marriage licence, and in some cases 
even issue divorce and alimony orders where, arguably, 
Islamic law would not justify it. Maryland attorney 
Naima Said reports the same phenomenon in the 
Washington DC area (Said 1998). Similarly, Cherrefe 
Kadri (interview, 2000), a lawyer based in Toledo, Ohio, 
comments on the sharp difference between family 
dispute resolution processes undertaken under the 
authority of an untrained imam and those, for example, 
of an imam not only knowledgeable about Islam but 
also with experience as a social worker in the West. 
In the former, disregard for US marriage and divorce 
certification often prevails, not to mention frequent 
gender bias cloaked under the name of Islam.
Looking more specifically at what happens in family 
disputes, we first see that, as is true worldwide, many 
cases are resolved outside any formal process, whether 
a court or an imam. In the USA as elsewhere, Muslims 
often prefer to keep family conflicts within the family, 
and will turn first to relatives as arbitrators and 
mediators. One Muslim marriage counsellor himself 
reports that he advises Muslim couples to go first 
to parents, uncles or aunts before approaching him 
(Chang 1990). It might be noted, however, that this is 
often more difficult for immigrants, whose extended 
family is most likely to be overseas. Alternatively, 
where there are Muslim attorneys or social workers, 
these professionals often act as informal mediators, 
drawing client confidence from their expertise in the 
Western legal system combined with an understanding 
of Muslim concerns and, sometimes, their bilingual 
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language skills. For example, Los Angeles attorney 
Sermid al-Sarraf (interview, 2000) reports that, in 
family dispute cases, he often first describes to clients 
what is likely to happen in full litigation in an American 
family court (including the accompanying high cost), 
and then assists the parties to try to reach an amicable 
settlement that avoids this costly approach. Similarly, 
Toledo attorney Cherrefe Kadri (interview, 2000) notes 
that she uses her medi ation and Arabic-language 
skills to assist trust-building with clients attempting 
to resolve disputes out of court. Al-Sarraf (interview, 
2000) also notes that he has an arrangement with a 
local Muslim scholar for reference on Islamic legal 
issues if any arise. He states that he has seen Islamic 
law referred to occasionally by the parties during 
these negotiations (for example, one party asserting 
things such as ‘under Islam, you would get nothing’), 
albeit sometimes inaccurately. Usually, however, his 
experience is that the reality of the US legal system is 
what drives the ultimate resolution of these cases.
Intellectual resources
Muslims in the USA have a plethora of sources from 
which to learn about Islamic law, and Islamic family 
law in particular. A remarkable number of English- 
language books, articles, magazines, scholars, 
conferences, and now websites on this topic are 
available. They range in accessibility from the most 
readily available mainstream bookstores and popular 
Muslim magazines to more obscure academic pieces 
in scholarly journals and research encyclopaedias. The 
information avail able in these sources covers not only 
expositions and translations of classical doctrine, but 
also reformist and practical guides for the lay Muslim.
Among the more readily available resources are 
books such as those by Esposito (1982), Doi (1984, 
1989) 'Abd al-'Ati (1977) and al-Qaradawi (n.d.), which 
include fairly thorough summaries of classical Islamic 
jurisprudence relating to marriage and divorce. The 
first two also include examinations of the application 
of Islamic family law in certain modern Muslim states, 
which are of considerable interest; for Muslims in the 
United States, however, it is the classical jurisprudence 
that is of the most relevance, as they seek to abide by 
Islamic law in the absence of state enforcement.
Other resources on Islamic family law are books 
written as historical and sociological resources for 
a primarily academic audience. These books include 
works like Amira el-Azhary Sonbol’s Women, the Family 
and Divorce Laws in Islamic History (1996), a collection 
largely made up of empirical studies giving a sense 
of family law issues as they played out in Muslim 
history, with some special focus on contradicting the 
claims that Muslim women were prisoners of Islamic 
family law. The academic works, whether monographs 
or articles in legal and profes sional journals, may be 
less accessible to the lay reader, and offer for example 
critiques of legal reasoning in a particular school of 
thought or a particular legal issue, or presenting the 
law in a social or historical context. An example of an 
academic work with particular relevance for the USA 
is Mohammad Fadel (1998), who undertakes a detailed 
legal analysis of the doctrine of the guardian in Maliki 
law, not only explaining the legal theory behind the 
rule allowing a minor to be contracted in marriage by 
his or her guardian, but also critiquing what he deter-
mines is a basic legal error in the Maliki doctrine of 
emancipation for girls. He also makes the innovative 
argument that a local Muslim community should 
play the role of legal guardian for Muslims living 
as a minority in a non-Muslim country such as the 
United States, enabling them to adjust for these sorts 
of discrepancies in classical doctrine. Other works 
investigate the parameters of the Hanafi doctrine 
permitting a woman to contract herself in marriage 
without a guardian (Siddiqui 2000; Ali 1996). Azizah al-
Hibri (1997) has also taken up the question of the right 
of a Muslim woman to contract her own marriage, as 
well as questions of a wife’s duty to obey her husband 
and to initiate divorce.
Another aspect of considerable scholarly study is the 
Muslim marriage contract and its various elements. 
Works here include Farah (1984), Rapoport (2000), 
Shaham (1999) and el-'Alami (1992). Azizah al-Hibri 
(1993) compares Muslim marriage contracts with 
prenuptial agreements in an inter-faith symposium 
article and Mohammed Tabiu (1990—91) addresses the 
implications of defects in Muslim marriage contracts.
Finally, the complicated area of dissolution of marriage 
is also a subject of considerable academic writing, such 
as by el-Arousi (1977), Carroll (1996) and Quick (1998). 
The latter addresses this subject in the particular 
context of Muslims in North America, and reviews 
the efforts and actions taken by Muslim organ izations 
in the West to achieve dissolution of marriage by an 
Islamic authority.
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For those seeking a more practical resource on 
Muslim marriage, there are works such as the pieces 
by Maqsood (1998) and al-Khateeb (1996) which take 
a conversational tone to offer guidance based on 
Islamic law and principles to Muslim married couples. 
Works like these are not legal references on Islamic 
family law, but father are focused on translating the 
basic Islamic rules of marriage for the average Muslim 
in plain language. Maqsood, whose book offers frank 
advice on the emotional, spiritual and sexual aspects 
of married life, has been called ‘the John Gray of the 
Muslim world’.7 A similar book by Mildred M. el-Amin 
(1991) begins each chapter with ‘Dear Couple’ or 
‘Dear Sister/Brother’. Al-Khateeb’s article includes a 
sample marriage contract, examples of stipulations, 
and a short list of Islamic legal rules affecting marriage 
(see ‘Terms of the contract’, in Chapter 11 for further 
discussion of the resurgence of interest in Muslim 
marriage contracts).
Resources on Islamic family law often overlap with 
literature on the continually popular topic of women 
and Islam, as is evident from the number of Muslim 
family law works including the word ‘women’ in their 
titles. Many of these authors seek to critique classical 
Islamic family law with an eye to a women’s empower-
ment, sometimes urging new interpretations of old 
texts.8 Specifically US examples of this are included 
among the essays in Webb’s Windows of Faith: Muslim 
Women Scholar-Activists in North America (2000) by 
well-known American Muslim legal scholars Azizah 
al-Hibri and Maysam al-Faruqi. Al-Hibri’s piece, ‘An 
Introduction to Muslim Women’s Rights’, includes an 
overview of marriage relations in Islam (e.g. contractual 
terms, guardianship, maintenance, divorce procedures) 
em phasizing how Islamic principles promote women’s 
liberty in a way contrary to how these principles were 
applied and interpreted in patriarchal Muslim societies, 
ultimately leading to biases in the law itself. Maysam al-
Faruqi’s chapter, ‘Women’s Self-Identity in the Qur’an 
and Islamic Law’, focuses on particular Qur’anic verses 
often cited on the subject of women’s rights (e.g. male 
superiority over female, obedience of wives, beating), 
providing a critical analysis of juristic interpretation of 
each. Articles and collections like these testify to the 
emergence of a new contribution to the field of women 
and Islamic family law: the contribution of a specific US 
Muslim scholarly literature written by women. Gisela 
Webb says in her introduction to Windows of Faith 
that such works are ‘evidence of the lively, creative, 
critical, and self-critical discussions currently taking 
place in the academy and in Muslim communities and 
professional organizations in the United States, raising 
issues of religious pluralism, democracy, gender, and 
modernity as they relate to Islam and Muslim identity’ 
(Webb 2000: xii). Khaled Abou el Fadl’s Speaking 
in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women 
(2001) similarly takes up issues of Islamic family law 
in the context of his critical analysis of authority and 
authoritarianism in Islamic law and society.
Consistent with Webb’s observation, Muslim 
organizations are also a rich source of information on 
Islamic law, and Muslim women’s organizations are 
especially interested in disseminating information 
about family law, often with a progressive look at 
well-known issues. For example, the Muslim Women’s 
League, ‘a non-profit American Muslim organization 
working to implement the values of Islam and thereby 
reclaim the status of women as free, equal and vital 
con tributors to society’, includes among its many 
position papers those titled ‘An Islamic Perspective 
on Sexuality’ and ‘An Islamic Perspective on Divorce’.9 
Another example is Karamah: Muslim Women Lawyers 
for Human Rights, an organization which defines its 
objectives as seeking to ‘increase the familiarity of 
the Muslim community with Islamic, American, and 
International laws on the issues of human rights’, and 
‘provide educational materials on legal and human 
rights issues to American Muslim women’.10 Karamah’s 
website lists publications for further study, including 
family law tides such as ‘Family Planning and Islamic 
Jurisprudence’, and ‘Marriage and Divorce: Legal 
Foundations’, both by Azizah al-Hibri, founder of 
Karamah.
Of course, not all Muslim organizations take a 
progressive, reformist attitude towards the subject of 
Islamic family law and women’s rights. Many Muslims 
advocate more traditional interpretations such as 
encouraging wifely obedience (in all but directly anti-
Islamic behaviour), the primacy of motherhood and 
discouraging public careers involving cross-gender 
interaction. Examples of this end of the ideological 
spectrum can be found on websites such as that of 
Alsalafyoon, which posts pieces such as ‘The Duty of 
a Woman to Serve her Husband’,11 and in books like 
Muhammad Abdul-Rauf’s Marriage in Islam (1995), 
which, for instance, describes household management 
as the wife’s primary responsibility, though 
acknowledging that individual couples may agree on 
other arrangements.
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The final arena of readily accessible resources on 
Islamic family law is the internet. This modern 
technology has created several avenues for the 
dissemination and exchange of information on Islam, 
and Islamic family law is no exception. These fora 
range from discussion groups (e.g. members of the 
‘sisters’ list mod erated from Queens University in 
Canada12 often discuss the legal and social parameters 
of Muslim marriage and divorce) to online universities 
(e.g. the College of Maqasid Shari'a13 offers a twenty-
credit ‘Introduction to Family Law’ course) and 
websites devoted to education of family law-related 
issues, such as <www.zawaj.com> which describes 
itself as ‘a complete portal site for information and 
resources regarding Muslim marriage, weddings, 
family relationships, and parent ing’. On its website 
are posted articles describing the proper relationship 
between spouses, raising Muslim children, sexuality 
and Muslim cases in the courts. There is even a list of 
recommended scholars to contact for fatwas (Islamic 
legal opinions), complete with their email addresses.14 
Another site, called ‘Loving a Muslim’, includes a 
summary of Islamic family law in its effort to address 
the ‘non-Muslim woman in a loving relationship with 
a Muslim man’.15 Finally, <beliefnet.com>, the popular 
inter-faith site on religion, includes several links to 
family law issues in its Islam section.
Reviewing all these sources in the context of current 
discourse in the United States, one aspect of Islamic 
family law stands out as being of particular interest: 
the concept of the Islamic marriage contract. This 
subject has attracted recent and continuing attention, 
stemming largely from the fact that the jurisprudential 
importance of marriage as a contract makes drafting 
a marriage contract an important tool to particularize 
individual marital relationships, and has in fact been 
used as such throughout Islamic history. As Sharifa 
al-Khateeb puts it in her 1996 article in a Muslim.
women’s magazine: ‘The Islamic marriage contract is 
meant to solidify the [purposes of an Islamic marriage] 
and specify stipulations important to the woman 
and man.’16 Interest in the Islamic marriage contract 
is growing, prompting a full weekend conference at 
Harvard Law School,17 a panel at the 2001 national 
conference of the Islamic Society of North America (see 
Lieblich 2001), numerous Muslim magazine articles, 
and website discussions, all of which have contributed 
to educating the public (both Muslim and non-Muslim) 
about this now underutilized shari’a tool (ibid., p. 1). 
These efforts highlight the fact that Muslim marriage 
contracts can contain a myriad of additional clauses, 
from a promise of monogamy and a wife’s delegated 
right of unilateral divorce, to equal participation in 
household chores and the right to complete one’s 
educa tion.18 Some note that Islamic schools of thought 
differ over the enforceability of these clauses, though 
these details are not always fully explained in the 
Islamic law summaries available for the layperson’s 
practical use.19 Finally, addressing the question of the 
Muslim marriage contract in the United States, the 
Karamah organization lists among its projects ‘drafting 
a model Islamic marriage contract which meets the 
objections of those American courts that have found 
Islamic marriage contracts unenforceable’20 - a project 
whose importance will become apparent in Chapter 
12, summarizing the treatment of Muslim marriage 
contracts by US courts.
Islamic law on divorce is also a popular topic among 
American Muslims, as the divorce rate rises and 
Muslims seek to understand their marital status 
under both religious and secular law. The lay Muslim’s 
knowledge about divorce gen erally includes awareness 
of talaq, the husband’s unilateral right to divorce by 
oral declaration, but details on its practical application 
(terminology, revocability, voidability) are less well 
known. Alternative methods of divorce such as khul’ 
(divorce for remuneration conducted through mutual 
consent) and faskh (judicial dissolution) are further 
from public consciousness, and the situation becomes 
more complicated when one adds in the potential for a 
wife to include a delegated talaq right in the marriage 
contract.21 Besides analyses of divorce law in the 
literature mentioned elsewhere in this review, some 
contributions by Muslims and Muslim organizations 
in the USA go beyond the classical Islamic law 
on the subject, offering instead non-mainstream 
interpretations. For example, the Muslim Women’s 
League position paper, An Islamic Perspective on 
Divorce’, after ex plaining the basic elements and 
types of divorce in classical jurisprudence, goes 
on to comment: ‘The controversy with divorce lies 
in the idea that men seem to have absolute power 
in divorce. The way the scholars in the past have 
interpreted this is that if the man initiates the divorce, 
then the reconciliation step for appointing an arbiter 
from both sides is omitted. This diverges from the 
Qur’anic injunction.’22 With this argument, the Muslim 
Women’s League critiques the established fiqh allowing 
unilateral husband-initiated divorce, by appealing to 
the Qur’anic verse stating ‘if you fear a breach between 
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them, then appoint two arbiters, one from his family 
and the other from hers; if they wish peace, God will 
cause their reconciliation’ (Qur’an 4: 35).
Whether it is in the form of summaries of 
classical mainstream jurisprudence or progressive 
interpretations of original religious texts, there is 
significant in formation on Islamic family law for 
Muslims in the USA seeking to educate themselves, 
either in the basics or the more complicated nuances 
of Islamic jurisprudence. The average Muslim carries 
around some understanding of the basics and very 
little of the jurisprudential nuances, but how he or she 
applies these Islamic laws in the context of US society 
varies widely, due somewhat to the varying levels of 
individual knowledge, but also because of ideological 
differ ences and simple practicalities. This variety in 
the practical application of Islamic family law is the 
subject of the next chapter.
ELEVEN: The Muslim family in the USA: law 
in practice
Solemnizing the union
The intersection of US and Islamic law becomes 
important right at the forma tion of the family unit 
— the creation of the marriage itself. Each state of 
the USA requires a civil marriage licence for every 
marriage created within its borders. Details on the 
specific requirements for these licences vary from state 
to state, but generally they require an official signature 
of the person performing the wedding, qualified 
by the state to do so, and those of witnesses to the 
ceremony. Islamic wedding requirements, consisting 
of an offer and acceptance and witnesses to the event, 
do not conflict with this if the person officiating 
the wedding is registered with the state as having 
this authority. In the United States, many Muslim 
leaders and lay individuals have this state authority, 
thus making the Muslim ceremony over which they 
preside simultaneously legal under the laws of the 
state, provided all necessary forms are filed. However, 
because not all Muslim marriage officiants carry such 
qualifications, Muslim weddings in the USA take a 
variety of forms. Many conduct one Muslim ceremony 
with a state-qualified imam, but many others have 
two events: a Muslim ceremony as well as a civil 
ceremony through state channels.23 Still others have 
only a Muslim ceremony and never bother with state 
registration requirements,24 a risky practice under 
US law because, barring a finding of common law or 
putative marriage, the parties and their children have 
no state-enforceable legal rights upon each other, thus 
affecting inheritance, health insurance, taxes and even 
immigration issues.
Terms of the contract
As for the contents of these Muslim marriage 
contracts, most Muslims in the USA seem to consider 
only one thing really important that would not 
otherwise be included in a standard civil marriage 
licence: a provision regarding the wife’s bridal gift or 
dower (mahr/sadaq). The majority of classical Muslim 
jurists hold dower to be an automatic result of the 
marriage contract, to the effect that even if no dower 
is stipulated, or it is stated that there will be no dower, 
the wife is entitled to claim a ‘proper dower’, assessed 
by her peers and those of her individual standing 
(Esposito 1982: 25; Welchman 2000: 135-6; Ali 1996: 
159). Customarily the dower is divided into one part 
payable immediately on the marriage (the ‘prompt 
dower’, sometimes only a token amount or symbol) 
and anothervpart deferred to a later date, either 
specified or more usually payable on the termination 
of the marriage by death or divorce (Rapoport 2000; 
Welchman 2000: 144; Moors 1995:106—13). Written 
documentation of Muslim marriages thus routinely 
includes mention of the dower arrangements, and in 
the USA, many mosques and imams include a fill-in-
the-blank provision in standard marriage contracts 
(Kadri, inter view, 2000). Case law of Muslim marriage 
litigation in the USA reveals that Muslims do generally 
include mahr/sadaq provisions in their contracts, their 
nature varying with the financial status and personal 
preferences and aspirations of the parties.25 Some 
examples of actual mahr/sadaq clauses in the USA and 
Canada are: $35,000, a Qur’an and set of hadith, a new 
car and $20,000 (Canadian), a promise to teach the wife 
certain sections of the Qur’an, $1 prompt and $100,000 
deferred, Arabic lessons, a computer and a home gym, 
a trip around the world including stops in Mecca, 
Medina and Jerusalem, a leather coat and a pager, a 
wedding ring as immediate mahr and one year’s rent 
for deferred mahr, and eight volumes of hadilh by the 
end of the first year of marriage and a prayer carpet by 
the end of five years of marriage (al-Khateeb 1996).26
One case vividly illustrates the significance vested by 
some Muslims in their dower agreements: in Aghili 
v. Saadatnejadi (1997), the husband threatened not 
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to record the Muslim marriage contract with state 
authorities unless the wife first agreed to relinquish 
that contract and sign a new one. The original contract 
included a dower of Iranian gold coins to the value of 
$1,400 and a provision for a payment of $10,000 as 
damages for any breach of contract by the husband. 
The husband’s threat suggests that he felt bound 
by the mahr terms of the initial contract. Also, Los 
Angeles attorney Sermid al-Sarraf comments that he 
has seen, in informal divorce negotiations, a husband’s 
recognition of the mahr amount, prompting the parties 
to include in their settlement an offset of this amount 
with other property (interview, 2000). Other Muslims 
tend not to consider the dower important at all, and 
include a clause about it (often only a token dower) in 
their contracts only because the Muslim officiating the 
ceremony tells them it is required (Kadri, interview, 
2000).27
Discussions among US Muslim women include debates 
over the importance of the mahr/sadaq in the first place 
— some rejecting it as putting a monetary value on the 
bride, others advocating it as a financial protection for 
women in the event of death or divorce and sometimes 
as a deterrent against divorce (especially powerful 
where there is a large deferred dower).28 There is indeed 
a dilemma presented by the institution: setting the 
mahr very high may provide good financial security for 
the wife and (where deferred) a good deterrence against 
husband-initiated divorce, but on the other hand, it 
burdens wife-initiated khul' divorces, which are usually 
negotiated with an agreement by the wife to forfeit her 
mahr, with the significant financial cost of waiving the 
outstanding amount and returning whatever prompt 
dower has already been paid. Setting the mahr low, 
or as only a token gift, has the reverse double-edged 
sword effect. That is, there is not as much to be lost 
in returning the mahr if the wife wants to negotiate a 
khul' divorce, but she also loses the deterrent effect on 
talaq divorce by the husband which is accomplished by 
a high deferred dower. Where the divorce occurs not 
through extra-judicial talaq or khul’, but rather judicial 
dissolution by third-party arbiters, the impact on mahr 
payment does not follow an absolute rule. Rather, the 
arbiters assess blame and harm caused by the spouses 
and allocate costs accordingly. Where there is no harm 
by the wife, she generally keeps all of the mahr (el-
Arousi 1977: 14; Quick 1998: 36-9; Ali 1996: 125).29
As elsewhere in the Muslim world, additional 
stipulations (e.g. stipulations of monogamy, delegated 
right to divorce, wife’s right to work outside the 
home, etc.) further defining the marital relationship 
of the new couple seem to be much less utilized than 
dower provisions,30 presumably because the dower 
is obligatory whereas additional stipulations are 
not only optional but also a subject of little public 
awareness, and some clauses are even controversial in 
classical jurisprudence and local community attitudes 
(Kadri, interview, 2000). Nevertheless, the idea of 
particularizing one’s Islamic marriage contract is 
gaining attention among the US Muslim population. 
Encouraged by Muslim women’s organizations and 
activ ists seeing the use of additional stipulations as 
a tool for women’s empowerment, more and more US 
Muslims are educating themselves about how to use 
the Muslim marriage contract. Says Sharifa Al-Khateeb 
of the North American Council for Muslim Women: 
‘The contract is a tool to help men and women design 
their future life together so there are no surprises ... 
and so women won’t be saying “I can’t do this because 
my husband won’t let me” ’ (Lieblich 1997).
Far from considering it a new, reformist feminist tool, 
many see the proactive use of the Islamic marriage 
contract as a way of protecting their basic Islamic 
rights. It is for this reason that Karamah reports it is 
working on a model marriage contract, grounded in 
classical Islamic legal principles, to be used by Muslims 
worldwide. One visitor to the Karamah website praises 
a friend for drafting her marriage contract to include 
clauses on monogamy and equal right to divorce 
(among others) and comments that many Muslim 
men unfortunately have a negative attitude towards 
drafting a marriage contract, considering it an ‘insult 
to their ability to behave as model Muslims’ and that 
they ‘forget that in times of imminent divorce, men 
and women do become irrational and make demands 
that are hard to agree upon’.31
The empowering potential for women in the Islamic 
marriage contract has also attracted scholarly interest 
among academics. According to John Esposito, Islamic 
marriage contracts were originally intended to raise 
the status of women because, being party to the 
agreement, women could add stipulations of their own 
(Lieblich 2001). Carol Weisbrod (1999) notes: ‘[t]here is 
considerable interest among Islamic women in the idea 
of using the contractual aspects of Islamic marriage 
to protect women’s rights.’ Of course, such use of 
the contract stipula tions presumes that the woman 
has the awareness and education necessary to utilize 
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it. This is often not the case and, as Lynn Welchman 
has pointed out, the Islamic marriage contract system 
leaves ‘the protection - or clarification - of rights such 
as education and waged employment for women out 
of the law per se and subject to the knowledge, ability 
and initiative of the individual women not only to 
insist on the insertion of a stipulation but to phrase it 
in a manner that gives it legal value’ (Welchman 2000: 
180). On the other hand, the marriage contract remains 
a very valuable tool because its grounding in classical 
law gives a ‘clear indication of the acceptability of 
the changing of the more traditional parameters of 
the marriage relationship’ (ibid., p. 180). It is for this 
reason that many activists take the need for education 
on the topic of marriage contract law so seriously, and 
their efforts largely focus on simply making women 
aware of this tool.32 
Women’s empowerment is not the only motivation, 
however. Those advocating the use of additional 
contractual stipulations focus not only on their 
potential to equalize gender-based advantages, but 
also as a way for both spouses proactively to express 
partnership in their new, unique union. Ayesha 
Mustafaa of the Muslim American Society says: ‘[i]t 
forces conversation on important issues: where you 
are going to live, whether your wife is going to work, 
whether she accepts poly gamy’ (Lieblich 2001).33 
Similarly, Kareem Irfan, of the Council of Islamic 
Organ izations of Greater Chicago, says: ‘[t]he contract 
forces the bride and groom to have a reality check 
before marriage’ (ibid.). What form this reality check 
takes depends upon the ideologies of the individual 
couple. For some, it may mean a reaffirmation of 
traditional roles, such as that the wife won’t go to 
college or work after the couple has children (ibid.). 
But for others, especially non-immigrant Muslims 
whose image of married life is very different from the 
traditional one, arrangements such as monogamy and 
equal access to divorce are more or less presumptions 
in the structure of marriage, and these men are not 
threatened by a woman’s interest in including these 
(and other rights-specific terms) in the marriage 
contract. Indeed, in many cases it is the groom as 
well as the bride seeking to have such stipulations 
included.34 The attitude of many of these couples is 
exhibited in the following statement of one Muslim 
bride: ‘I love him ... and I can’t see him [taking a second 
wife], ever. But we put it in the contract because you 
never know’ (ibid.). These young Muslims tend to view 
the contract drafting process not only as an allocation 
of rights and duties, but also as an exercise in learning 
to express their new identity as a couple, and, even 
more importantly, as a way to open up discussion (and 
determine compatibility) on important family issues 
(career, children, finances, residence location, etc.) that 
might otherwise be postponed to more stressful times 
(Quraishi 1999).35 In other words, among a growing 
proportion of the American Muslim population, there 
is an interest in drafting more detailed, personalized 
Muslim marriage contracts - documents that are not a 
generic stamp of mere legal status conferred by some 
external authority, but rather, full, detailed expressions 
of the way each couple defines itself.
For those who choose to include specific stipulations 
in their marriage contract there are many insightful 
ideas from which to choose. Islamic history attests to 
Muslim marriage contracts including stipulations in 
which the husband promises not to marry additional 
wives (usually with the remedy that the wife may 
obtain a divorce, or even force a divorce of the second 
wife, if this promise is breached), delegates his talaq 
right to the wife, agrees not to relocate the family 
without the wife’s consent, agrees never to prevent 
her from visiting her relatives, and to provide her 
with servants for household work as is befitting her 
accustomed lifestyle, among many others (Rapoport 
2000: 14; Fadel 1998: 24-6; al-Hibri 2000: 57). Muslims 
in the United States have already taken advantage of 
the creativity allowed in these provisions and have 
included stipulations limiting visits from in laws, 
that the wife will not be expected to cook or clean, 
protecting the wife’s overseas travel required by her 
profession, and custody of the children upon death 
of either spouse (Lieblich 2001, 1997).36 Many clauses 
affecting the ongoing marital relationship (such as 
rearing the children as Muslims, providing household 
services, allowing a wife to attend school, and location 
of the home) are included despite a realization by the 
couple that a US court would probably not intervene 
to enforce such terms (discussed further below). Other 
terms, such as a promise not to marry additional wives, 
have little effect in the USA for a different reason: the 
action is already prohibited by US law. Nevertheless, 
these couples feel it important to include such terms 
for religious reasons (i.e. thus preventing even a non-
civil but nevertheless Muslim marriage to an additional 
wife), as a protection in the event they relocate to a 
jurisdiction that does allow such activity, and also as a 
mutual expression of the nature of their partnership. 
Finally, some marriage contracts use stipulations to 
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provide for remedies in the event of a breach of other 
contractual terms (e.g. a monetary value or a wife’s 
right to immediate divorce upon occurrence, etc.).37
Within the marriage
So far we have predominantiy discussed areas where 
Islamic and US law are different, but not direcdy 
conflicting. There are, however, other practices where 
some might regard the two laws as in direct opposition, 
and Muslims fall on both sides of the question of which 
law takes precedence. Polygyny is one of these areas. 
Because classical interpretations of Islamic law allow 
men to marry up to four wives, some Muslims believe 
that the US prohibition of polygamy directly violates 
their freedom of religion and, believing that Islam 
supersedes secular law, proceed to become part of a 
polygynous marriage. Thus, we see for example, in N.Y. 
v. Benu, a husband giving custody of his children to 
his wife after he married a second woman, and other 
reports of Muslim polygynous marriages (Little 1993; 
Taylor, interview, 2000). Aminah Beverly McCloud 
relates the dilemma faced by many US Muslim 
women whose husbands take a second wife - they feel 
religiously bound not to object to a practice God has 
permitted. She notes that even some Muslim leaders 
engage in this practice, leading to ‘marriages of years 
of devotion fall[ing] into chaos’ (McCloud 2000: 
141—2). Generally, the first wife in these marriages is 
recognized as legal under US law, but any subsequent 
wives and their children are not. These later wives are 
‘married’ to the husband in Muslim ceremonies either 
in the USA by imams willing to do so, or in ceremonies 
overseas where polygyny is legal. Because of the 
religious dilemma, however, McCloud states that many 
of these women file charges not for bigamy but for some 
sort of fraud. She also states that ‘all of the potential 
legal consequences of the practice of polygamy in the 
American context have not yet appeared, but ... are 
bound to find their way into the courts as more and 
more women seek alimony and child support’ (ibid., p. 
142).
Clearly, the majority of the population does not engage 
in polygynous mar riages, but views on the practice 
differ, as can be seen in a book by Abu Ameenah Bilal 
Philips and Jameelah Jones entitled Polygamy in Islam 
(1985), providing a lengthy social and legal justification 
for the practice. Moreover, many Muslims themselves 
committed to monogamous marriages nevertheless 
recognize Muslim marriages involving more than one 
wife as Islamically valid. Thus, in an online Muslim 
advice column responding to a woman wondering how 
to marry a man already legally married in the USA, the 
columnist does not question the Islamic legalities of 
such a marriage, but nevertheless advises against it 
because of the woman’s uneasy feelings and apparent 
lack of knowledge of the first wife (Hanifa 2000). 
Others, on the other hand, argue strongly against 
Muslims participating in such marriages in the United 
States, urging that the Qur’anic norm is monogamy and 
pointing to classical juristic arguments constraining 
the institution of polygyny (al-Hibri 1993: 66—7). For 
example, Azizah al-Hibri cites classical Islamic scholars 
stating that if marriage to a second wife causes the 
first wife harm, it is forbidden, and also notes Islamic 
schools of thought allowing the couple to include a 
clause in the marriage contract barring the husband 
from taking more wives. Similarly, Amina Wadud 
(1999), in addition to critiquing several traditional 
justifications for polygyny, undertakes her own textual 
interpretation of the relevant Qur’anic verses and 
sets forth an alternative reading of the permission 
for the practice, em phasizing its specific limitation to 
the just treatment of orphans. The Muslim Women’s 
League makes the additional argument that because 
the subsequent wives are not legally recognized 
under the laws of the state, then by definition they 
cannot be treated equally, a requirement of Islamic 
law in polygynous marriages.38 That is, subsequent 
wives in the United States not only do not have any 
rights to general spousal benefits (such as insurance 
benefits and inheritance) but they also necessarily 
lack any avenue of enforcing their spousal rights if a 
husband chooses to abuse or divorce them, since the 
marriage will have no validity in the US courts. There 
is also the possibility of a prosecution for bigamy if the 
authorities are so inclined. Another argument against 
American Muslim men marrying more than one wife 
relies on the simple Islamic jurisprudential principle 
that one must obey the laws of the land where one 
chooses to live, as long as they do not prevent one from 
performing one’s religious obligations. Since polygyny 
is at most permitted in Islamic law, rather than being an 
obligation, it is held that US laws requiring monogamy 
should be respected.
Another area of potential conflict in types of allowable 
marriages lies in the question of inter-religious 
marriages. Classical Islamic law allows Muslim men 
but not women to marry non-Muslim monotheists, 
those who belong to religious communities recognized 
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as ‘people of the book’, whereas US law puts no 
religious restrictions on spousal partners (Esposito 
1982: 20; Doi 1984: 36). Given the melting-pot 
nature of life in the USA, many Muslims, both men 
and women, do indeed marry non-Muslims (Haddad 
and Lummis 1987: 148).39 While those who criticize 
Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men find a basis 
in standard fiqh positions, some object also to Muslim 
men marrying non-Muslims, on the basis that this 
constitutes an unfair double standard or results in a 
reduced number of Muslim men whom Muslim women 
may marry (Haddad and Lummis 1987: 146; Marquand 
1996).40 Others argue that the allowance is limited to 
those living under Muslim rule and therefore does 
not apply in places like the United States.41 Azizah 
al-Hibri makes a shari'a-based argument against both 
Muslim men and women marrying outside the faith, 
arguing that the original reason ('illa) for the Islamic 
prohibition of women marrying non-Muslim men 
has now changed in our context. That is, the reason 
classical Muslim jurists denied a woman the option of 
marrying a non-Muslim man was to protect her from 
the husband’s potential denial of her free exercise of 
her religion (acknowledging the patriarchal nature of 
marriage, and the fact that Christianity and Judaism 
prohibited inter faith marriages at the time). Al-Hibri 
concludes that this 'illa still exists, but argues further 
that additional realities of the American Muslim 
context (i.e. the likelihood of a Muslim man losing 
custody of his children and/or being unable to fulfil the 
Islamic obligation to raise them as Muslims if divorce 
from his non-Muslim wife occurs) mean that Muslim 
men also deserve the protective attention thus far 
granted to Muslim women, and, thus, the prohibition 
of inter-faith marriage should be extended to them 
(al-Hibri 2000: 68-9). Nevertheless, marriages in which 
the husband is Muslim and the wife Jewish or Christian 
are generally accepted by most US Muslims. For 
women marrying non-Muslim men, on the other hand, 
there is usually a stigma, or worse. Many Muslims 
follow Islamic fiqh’s rejection of women marrying 
outside the faith, and most respected imams will not 
officiate at such ceremonies (Haddad and Lummis 
1987: 145).42 Muslim women’s reactions range from 
disregard of the rule and consequent critical attitudes, 
to full support and justification of the fiqh position as 
beneficial to society and family. In between are many 
who reluctantly accept the rule, and perhaps seek 
alternative interpretations.43
Some inter-religious marriages involving Muslims 
are inter-cultural marriages between indigenous US 
citizens and immigrants. When the immigrant is the 
husband, mainstream US culture has developed the 
fear that the husband will ultimately abscond with his 
children (and perhaps the wife) to his country of origin, 
depriving the wife of all spousal rights recognized in 
the USA. The 1987 book and corresponding film titled 
Not Without My Daughter44 arguably largely created 
and certainly entrenched this fear in the wider US 
public (Baker 2002), resulting in particular attention 
in the State Department information on ‘Inter-
national Parental Child Abduction’.45 A piece featured 
on its travel website titled ‘Islamic Family Law’ is 
posted to ‘make clear the basic rights and restrictions 
resulting from marriages sanctioned by Islamic law 
between Muslim and non Muslim partners’, noting 
that ‘for Americans, the most troubling of these is the 
inability of wives to leave an Islamic country without 
permission of their husbands, the wives’ inability to 
take children from these countries, and the fact that 
fathers have ultimate custody of the children’.46 While 
it appears to be a sincere effort to summarize Islamic 
family law for those living in the United States, the 
State Department’s narrow focus on only Muslim-non-
Muslim marriages skews the tone of its report and the 
reality of these issues. Clearly, the problems addressed 
(inability to leave without permission of husbands, 
barriers to custody) are faced by all women living 
under Islamic law, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. 
The State Department’s limited view perpetuates 
the Not Without My Daughter stereotype that Muslim 
men are a particular threat to non-Muslim American 
women. More over, stereotypes in the dominant US 
culture that portray Arabs and Muslims as violent 
fundamentalists oppressive to women further fuel 
distrust of inter-cultural Muslim marriages in the 
non-Muslim population.47 As will be seen in the next 
chapter, this distrust sometimes extends to Muslims 
and Islamic law generally, and has a direct impact 
when Muslim marriages end up in divorce courts.48
Stereotypes also frequently confuse religion with 
culture, again leading to mistakes about what exacdy 
is part of Islam and Islamic family law. For example, 
though arranged marriages (in various forms, ranging 
from complete parental control against the wishes 
of their children to family-arranged meetings of a 
potential couple) are found in many Muslim cultures 
(Haddad and Lummis 1987: 149-51), Islamic source 
texts do not require third-party intervention as a 
necessary or even preferred process of finding a spouse. 
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Muslim scholars in the USA, such as the late Fazlur 
Rahman among others, point out that there is nothing 
in the Qur’an or hadith ‘asking Muslims to have arranged 
marriages’ (Iqbal 1987). This is true even in the face 
of much of classical Muslim jurisprudence requiring 
guardian involvement in marriage negotiations for 
minors and even for adult women, reasoning (among 
other things) that this is necessary for their protection. 
Some Muslim women activists emphasize the non-
Qur’anic basis for these guar dian rules in arguments 
for reform beyond patriarchal interpretations in 
Islamic law (al-Hibri 2000: 60; Fadel 1998). Similarly, 
wedding particulars, from clothing and food to 
where the bride and groom sit, all vary from culture 
to culture, none of which commands Islamic official 
sanction, but may often be confused as such (Chang 
1990).49 It is not just non-Muslims who confuse culture 
with religion. Some Muslims assume cultural practices 
that have been within their families for generations 
are actually required by Islamic law. Thus, many 
debates within US Muslim families, whether they are 
inter-generational or inter-cultural, often super ficially 
seem to be about religion, but are really based on a 
mixture of cultural and religious/legal norms. These 
debates include, for example, arguments over the level 
of parental involvement in choosing one’s spouse (and 
participation in wedding formalities themselves), the 
amount of pre-marital contact future spouses may 
have, the nature and amount of dower, allocation of 
household respon sibilities (financial and physical), and 
spousal activities and work outside the home, to name 
just a few. Many of these issues do appear in juristic 
discussions (both classical and modern), but usually in 
the context of what role custom plays in law making, as 
these issues are not specifically addressed in the Qur’an 
and hadith (see ‘Intellectual Resources’ in Chapter 10). 
As the community evolves and migrates, discussions of 
these topics become complicated as the line between 
law and culture blur for the average Muslim.
Male superiority within the hierarchy of the family is one 
culturally validated but also often religiously justified 
ideology (Marquand 1996).50 Many US Muslims believe 
in a patriarchal final authority over family matters, and 
look to Qur’anic verses in support of this belief. Others 
resist this notion as an antiquated cultural preference, 
and look instead to Qur’anic and Islamic concepts of 
partnership and equality of the sexes (Wadud 1999, 
2000; al-Hibri 2000; al-Faruqi 2000; Barazangi 2000; 
Muslim Women’s League, ‘Gender Equality’, n.d.). Both 
philosophies, and variations in between, can usually 
support harmonious and successful families. However, 
the idea of male superiority sometimes is used to justify 
physical and mental abuse of other family members, 
especially women and children, as a Muslim male’s 
right, presented as somehow endorsed by the shari'a 
(Kadri, inter view, 2000; Winton 1993).51 In the words 
of Kamran Memon (1993), an attorney and one of the 
first in the US Muslim community to write publicly on 
the subject:
Tragically, some Muslim men actually use Islam 
to ‘justify’ their abusive be havior...considering 
themselves to be Islamically knowledgeable 
and dis regarding the spirit of Islam, they 
wrongly use the Qur’anic verse that says men 
are the protectors and maintainers of women to 
demand total obedience and order their wives 
around ... These men misinterpret a Qur’anic 
verse that talks about how to treat a disobedient 
wife and use it as a license for abuse.52
Even worse, as Memon and other Muslims note, is 
when battered Muslim women accept these religious 
claims and suffer the abuse, believing it to be some sort 
of religious duty on their part, and are unfortunately 
supported in this belief by Muslim community 
members, even leaders (Kadri, interview, 2000).53
This attitude, of course, disrupts the family unit with 
its acceptance of violence and general instability, and 
even more seriously if it drives the wife to flee the 
household or causes social workers to remove children 
from a dangerous family setting. Recendy, members of 
the Muslim community have begun to recognize the 
problem of domestic violence, publicly speak against 
it,54 and take proactive steps inspired by Islamic 
principles to respond to the situation (Nadir 2001: 78; 
al-Khateeb 1998: 17; Syed 1996; Memon 1993). For 
example, the Peaceful Families Project, a programme 
funded with a $76,000 grant from the US State 
Department and spearheaded by Sharifa al-Khateeb, 
has held conferences in several major American cities 
dedicated to educating and advising the American 
Muslim public to combat domestic violence in Muslim 
families (Kondo 2001). Moreover, a number of Muslim 
organizations have been established specifically to 
assist battered Muslim women, or have developed 
programmes targeted at this objective, through 
education, creation of shelters and providing legal and 
counselling assistance.55
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Dissolution of American Muslim marriages
Most Muslims pursuing divorce are careful to follow 
local state rules in order to ensure its recognition 
under US law. Sometimes Islamic family law does 
arise in these civil divorce proceedings, usually in 
the form of a claim for payment of the mahr/sadaq 
amount. Family law attorney Abed Awad reports, for 
example, that he sees a trend of husbands resisting 
dower payments, sometimes using the shari'a- 
based argument that wife-initiated divorces entail 
the wife’s forfeiture of the mahr (interview, 2000). 
Another Muslim attorney, Sermid al-Sarraf, describes 
one case where the spouses turned to Islamic law to 
assist in determining the custody of their children, 
each consulting different Muslim legal scholars on 
the question. In the end, however, other issues, such 
as competency and capability of support, played a 
stronger role in the custody decision (interview, 2000). 
In general, US Muslims facing divorce disputes seem 
to seek advice and assistance on both their Islamic 
and secular legal rights; and as the number of Muslim 
legal professionals and legal organizations in the USA 
grows, more and more experts become available who 
can assist with both simultaneously.
In a minority of cases, Islamic divorces are conducted 
outside the American system altogether, either by a 
husband’s private talaq declaration or through a third-
party determination by local Muslim arbiters, and the 
parties fail to file any divorce documents under state 
rules.56 Such divorces would lack validity under US law, 
and the parties may be faced with complications in 
any subsequent attempts to marry in the United States 
(Little 1993).57 They would also present obstacles to 
either spouse attempting to enforce any terms of an 
Islamic divorce settlement, such as the distribution of 
property or custody of children, in the event that the 
other spouse breaches the deal. Some case law, discussed 
in the next chapter of this report, reflects efforts by 
the courts to deal with these extra judicial divorces.
Deliberately opting out of US default rules
Some Muslims are proactively interested in ways to 
legitimately opt out of United States legal norms that 
potentially conflict with their Islamic preferences. For 
example, in community property states some Muslims 
are concerned that a community property distribution 
of half a wife’s property to her husband in fringes 
on the Muslim woman’s right to full and exclusive 
ownership of her property.58 Others believe that 
community property distributions should not be given 
to Muslim women in addition to their mahr, which they 
hold already to fulfil the need sought to be resolved by 
community property statutes.
But community property is not absolutely mandatory, 
even in community property states. One can opt out 
of community property by executing a valid pre-
nuptial agreement to that effect, but few couples 
have the knowledge or foresight to arrange this.59 
A complicating concern is the possibility that the 
mahr agreement will be insufficient or not ultimately 
enforced, and therefore opting out of community 
property distribution will leave a Muslim woman with 
neither shari'a-based nor secular-based adequate 
support. Ironically, there are historically established 
financial compensation norms in Islamic law aimed at 
responding to the same problem to which community 
property laws are addressed. Azizah al- Hibri (2000: 57) 
points out in this respect that under classical Islamic 
law, wives who perform household chores are entided 
to financial compensation from their husbands for 
this work or, where the woman is accustomed to it in 
her social circles, to have paid help to do it for them 
because such work is not a religious obligation. While 
some Muslim countries today are seeking to revive this 
principle in practical terms in financial distributions 
upon divorce,60 the doctrine remains unknown among 
most lay Muslims, in the United States and worldwide. 
Of course, enforceability of this Islamic doctrine in the 
United States is dependent upon voluntary compliance 
by ex-spouses, as it is unlikely to be applied by United 
States courts without some compelling reason to do so.
TWELVE: Islamic family law in US courts
We now turn to the question of how Muslim marriages 
have fared in the US courts.61 There is fairly little 
awareness in the US Muslim community about this 
subject, and consequently many mistaken assumptions 
are made. Much confusion surrounds the question 
of the validity of the marriage contract itself, as 
many assume that the law of pre-nuptial agreements 
will safeguard the enforcement of Muslim marriage 
contract clauses.62 As will be seen in this chapter, 
Muslims seeking to enforce their marriage contract 
as a pre-nuptial agreement have actu ally had varying 
success in the courtroom. One essential question that 
will be addressed is whether David Forte’s prediction 
that there will be difficulty in ‘pleading Islamic law in 
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American courts’ has been fulfilled (Forte 1983: 31). In 
this chapter, we will review the treatment of Muslim 
marriage in published US case law, and review the 
thoughts of Muslim attorneys working in this field.
The validity of Muslim marriages
The question begins at the beginning—whether a 
Muslim marriage will be recognized as valid under 
domestic US law in the first place. As mentioned in 
Chapter 11, this is only a real concern where the couple 
did not also follow secular state rules in registering 
their marriage. But even where there is only a Muslim 
marriage ceremony, the courts have not rejected such 
marriages outright, but rather undertake their own 
inquiry into whether the marriage was valid under the 
laws of the place in which it was conducted. For example, 
Farah v. Farah was a 1993 Virginia case involving the 
proxy marriage in England of two Pakistanis (with 
a subsequent wedding reception in Pakistan) who 
subsequently moved to the United States. Because the 
proxy marriage did not follow English require ments 
for a valid marriage, the Virginia court held that it 
could not recognize it as a valid marriage, stating that 
the fact that the proxy wedding complied with general 
Islamic family law rules (which would be relevant 
in Pakistan) was irrele vant. Conversely, in a more 
recent case, Shike v. Shike (2000), a couple married in 
a Muslim nikah (marriage) ceremony in Pakistan and 
subsequently documented it in Texas by having a Texas 
imam sign a standard Texas marriage licence. Though 
the couple initially believed their nikah to be only an 
engagement,63 the court’s inquiry revealed that the 
parties’ public representations were that of a married 
couple and therefore the court found the marriage 
valid under Texas law, even though performed outside 
Texas. Finally, in Aghili v. Saadatnejadi (1997), the Ten-
nessee Court of Appeals held that an Islamic marriage 
ceremony, followed by later compliance with state 
marriage licence law, qualified as a legal marriage, 
reversing the trial court’s summary judgment that 
the Muslim marriage ‘blessing’ did not qualify as a 
solemnization ceremony.
When there is no documentation of a marriage at all, 
Muslim or secular, then the court is faced with the 
difficult question of determining whether there was a 
‘putative’ marriage (or in some states, a ‘common law’ 
marriage). This is what happened in Vryonis v. Vryonis, 
a 1988 case in California in which a couple entered into 
a private mut'a marriage (a marriage for a temporary 
period of time recog nized under Shi'i but not Sunni 
Islamic jurisprudence) with no written documenta tion 
or witnesses. The court of appeals rejected the trial 
court’s inquiry into the wife’s reasonable belief in the 
validity of her marriage under Islamic law, and instead 
inquired into whether she had a reasonable belief of a 
valid marriage under California law. In the end, with no 
evidence of public solemnization, no licence, and no 
public representations of the couple as a married unit, 
the court answered the question in the negative. In 
reading Vryonis, it is interesting to note two elements 
considered by the court as persuasive against the 
existence of a real marriage: that (1) the wife kept her 
own name and (2) maintained a separate bank account. 
Commenting on this case, Azizah al-Hibri points out 
that, among Muslims, these facts would carry no 
persuasive weight against the existence of a marriage 
because the changing of the wife’s family name on 
marriage is not required by fiqh, and indeed has not 
been a characteristic of most Muslim com munities. 
And second, Muslim women often keep separate bank 
accounts to protect their right under Islamic law to 
exclusive control over their personal property (Muslim 
Women’s League and Karamah 1995).64
Finally, there have been some cases of marriages 
held invalid by the courts where the Muslim parties 
are found to have violated basic norms of justice as 
recognized in the USA. For example, where a Muslim 
parent forces a minor to marry against his or her will, 
the courts have brought criminal charges against the 
parent.65 In such cases, parental cultural defences are 
unsuccessful and held simply to violate public policy 
and the constitutional rights of the minor.
The enforceability of specific marriage contract provisions
The question of judicial enforcement of the terms of 
marriage contracts is important to Muslims because, as 
a minority community in a secular legal system, the only 
authority with physical state power to which individual 
spouses can turn when their partner breaches a marital 
agreement is the domestic courts. While local Muslim 
authorities (scholars, imams, family elders) are widely 
used to assist conflicts internally, these authorities 
ultimately rely on voluntary compliance by the parties; 
they do not have the police power necessary to force 
compliance against a recalcitrant spouse. However, 
courts interpreting complex personalized Muslim 
marriage contracts face a dilemma because there is 
a judicial preference not to interfere in an ongoing 
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marital relationship (Rasmusen and Stake 1998: 484).66 
Thus, clauses that demand compliance during the life 
of a marriage (such as a spouse’s right to complete an 
education, a promise of monogamy, or the nature of 
raising the children), even if they do not offend public 
policy, are rarely the subject of judicial oversight. If 
the marriage is at the point of breakdown, however, 
the court may be willing to include breach of marital 
agreements in its calculation of damage remedies for 
the violated spouse. This is often frustrating for those 
who would have preferred to maintain the marital 
relationship as agreed, rather than receive damages 
for its dissolution. As American legal scholar Carol 
Weisbrod (1999: 51) puts it: ‘In many family law cases, 
money is not an adequate remedy... [but] other more 
direct remedies may be barred because, for example, 
personal services contracts are not specifically 
enforceable and the United States Constitution 
guarantees the “free exercise of religion,” with all 
the complexities of that idea.’ As will be seen, this 
may have serious consequences for those relying 
on agreements regarding the religious upbringing 
of the children.
Provisions regarding the mahr/sadaq in a Muslim 
marriage contract are some what easier for the courts 
to handle because they are usually already defined in 
terms of a monetary amount payable upon dissolution 
of the marriage — a secular concept understandable 
to US judges. In the most recent case to take up the 
question, Odatalla v. Odatalla (2002), a New Jersey 
court treated the Muslim marriage contract in question 
under standard contract law and ultimately upheld the 
$10,000 postponed mahr as binding in a US court. Said 
the New Jersey judge: ‘[W]hy should a contract for the 
promise to pay money be less of a contract just because 
it was entered into at the time of an Islamic marriage 
ceremony? ... Clearly, this Court can enforce so much of 
a contract as is not in contravention of established law 
or public policy’ (Odatalla 1995). What is unique about 
this case is that, contrary to the predominant approach 
of most US courts up to this point, it did not analyse 
the mahr as a pre-nuptial agreement, but rather under 
neutral principles of contract law.67 Abed Awad, who 
litigated the case on behalf of the prevailing wife, 
insists that the misconstruction of mahr agreements 
as pre-nuptial agreements under US law has created a 
serious warping of American judicial understanding of 
Islamic law as well as a hindrance to providing justice to 
US Muslim litigants.68 As urged by Awad in the Odatalla 
litigation, mahr is not consideration for the contract, 
but rather an effect of it — an automatic consequence 
whenever a Muslim couple marries (Awad 2002). This is 
borne out by classical jurisprudence on the subject and 
the fact that Muslim jurists would assign an equitable 
mahr to those wives whose contracts did not specify 
one (Welchman 2000: 136, 140; Rapoport 2000: 14).69 
Thus, enforcement of Muslim marriage contracts, says 
Awad, should be by simple contract law principles, and 
not by the more particularized rules of pre-nuptial 
agreements that vary from state to state and generally 
carry heightened scrutiny (Awad 2002).
The characterization of Muslim marriage contracts as 
pre-nuptial agreements is not exclusive to US judges. 
Many lay Muslims, unaware of the legal distinctions 
between pre-nuptial agreements and simple contracts, 
often refer to Muslim marriage contracts as pre-nuptial 
agreements, and moreover some actively ad vocate 
the employment of this legal tool by US Muslims.70 
Attorney Abed Awad points out that these Muslims are 
often unaware of the technical requirements attached 
to valid pre-nuptial agreement drafting, and also that 
such agreements are assumed to override all other 
standard laws regarding dissolution of marriage, such 
as inheritance, community property, alimony and so on 
(Awad, interview, 2001). In Islamic law, however, these 
are separate questions — a Muslim wife is entitled to 
both her mahr and her standard inheritance portion 
— and Awad points to this as another proof that the 
Muslim marriage contract should not be seen as a pre-
nuptial agreement.
A California case illustrates what happens when pre-
nuptial agreement analysis meets an incomplete 
understanding of Islamic law in a US court. In Dajani 
v. Dajani (1988), the California Court of Appeals 
interpreted the mahr in a Muslim marriage contracted 
in Jordan to be a pre-nuptial provision ‘facilitating 
divorce’ because the 5,000 Jordanian dinars became 
payable to the wife only upon dissolution of the 
marriage. In California, as in most states, a pre-marital 
agreement may not ‘promote dissolution’ and thus a 
promise of substantial payments upon divorce may 
be interpreted to invalidate that clause.71 The court 
thus considered the mahr windfall to be potential 
profiteering by divorce’ by the wife and against public 
policy, and held the provision unenforceable, causing 
Mrs Dajani to lose her expected mahr. Azizah al-
Hibri has critiqued this court opinion, showing it 
to reflect a basic misunderstanding of Islamic law 
and the institution of deferred dower, particularly 
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since deferred dower is also due upon the death of 
the husband (al-Hibri 1995: 16-17).72 It might also 
be pointed out that, under Islamic law, if a woman 
initiates divorce extra-judicially through khul', then 
she is likely to forfeit her mahr.73 Thus, a mahr clause in 
this situation acts as a deterrent to (not a facilitator of) 
no-fault divorce by the wife - a result quite opposite 
from the ‘profiteering’ assumptions made by the 
California Court of Appeals.
The whole life of the Dajani case, from trial to appeal, 
illustrates mistakes that can be made when US 
judges attempt to adjudicate matters of Islamic law. 
At trial, for example, Muslim experts testified to the 
Dajani judge regarding the forfeiture of the dower 
upon divorce initiated by the wife, and, based on this 
testimony, the trial court concluded that the wife must 
forfeit her mahr because she initiated the divorce, an 
oversimplified understanding of Islamic law on the 
matter. (Unfortunately, the court did not undertake 
an analysis of faskh dissolution in Islamic law where 
an inquiry into harm is made, distinguishing it from 
extra judicial khul'.) But when it got to the Court of 
Appeals, the inquiry into Islamic law was even more 
superficial: it went straight to rejecting all mahr 
provisions generally as ‘facilitating divorce’.
Demographic distribution may play a role in the ability 
of US judges fully to understand minority religious 
practices affecting family law rights. For example, the 
Odatalla case originated in New Jersey, in an area with 
a significant Arab-American population. Similarly, New 
York family courts dealing with Muslim litigants have 
relied on their experience with the Jewish ketuba, a 
custom carrying many parallels with Muslim marriage 
contracting. Thus, in Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich 
(1995), the New York Supreme Court, though a bit 
confused in its usage of terms,74 specifically stated: ‘The 
sadaq is the Islamic marriage contract. It is a document 
which defines the precepts of the Moslem marriage by 
providing for financial compensation to a woman for 
the loss of her status and value in the community if the 
marriage ends in a divorce. This court has previously 
determined that sadaq may be enforceable in this 
court.’ In this case, the court ultimately ruled the sadaq 
at issue to be unenforceable, but it did so in a way that 
is more instructive to Muslims. In Fahnrich (1995), the 
New York court had difficulty giving effect to the sadaq 
provision in the Muslim marriage contract simply 
because the terms were too vague under basic contract 
principles. The clause ‘[t]he sadaq being a ring advanced 
and half of husband’s possessions postponed’ left too 
many financial calculation ‘questions unanswered (e.g. 
half of which possessions calculated at what point in 
the marriage? Postponed until when?). Thus, it was a 
violation of the Statute of Frauds, not public policy, 
which doomed this mahr provision. In fact, these same 
criticisms would be likely to be raised under an Islamic 
investigation of the terms of the contract (Rapoport 
2000: 5-21). In both jurisdictions, Muslims would be 
wise to pay more attention to writing clear terms in 
their marriage contracts.75
The need for clarity arises in another clause often 
included as standard in Muslim marriage contracts, 
stating something to the effect that the marriage is 
governed by Islamic law. These sorts of clauses have 
been found by one court to be insufficiently clear to 
warrant court enforcement of its terms. In Shaban 
v. Shaban (2001), the California Court of Appeals 
rejected a husband’s attempt to enforce the mahr 
(the equivalent of $30) listed in his Egyptian Muslim 
marriage contract, instead awarding the wife $1.5 
million in community property. The marriage contract 
included a clause stating that the ‘marriage [was] 
concluded in accordance with his Almighty God’s 
Holy Book and the Rules of his Prophet’, and the 
husband asserted that this meant that the dissolution 
should be governed by ‘Islamic law’. The court flatly 
rejected this attempt to incorporate Islamic law by 
reference, stating that ‘Islamic law’ was such a broad, 
abstract concept that brought too much uncertainty 
into the terms of the contract. Pointing out the many 
manifestations (schools of thought, state legislation) 
of Islamic law, the court concluded: ‘An agreement 
whose only substantive term...is that the marriage 
has been made in accordance with “Islamic law” is 
hopelessly uncertain as to its terms and conditions.’76 
Thus, the Statute of Frauds, requiring clear contract 
terms, prevented its enforcement. Interestingly, the 
court did not even get to the question of whether the 
mahr clause was against public policy (as they had in 
Dajani, and as the trial court had done in this case). 
Said the court: ‘It is enough to remark that the need 
for parole evidence to supply the material terms of the 
alleged agreement renders it impossible to discuss any 
public policy issues. After all, how can one say that an 
agreement offends public policy when it is not possible 
even to state its terms?’
The California court’s attitude in Shaban is significantly 
different from the New York Supreme Court’s 
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treatment of a similar clause in Aziz v. Aziz (1985), in 
which it found a Muslim marriage contract, with its 
mahr provision of $5,000 deferred and $32 prompt, 
to be judicially enforceable despite its being part of 
a religious ceremony, because it conformed to the 
requirements of New York general contract law. This is 
true even though the contract apparently stated that it 
united the parties as husband and wife ‘under Islamic 
law’. The concerns of ‘Islamic law’ by incorporation so 
central to the California Shaban court apparently did 
not bother the New York Supreme Court. In the words 
of the court: ‘The document at issue conforms to the 
requirements of [state contract law] and its secular 
terms are enforceable as a contractual obligation, 
notwithstanding that it was entered into as part of a 
religious ceremony.”77
There are two interesting aspects of Shaban that are 
relevant for our study here. First, the court’s rejection 
of the entire contract because of a clause stating it 
is governed by ‘Islamic law’ is important to Muslims 
because most, if not all, Muslim marriage contracts 
include this type of statement. This is true even of 
marriage contracts drafted in the United States. Since 
the court appeared par ticularly frustrated with the 
lack of any other substantive terms in the contract 
besides this one and the mahr provision, it may be that 
by individualizing and embellishing their marriage 
contracts with many substantive stipulations, Muslim 
couples may be able to avoid a result like the one in 
Shaban, but there is no guarantee. In addition, as will 
be seen in more detail later, other states have found 
their way to enforcing Muslim marriage contracts 
despite such references.
The other interesting thing about the California court’s 
treatment of Shaban is its absolute lack of interest in 
investigating the permutations of Islamic law if it were 
to govern the agreement. They are justifiably concerned 
about the complexity and diversity of ‘Islamic law’ 
and their reluctance to engage it is understandable. 
Nevertheless, one is left with the impression that the 
court took for granted the husband’s version of Islamic 
law — i.e. that the wife would be limited to $30 mahr 
under Islamic law, and that the obviously fairer thing 
to award the ex-wife of a now-wealthy American 
doctor after twenty-seven years of marriage is her 
com munity property entitlement of $1.5 million. But 
if the court had decided to make a deeper investigation 
of Islamic law in such a situation, they might have 
found that the stipulated mahr is not always the end 
of the story for a Muslim court—she might have been 
given an adjusted mahr mithl if the stipulated mahr 
was out of proportion to women of her peer group, and 
she might even have been awarded muta maintenance 
(equivalent to alimony) in an amount close to the 
community property award (Rapoport 2000). Further, 
Islamic legal precedent establishing that women 
have no obligation to do housework or even to nurse 
children (and thus should be compensated for it if they 
choose to do so),78 points to an awareness of the very 
problem that community property laws in the modern 
West seek to remedy (al-Hibri 2000; Walter 1999). It is 
a mistake to assume that awards under Islamic law are 
necessarily going to be worse for the wife than under 
US law. In fact, it appears that most spouses attempting 
to enforce Muslim marriage contracts in US courts are 
wives (not husbands), attempting to enforce rather 
high mahr amounts.79
An interesting aspect of these cases is that they show, 
in general, that for those courts that do undertake the 
effort, they have been fairly good at understanding the 
relevant Islamic jurisprudence defining the nature of 
a Muslim marriage contract, in order to discern which 
elements it can enforce as a secular court. These 
judicial understandings are largely from their own 
research as well as Muslim expert witnesses presenting 
courtroom testimony. Though they often disagree with 
each other in a particular case and frequently leave 
out juris prudential details, the outcome of the cases 
indicates that, by and large, these experts have served 
to give the judges a rather good idea of the important 
elements at work. In one case, an appellate court even 
corrected its trial court in under standing the nature 
of Muslim wedding officiants. In Aghili v. Saadatnejadi 
(1997), the Tennessee Court of Appeals, citing expert 
testimony, explained:
In contrast to Western religious teaching and 
practice (particularly in Chris tianity, both 
Catholic and Protestant, but also to some extent 
Judaism) Islam from its inception to the present 
has consistendy rejected the distinction be-
tween clergy and laity. Islamic law stipulates 
quite precisely that anyone with the requisite 
knowledge of Islamic law is competent to 
perform religious ceremonies, including 
marriage. One is not required to have an 
official position in a religious institution such 
as a mosque (masjid) in order to be qualified to 
perform such ceremonies.
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This understanding of Muslim wedding officials (and 
imams in general), though it overstates the facts 
in assuming there is a need for an officiant at all 
(Islamic law does not require one), is still instructive in 
accurately trying to appreciate the different structure 
of religious authority in Islamic law as compared to 
other religions, and does so in a respectful way. There 
is here an appreciation that a Muslim marriage does 
not have to look like a Christian one, and need not 
have an altar or a minister in order to be valid. In this 
case, the court’s awareness resulted in its rejection of 
the husband’s claim that his marriage was not valid 
because the officiant was not a real ‘imam’. Said the 
court, his ‘right to bear the title imam is irrelevant’. Of 
course, the education of judges is not uniform across 
the USA (as the Dajani case exemplifies), but this 
review of the case law indicates an overall positive 
picture, especially in those states that have more 
experience with minority religious legal traditions, 
such as New York.
The lesson for American Muslims from these cases is 
that, even though a Muslim marriage contract serves 
a religious function, if its terms are clear, an American 
court might find a way to enforce those terms serving 
a ‘secular’ purpose, such as the financial mahr/sadaq 
awards due upon dissolution. But a final note on 
secular court understandings of mahr/sadaq clauses: 
it is worth noting that Muslim jurisprudence, classical 
and modern, identifies a number of functions fulfilled 
by the institution of mahr, whether in its status in the 
contract or more broadly in the social life of the wife 
in particular. A number of these functions have been 
identified by US courts in the cases described above.80 
These include: (i) it serves the purpose of financial 
security for the wife in the event of a divorce;81 (2) it 
may serve as a deterrent to the husband declaring a 
unilateral talaq divorce;82 (3) it constitutes a form of 
compensation to a woman unjustly divorced by the 
husband’s unilateral talaq; (4) it is the husband’s 
consideration for entering the marriage, under basic 
contract law principles; or, lastly, (5) it is simply a gift 
from the husband to the wife.83 Each of these functions 
of mahr might prompt a different analysis by a secular 
court attempting to understand it in secular terms, and 
there is consequently the potential for inconsistencies 
between courts and frustration by Muslim litigants 
who may interpret the pur pose of their mahr differently 
than that focused on by the court. For example, if the 
mahr is merely a gift, then why does Islamic law treat 
it as a debt owed by the husband if he chooses not to 
pay it? (Esposito 1982: 25; Rapoport 2000: 10). If it is 
compensation for unjustified unilateral divorce by the 
husband, then what if the divorce at issue was initiated 
by the wife instead? If it serves as financial support for 
the wife after divorce, then does the initiator of the 
divorce (i.e. whether it is khul' or talaq) really matter, 
and can secular alimony and child support payments be 
substituted instead? Rapoport’s review of the evolution 
of the deferred mahr suggests that that institution 
did act as a substitute for alimony, but this does not 
speak to the rationale of the prompt mahr (Rapoport 
2000). Further complicating all these analyses are the 
myriad variations on what mahr amount is payable 
up-front and what amount is deferred — i.e. if it is 
substituted for alimony, then should Muslim women 
start asking for a large amount up front instead of a 
large deferred amount, to protect themselves against 
the possibility that a court will award them neither 
alimony nor their deferred mahr? And then there is the 
question of how to treat dowers that are not specified 
in monetary terms at all. All of these questions remain 
unanswered, and perhaps there is no uniform answer 
that applies to the situation of every woman (i.e. while 
one might need financial security, another might 
need deterrence against her husband’s unilateral 
divorce). Nevertheless, as these cases demand more 
and more judicial attention, they will also draw the eye 
of Muslim legal experts in the USA to focus on basic 
Islamic jurisprudence on the subject, its appropriate 
interpretation in the context of modern-day USA, and 
then address how to present these conclusions to the 
judiciary.
At present, US Muslim attorneys differ over the viability 
of pursuing the enforcement of mahr/sadaq provisions 
in the courts. Some believe it to be generally a losing 
proposition, citing local cases they have seen where 
the mahr was denied (Kadri, interview, 2000). Others 
are optimistic about the future of mahr recogni tion in 
the United States and encourage those pursuing these 
cases (al-Sarraf, interview, 2001). Indeed, in the cases 
reviewed above, spouses asserting the en forceability of 
a Muslim marriage contract as a pre-nuptial agreement 
did not always succeed. In both California cases dealing 
with mahr claims as pre-nuptial agreements, Dajani 
and Shaban, the court ultimately refused to honour 
the con tract. In New York and Florida, the parties fared 
a bit better: in Aziz (NY) and Akileh (FL) the Muslim 
dower provisions were upheld, though the language 
of the Florida court indicates that they perceived the 
sadaq to be the husband’s con sideration for entering 
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into the contract, an analysis with which Awad would 
strongly disagree.
Reviewing the history of the subject in general, it 
appears that interest in enforcing mahr provisions 
in the courts has taken particular hold in the Muslim 
community over the past five years or so. In earlier 
years, Muslim couples apparently tended to opt for 
informal recognition, voluntarily enforced through 
internal channels. As more and more Muslims draft 
formal Muslim marriage contracts in the United States, 
the courts will presumably see more litigation of mahr 
clauses. It remains to be seen whether there will be 
consistent treatment of these cases by state family law 
courts, and whether that treatment will be to review 
these cases as pre-nuptial agreements, seek to reject 
them as contracts with uncertain terms due to their 
religious references, or analyse them under straight 
contract law.
As for the enforceability of contractual stipulations 
other than the dower, there is much less case law 
because, as noted earlier, these sorts of stipulations 
are less popular in Muslim marriage contracts, and 
have even less frequently become the subject of 
full litigation ending up in published case reports. 
One stipulation many Muslims wonder about is a 
clause regarding the religious up bringing of the 
children, a relatively popular clause in inter-religious 
marriages. Specifics vary from state to state but, 
generally, agreements that a child will be raised in a 
particular religion are not enforceable in a pre-nuptial 
agreement, but if included in a separation agreement 
(when the marriage is ending) are usually recognized. 
For example, in Jabri v. Jabri (1993), a New York court 
held: ‘Agreements between divorcing spouses with 
respect to the religious upbringing of their children 
will be upheld by the courts only when incorporated 
into separation agreements, court orders, or signed 
stipulations... In the absence of a written agreement, 
the custodial parent... may determine the religious 
training of the child.’ And in Arain v. Arain (1994), 
the New York Supreme Court rejected for lack of 
supporting evidence a custody-change request based 
on a claim that the wife had violated her agreement 
to ‘raise the child pursuant to the Muslim faith’. 
Muslims will note that this is in contrast to standard 
Islamic law rules on custody, which would hold that 
a non-Muslim’s wife failure to raise the children as 
Muslims would cause her custody of the child to lapse 
at least once age of discrimination is reached. This US 
judicial policy is based on several reasons, including 
the unconstitutional judicial promotion of a particular 
religion, and avoidance of judicial interference in an 
ongoing marriage (Zummo v. Zummo, 1990). As a result, 
Muslim marriage contracts including a religion-of-
the-child clause are unlikely to be enforced because 
these contracts are usually likened to pre-nuptial 
agreements in order to be enforced. However, upon 
divorce, if such an agreement is possible (either through 
divorce mediation, or informally between themselves), 
the parties may be able to accomplish this goal, if the 
agreement is included in their documented separation 
agreement. In any case, religious upbringing of the 
children is a complicated and risky business, and (as 
discussed earlier) is one of the reasons some Muslims 
today warn against marriage to non-Muslims (al-Hibri 
2000).
The validity of Muslim divorces
The basic rule governing the validity of divorces in US 
courts is lex domicili, that is, the validity of the divorce 
is dependent upon the law of the domicile of the parties 
(Reed 1996: 311). Thus, where it is sought to enforce 
Muslim divorces conducted outside the United States, 
the court will look to the law of the foreign state. For 
example, in a case as old as 1912, Kapigian v. Minassian, 
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held as valid the 
Turkish law of the time which auto matically nullified 
the marriage of a non-Muslim woman to a non-Muslim 
man upon the wife’s conversion to Islam, and therefore 
upheld the divorce of a Turkish Muslim woman convert 
whose husband was then living (and remarried) in the 
United States.
Of further interest to the Muslim community is the 
treatment of domestic non-judicial divorces — those 
accomplished by verbal talaq or through formal 
approval by a local Muslim imam. These have not fared 
well. In Shikoh a Shikoh (1958), the federal Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a religious 
divorce granted by a local shaykh failed to constitute 
a ‘judicial proceeding’, which was required for all 
legitimate divorces under New York law, and held the 
divorce invalid. Said the court, lex domicili still applied: 
‘where the divorce is obtained within the jurisdiction 
of the state of New York, then it must be secured in 
accordance with the laws of that state’. And even where 
the domicile is a Muslim country, the US courts have 
demanded a judicial proceeding. Thus, in Seth v. Seth 
(1985), the Texas Court of Appeals refused to recognize 
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a talaq divorce conducted in Kuwait as valid because 
there was ‘no factual showing [that] any official 
state body in either India [where they were married] 
or Kuwait... had actually executed or confirmed the 
divorce and marriage’.
Looking over these cases as a whole, we might notice 
that they reflect a basic Western assumption built into 
the judicial reasoning — i.e. that a divorce has to be 
somehow officially recognized by some official body, 
even in a Muslim country, in order to be legitimate. 
However, Islamic laws of divorce do not follow this 
same premise, as private declarations of divorce (talaq) 
or private mutually-con sented divorce agreements 
(khul') are nevertheless given legal validity in Islamic 
fiqh. Of course, modern Muslim countries, with 
variations on classical Islamic law as their legislated 
codes, often require something more for legal 
recognition of a divorce, even if only a registration 
of an extra-judicial divorce with the authorities. The 
question that has apparently not yet reached a US 
court is whether it would recognize an extra-judicial 
talaq or khul' divorce if it had been registered with 
the state as a divorce deed, and therefore perfectly 
valid as a divorce in that particular country (as is the 
case in Egypt or Pakistan, for example) but not the 
subject of a ‘judicial proceeding’ as required by this 
US case pre cedent. If the question is ever raised and 
the court is willing to undertake a study of Islamic law 
in order to answer it, the argument might be made 
that the rationale behind the ‘judicial proceeding’ 
requirement is the due process principle of notice and 
the right to be heard,84 and therefore khul' divorces 
(obtained extra judicially but with mutual consent of 
both parties) should be recognized but talaq divorces 
(whereby a husband merely declares the divorce 
with no necessary consent by or even notice to the 
wife) should not. This level of Islamic law awareness 
and analysis, however, can only be hoped for, as the 
cases summarized thus far illustrate the serious 
misunderstandings of Islamic law upon which some 
of these cases have been adjudicated.
The divorce cases requiring ‘judicial proceedings’ and 
other cases where Islamic legal norms are rejected 
for violation of public policy, tend to reflect the pre-
sumption that the secular rules which override 
religious laws are somehow better, fairer, and reflect 
more progressive views on women, children and 
human rights. Yet, US Muslim scholars might take 
issue with this presumption, pointing out that in some 
cases, Islamic law is more progressive and beneficial 
to women than its secular counterpart. For example, 
the institution of khul' divorces, allowing a woman 
to end a marriage (usually for the price of her mahr) 
without having to go through the long and often 
painful process of divorce litigation, might be seen as 
a very useful tool for women. Moreover, the right to a 
mahr is so central to Muslim consciousness that it is 
usually the only marital stipulation Muslim women are 
aware they must include in their marriage contracts. 
Many see the deferred mahr as meaningful deterrence 
against a hasty divorce by the husband, and the prompt 
mahr as a means of ensuring financial security and 
independence to women who may or may not have an 
outside income. When a US court strikes down a mahr 
provision (whether as too religious or against public 
policy), many Muslim women believe this is a step 
backwards, not forwards, for women. Many assert that 
some of these cases do a serious injustice to Muslim 
women and to the aspects of Islamic law that protect 
their interests (al-Hibri 1995). Other woman- affirming 
aspects of Islamic law as yet unaddressed by US courts 
include the recognition that a woman’s household 
work is financially compensable, that her property 
is exclusively her own, and the ability personally to 
tailor a marriage contract. These are all illustrations 
of Islamic jurisprudential progressiveness, some of 
which have only recently been paralleled in the West. 
Comparing different legal systems, therefore, must be 
undertaken with care, and it is dangerous to assume 
that a comity-based recognition of an alternative norm 
is always a con cession to the lesser law. Sometimes it 
may be a step forwards.
Child custody
As in every community, many Muslim divorce cases 
necessitate a custody deter mination. Islamic family 
law can arise in these cases when one party asserts 
classical shari'a custody rules based on the age and 
gender of the children (Doi 1989: 37).85 Such claims may 
play a large role at the informal level (mediated divorce 
settlement agreements, for example) in the US Muslim 
community, but published case law focuses mainly on 
the validity of overseas custody decrees from Muslim 
countries. There is not a huge amount of published 
case law on this subject, although Henderson (1997-98: 
423) notes a certain recent increase, with only three 
cases involving state court interpretation of custody 
decrees from Muslim countries being reported between 
1945 and 1995, while a further three were reported in 
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the year 1995-96 alone. These cases reveal differing 
treatment by states towards Islamic law’s custody 
rules, sometimes showing deference to Muslim courts 
and sometimes not, but always within the context of 
the US standard of the ‘best interests of the child’. For 
example, in Malak v. Malak (1986), the California Court 
of Appeals evaluated one Muslim custody decision 
from Abu Dhabi and one from Lebanon. The Abu Dhabi 
decision, awarding custody to the father because of its 
rule automatically granting custody to fathers when 
the child reaches a given age, was held inconsistent 
with best interest standards and was rejected. The 
Lebanese Muslim court decree, on the other hand, was 
found to comply with American courts’ expectations of 
notice and also legitim ately considered ‘educational, 
social, psychologic[al], material, and moral factors, for 
the purpose of insuring the best interest of the two 
children and their present future and in the long run’.86
Some courts have recognized the child’s religion as a 
legitimate factor to be considered in a ‘best interest’ 
analysis, for courts in a society where religion is 
centrally important. Thus, in Hosain v. Malik (1996), a 
Maryland court concluded that, in Pakistan, custody 
determination of the best interest of the child was 
appropriately determined according to the morals and 
customs of Pakistani society. Said the court:
We believe it beyond cavil that a Pakistani 
court could only determine the best interest 
of a Pakistani child by an analysis utilizing 
the customs, culture, religion, and mores of 
the community and country of which the child 
and —in this case — her parents were a part, 
i.e., Pakistan...[B]earing in mind that in the 
Pakistani culture, the well being of the child and 
the child’s proper development is thought to be 
facilitated by adherence to Islamic teachings, 
one would expect that a Pakistani court would 
weigh heavily the removal of the child from that 
influence as detrimental.
Judicial consideration of the religion of the child 
in ‘best interest’ analyses is not limited to review of 
international decisions. Some courts have found it 
relevant as a positive factor in their own ‘best interest’ 
evaluation, for example, where religion has been an 
important part of the child’s life until that point; but, 
again, the importance given to this criterion varies 
widely from state to state.87
Returning to Hosain, it is interesting to note that the 
court there viewed classical Islamic custody rules 
as not necessarily contrary to public policy. Said the 
court: ‘We would be obliged to note that we are simply 
unprepared to hold that this longstanding doctrine 
[hazanat - i.e. custody] of one of the world’s oldest and 
largest religions practiced by hundreds of millions of 
people around the world and in this country, as applied 
as one factor in the best interest of the child test, is 
repugnant to Maryland public policy.’
Not all American courts are so reluctant to condemn 
classical Islamic custody rules outright, however. In Ali 
v. Ali (1994), for example, a New Jersey court rejected a 
Palestinian custody decree as not in the ‘best interests 
of the child’, commenting on the law applied by 
Palestinian shari'a courts in Gaza that auto matically 
entitles the father to gain custody of a son at age seven 
in the following terms: ‘Such presumptions cannot be 
said by any stretch of the imagination to comport with 
the law of New Jersey whereby custody determinations 
are made based upon the “best interests” of the child 
and not some mechanical formula.’ Incidentally, this 
attitude also finds an audience in legal academia; 
Henderson (1997-98), for example, devotes an entire 
article to warning judges to be ‘circum spect of foreign 
custody decrees based on Islamic law’ because it is 
‘mechanical, formulaic and should not be followed’.
One final note on American judicial treatment of 
Muslim marriage litigation as a whole: the fact that 
many of the cases reviewed in this section involve 
marriages either contracted or ended in a foreign 
country may at first seem not directly relevant to 
a study of Islamic family law in the United States. 
However, the complex international demographic of 
the Muslim population in the USA means that many do 
not live in the same place over their entire lifetime — 
they may, for example, emigrate to the USA early in life, 
move overseas later in life, or live a dual citizenship 
in more than one country. Or, perhaps, because they 
have overseas relatives, an individual Muslim may live 
in the United States full time, but have his/her Muslim 
wedding ceremony overseas with extended family. 
Cases where the marriage is executed or dissolved 
overseas could all end up being litigated in the US 
courts. As the population of second-generation and 
native US Muslims grows and more Muslim marriages 
end up in US courts for litigation, we may see more 
cases where the full law-related gamut of marital life 
occurs here in the USA. In these cases, comity to other 
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nations will not be at issue, and US judges will be faced 
with the question of how to treat Islamic family law in 
the context of litigants from one of their own domestic 
religious minorities.
THIRTEEN: Future trends and predictions
In order fully to appreciate the current developments 
in the broader picture of Muslim family law in the 
USA, it is imperative to investigate the roots of current 
theories utilized by Muslim thinkers in North America. 
Over the past sixty years or so, Muslims in the USA, 
whether indigenous, immigrant or simply based in 
the USA for a variety of reasons, have developed a 
vibrant and dynamic discourse on issues of Islam and 
modernity. This intellectual tradition focuses on both 
the development of theoretical approaches to relevant 
problems and prac tical methods for resolution of 
those challenges.
The theoretical basis for creating a new legal 
methodology for Islamic family law finds its origin in 
the early efforts of Muslim thinkers within the Western 
academy. For example, scholars such as the late 
Ismail al-Faruqi called for the ‘Islamization’ process 
of all Western disciplines (al-Faruqi 1982). Some of 
the intellectual forebears of this movement include 
Muslim scholars such as Muhammad Abduh and 
Rashid Rida, from the end of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Rida has been characterized by 
Wael Hallaq (1997: 216) as one who ‘steered a middle 
course between the conservative forces advocating the 
traditional status quo of the shari'a, on the one hand, 
and the secularists who aimed to replace the religious 
law by non-religious state legislation on the other’.88 
This involved, first, the turning of the Muslim focus 
on to Western thought and creating an environment 
where Muslim scholars began to distinguish between 
a full-blown condemnation of all Western thought 
and the possibility of reconciling various forms of 
knowledge. Al-Faruqi’s legacy is found in works that 
present an Islamic viewpoint on disciplines as diverse 
as linguistics and physics. The late Fazlur Rahman was 
another scholar who engaged with issues facing modern 
Muslims and proposed specific strategies for addressing 
them. One of Rahman’s specific contributions was a 
focus on the ethics of revival and emphasizing the link 
between morality and legal thought (Rahman 1982). 
The works of these and other scholars have opened 
the door for many new generations of reformers and 
thinkers who are grounded firmly within the Muslim 
tradition but are able to employ also concepts from 
other sources. In the area of Islamic law, and specifically 
usul al-fiqh (jurisprudential theory), Muslim scholars 
in the USA have explored a rich variety of issues that 
face the local Muslim community. One scholar who 
focuses on applying classical usuli scholarship to 
questions of modern Islamic law in the USA is Taha 
Jabir al-'Alwani, who reviews historical perspectives 
on the evolution of juristic disagreement in Islam and 
offers a methodology of modern inclusive scholarship 
(al-'Alwani 1985).
Bridging the worlds of Islamic and US law, there are a 
number of Muslim law professors in the United States. 
Though few, these professors have left their mark in 
community building and Islamic legal education, as 
well as excellence in their chosen secular legal fields. 
For example, Gherif Bassiouni, Professor of Law at 
DePaul University College of Law for over thirty 
years, is an expert in inter national criminal law and 
human rights. His numerous publications in several 
languages include pieces on general criminal law and 
human rights as well as Islamic law on these issues (for 
example Bassiouni 1982, 1983, 1987) and he has been at 
the forefront of international and national debates on 
issues of human rights and Islam (including receiving 
a 1999 nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize), urging 
that human rights are not alien to Islam, and in fact are 
founded on Islamic principles. Similarly, Abdullahi An-
Na'im, Professor at Emory Uni versity School of Law, is 
a significant contributor to the discussion on Islam and 
human rights. An-Na'im (1990, 1992) has highlighted 
the critical issues and areas that must be addressed by 
modern Muslim societies in order to form institutions 
that respect basic human rights and liberties.
Another Muslim law professor, Azizah al-Hibri, has 
contributed to the on going dialogue of women’s 
rights and Islam, publishing extensively on Islamic 
law issues especially affecting women (al-Hibri 1993, 
1997, 2000). Professor of Law at the University of 
Richmond School of Law, al-Hibri is also founder of 
Karamah: Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights, 
and frequently makes presentations in both domestic 
and international fora speaking on shari'a -based 
legal mechanisms to protect the human rights and 
welfare of Muslim women. Finally, there are diverse 
perspectives on the use of classical scholarship and its 
connection to modern interpretations. Khaled Abou 
el-Fadl, Professor of Law at the University of California 
at Los Angeles, has, among other things, examined the 
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historical and cultural record of Muslim communities 
who lived in non-Muslim states and drawn upon these 
lessons to particularize his interpretation of Islamic 
law to the US Muslim environment (Abou el-Fadl 
1994). Abou el-Fadl remains grounded in the classical 
traditions to the extent that he continues to inform 
his own work with discussions from classical Islamic 
scholarship (Abou el-Fadl 2001).
The precarious position of being a part of a minority 
Muslim population has informed not only Muslim 
legal scholars, but also another group of reformers 
who have focused on activism as a tool to introduce 
new positive and creative responses to some of the 
legal needs of the community. For example, the dif-
ficulties of explaining Islamic family law to domestic 
courts and institutions, as well as the desire to resolve 
intimate matters with those who share the same faith-
based system of ethics and morals, has prompted some 
members of the Muslim community to examine the 
viability of establishing local faith-based tribunals. 
Similar efforts have been embarked upon in the United 
Kingdom with the establishment of Muslim Law 
Shariah Councils (MLSC) whose aim it is to ‘keep the 
identity of our community, to keep its laws, to keep it 
whole, while at the same time not breaking the laws 
of the state, having our own private language, while 
speaking the common language’ (Shah-Kazemi 2001: 
10). Muslims in the United States have begun to discuss 
the possibility of establishing such tribunals.89 One of 
the differences between the US and UK experiences is 
that Muslims in the USA have, at least at the theoretical 
level, been interested in a model of marriage dispute 
resolution that is more egalitarian in its approach. The 
English MLSCs, on the other hand, seem predicated on 
the role of the qadi as mediator or judge in the process 
of Muslim marriage dissolution (Shah-Kazemi 2001). 
An example of the American approach can be seen in 
the work of Amr Abdalla, who calls for an Islamic model 
of interpersonal intervention in conflict based on three 
principles: (1) restoring Islam to its message of justice, 
freedom and equality; (2) engaging the community 
in the intervention and resolution process; and (3) 
adjusting the intervention techniques according to 
the conflict situation (Abdalla 2000: 153).90 As the idea 
of establishing US Muslim tribunals evolves, it will be 
important to examine whether they will mimic the role 
of a Muslim qadi who is the expert, or rather will be 
infused with the involvement of various other Muslim 
professionals and community members. The choice 
between these two approaches will have a significant 
influence on the ultimate nature of decisions emerging 
from these tribunals.
The attitude of the US courts to the rise of these 
tribunals is as yet unknown, but there are indications 
that some judges would welcome the existence of 
reliable arbiters of Islamic family law issues, and 
may even be undertaking their own consultation 
with Muslim authorities in the interim. For example, 
in a recent divorce case in Pomona, California, a 
complicated mahr question was ultimately resolved by 
referral of the parties to two Muslim imams (mutually 
agreed to by the parties) on the mahr question, which 
was then returned to the family judge who allocated 
the dissolution amount accordingly (Erickson, 
interview, 2001). This very innovative approach 
honoured the parties’ allegiance to Islamic law while 
still maintaining state jurisdiction over the case.
Muslims in the USA have a helpful precedent for these 
efforts in the experience of the Jewish community, 
which has already established an alternative 
dispute-resolution faith-based system. The Jewish 
community’s beit din institutions play the role of 
arbitrators or mediators in marriage dissolution 
processes (Greenberg-Kobrin 1999: 364). Further, 
many states have adopted laws that include clergy as 
potential mediators or counsellors for family disputes; 
some now make it manda tory for couples and families 
to consult with some type of mediator whenever any 
issue of dissolution or custody arises (Lyster 1996). 
Muslims may find that, in addition to their imams, 
they can use the services of Muslim lawyers or social 
workers. Panels similar to beit din within the Jewish 
community might function as faith-based tribunals 
for various family law issues. Muslims may explore the 
option of naming possible mediators or arbitrators in 
their marriage contracts or pre-nuptial agreements. 
The contract that one signs must conform to all of 
the standard hallmarks of contract law.91 The idea of 
restoring Islamic values through creating an Islamic 
mediation model is echoed in other Muslim activist 
work asserting a restoration of Islam to its basic values 
of justice, freedom and equality. Many US Muslims see 
the message of reform as central to any action taken 
by a Muslim. They find the impetus to form social 
change movements inherent in the fact that they are 
Muslim, and hope to find a space that exists between 
the realm of an Islamic belief system and their US 
cultural milieu.92 This feeling of individual obligation 
has been manifested in the creation of various 
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organizational structures seeking positive change in 
the form of activist, grassroots activities and education 
of the Muslim and non-Muslim public on issues of both 
Islamic and US law. One example is Karamah, noted 
earlier, an organ ization engaging both the Muslim and 
non-Muslim communities on the topic of human rights 
and women. Its activities include participation in the 
Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women, 
and inter-religious fora on women’s rights issues,93 
as well as the model marriage contract project noted 
earlier. Through this work Karamah has provided a 
critique of mainstream secular and Islamic opinions 
on legal issues relevant to women.
Another organization of interest to our study and 
mentioned above is the National Association of 
Muslim Lawyers (NAML).94 Initially established in 1995 
as a web-based community forum for discussions and 
networking among Muslim lawyers, this organization 
has now evolved into a formal organization addressing 
the needs of the burgeoning Muslim legal community. 
Its annual conferences have covered topics of interest 
to those following the legal situation of Muslims in the 
USA, both in terms of Islamic and US law.95 Moreover, 
the searchable online database of Muslim attorneys 
provided on NAML’s website is a significant contribution 
to the Muslim community at large, providing a readily 
usable contact list of legal professionals who are also 
sensitive to Muslim family norms.
The increased use of web-based communication has 
greatly contributed to the formation and expansion of 
unprecedented and spontaneous debates on Muslim 
family law issues such as marriage, divorce and 
child custody. In addition to the domestic impact of 
discussion groups such as the NAML email list, the 
use of web pages to disseminate various new doctrines 
and religious rulings has had a tremen dous effect on 
the international discussion of Islamic family law. The 
active nature of the American Muslim community 
online has placed it in an influential position in 
these global discussions of Islam and Islamic law. For 
example, during the Bosnian war, a Muslim website 
based in the US, <islam.org>, posted two religious 
rulings on abortion. The website rulings had an impact 
on the question of abortion within an international 
context by providing differing perspectives from 
various sources (Watanabe 2000; <www.islam.org>). In 
countries where the government or a specific group of 
scholars control a religious hegemony and discourage 
divergent interpretations and views, these types 
of diverse perspectives accessible via the internet 
can revolutionize the way that individuals view a 
certain topic.
The US Muslim experience is contextualized in a 
democratic, secular society. Women have emerged as 
an integral part of the Muslim activist and intellectual 
movements, as noted earlier in this study, especially 
in the areas of issues involving domestic violence and 
abuse of women in general. Muslim women have not 
only served as activists and community organizers; 
they have also been able to offer their perspective on 
relevant legal issues. In the United States, scholars 
such as Amina Wadud are able to publish their 
interpretations of the Qur’an openly and share them 
with the wider Muslim community (Wadud 1999). 
Furthermore, American Muslim scholars such as 
Aminah Beverly McCloud present the reality of a 
dynamic and living form of Islam within the African-
American Muslim community (McCloud 1991). With 
voices like these in the community, immigrant Muslims 
cannot limit their interpretations to those scholars 
who exclusively rep resent their country or their school 
of thought. A back-home focused approach is thus 
challenged by indigenous and second-generation 
communities that are already fully aware of and 
dealing with modern Western society.96
FOURTEEN: Conclusion
This survey has sought to catalogue and explain the 
nature and application of Islamic family law within 
the US Muslim community. The potential of this 
community is evident by the wide range and depth 
of its contributions in this area. This study has 
demonstrated that Islamic family law as manifested 
in the United States has been a subject of significant 
interest and considerable com plexity, both in terms 
of US domestic and Islamic law, as well as their 
interaction. In the previous chapter, we have seen 
that within the United States are significant trends 
of reform and activism addressing Islamic family law. 
Yet it is important to keep in mind that these reform 
efforts also face several potential problems as they 
progress. For example, one of the main concerns that 
the Muslim community shares with other religious 
groups in the United States is the recognition that 
forward-thinking actions and scholarship that steer 
away from religious orthodoxy may lose acceptance 
by the mainstream faith-based system. In a parallel 
situation, the Jewish orthodox community has, at 
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times, refused to accept terms that do not conform to 
a traditional understanding of religious rights when 
those rights were negotiated in a ketubah, or religious 
pre-nuptial agreement (Greenberg-Kobrin 1999: 397).
Another major potential problem lies in the need to 
differentiate between culture and religion. Enmeshed 
in this particular question is the role of cultural 
practice and interpretation. While a cultural practice 
may actually protect the family rights of an individual, 
when the family serves as a negotiating repres entative 
in marriages, it is possible that a cultural pattern 
of family interaction can be more limiting than the 
constraints actually set by religious law (Hashim, 
interview, 2000).97 The Muslim community will have 
to sift through its multi cultural history and traditions 
and decide which practices will be preserved and which 
will be discarded if they do not fit an appropriate 
religious and societal agenda. Creation of a unified 
agenda or perspective will remain a challenge for this 
community. At the heart of this issue is the fact that 
there remain on-going internal debates in the United 
States’ Muslim community as to who should be in 
charge or involved in formulation of community-wide 
agendas. In some instances, gender has remained a 
barrier to the full involvement of Muslim women. 
Different cultural practices are reflected in women’s 
space in a mosque. For instance, The Mosque in America 
report notes that there is an increasing practice of 
separating women in prayer from men by a hung cloth, 
or having them pray in another room (Bagby et al. 
2001: 11).98 While this is not definitive evidence that 
women are not a part of the general community space, 
it is interesting to note that there is an increasing 
trend towards gender segregation in the mosque 
environment. The study did not reach the conclusion 
that certain cultural groups had higher levels of 
segregation in their mosques. This would be a relevant 
topic to explore in future studies and would provide 
an analytical tool to differentiate between cultural 
variables that affect gender participation and religious 
interpretations that are used to justify segregation. 
Finally, the reality of class differences among Muslim 
Americans has been an ongoing divide. For instance, 
the actions of the immigrant Muslim community have 
included acknowledgement that they ‘had been guilty 
of ignoring the persistent and social problems of the 
indigenous Muslims’ (Dannin 2000: 26).
Another important challenge for the future of Islamic 
family law in the United States stems from the 
demographic of Muslims. This report, in talking about 
Islamic family law in the USA, has assumed a certain 
level of adherence and belief in Islam as a legitimate 
organizing system for one’s life and society. We have 
mentioned the several varieties of interpretation of 
Islamic law among the diverse Muslims in the United 
States, but there is also significant variation in levels 
of adherence to Islam as a source for behaviour in the 
first place. As noted in both Haddad and Lummis and 
the Mosque project, Muslim practice ranges from those 
who are ‘unmosqued’ to those who attend holiday 
prayers, and those who are more involved in their 
particular communities (Lummis and Haddad 1987: 9; 
Bagby et al. 2001: 3). It will be a challenge for Muslim 
scholars and activists in America to bring together 
these different types of Muslims and develop a 
consensus, especially in the volatile area of family law 
that touches on intimate interpersonal relationships 
and deep moral values. This is the ultimate challenge 
for any minority faith: to adhere firmly to its values 
and traditions while also adapting to the social, legal 
and cultural contexts in which it exists.
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Notes
Our sincere thanks to Steve Vieux and Abed Awad for 
their  helpful research  assistance, and to all those 
who shared their experiences and  expertise in our 
interviews with  them (see attached interview list).
1 Anglo-American family law itself  has religious Christian  origins, 
as acknowledged in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 US 130 (1873), where 
the Supreme Court described the ‘divine ordinance’ of the 
‘constitution of the family organization’ (ibid., 141; Mason 1994: 
53); but this aspect of US law will not be elaborated here.
2 The  research material for this study is comprised of: interviews 
with professionals who serve the US Muslim community, legal 
research of current United States federal and state case law, review 
of general literature (books, magazines, newspapers) addressing 
issues concerning Muslims in the United States, internet searches 
of Muslim-related sites, and the professional experiences of the 
authors. As the research time was constrained due to publication 
deadlines, the report is itself quite limited, and makes no claim to 
be exhaustive of all issues, resources, scholars and other elements 
potentially relevant to this topic. For surveys conducted by other 
sources, see Haddad and Lummis (1987). Haddad and Lummis 
studied eight mosques located  in the Midwest,  upstate  New 
York and  the East Coast over a period of two years. They focused 
on personal backgrounds and religious attitudes of the seventy to 
eighty participants in the study. Haddad and Lummis surveyed 346 
Muslims, 64 per cent of whom were immigrants, and 16 per cent 
were children of immigrant parents. Thirty-four per cent of their 
sample were Lebanese American, 28 per cent were Pakistanis, with 
individuals from other Arab nations comprising the remainder of 
the sample. Another useful and more recent study is The Mosque 
in America: A National Portrait (Bagby et al. 2001), sponsored by 
a number of Muslim organizations and part of a larger study of 
American congregations coordinated by Hartford Seminary’s 
Hartford Institute for Religious Research. The project included a 
random sampling from 1,209 mosques across the United States, 
based on responses from 416 mosque leaders. The new survey 
showed African Americans were the dominant ethnic group in 27 
per cent of mosques, South Asians in 28 per cent and Arabs in 15 per 
cent, with the remaining mosques described as ‘pluralistic’ (ibid., p. 
3). See <http:/ /fact.hartsem.edu> for further information.
3 See American Muslim Council (1992). The number of Muslims in 
the USA con tinues to be an unsettled issue. Haddad and Lummis 
(1987: 3) noted that these might be between 2 and 3 million. The 
Mosque in America project findings reflect 2 million Muslims 
who attend or participate in mosques to a varying degree, with 
an overall estimate of 6- 7 million Muslims present in the USA 
(Bagby et al. 2001: 3). One of the supreme challenges for counting 
the number of Muslims in the USA is the fact that there remains a 
large, as identified by Haddad and Lummis (1987: 9), ‘unmosqued’ 
proportion of the population who not have a direct and regular 
affiliation with a mosque.
4 See Quraishi (2001); Al-’Alwani (1993: chapter on lkhtilaf); Abou el-
Fadl (1997: 18) notes the belief that ‘a major contributing factor to the 
diversity of Islamic theological and legal schools is the acceptance 
and reverence given to the idea of ikhtilaf (disagreement)’.
5 See Sciolino (1996) on different ‘versions’ of Islamic law regarding 
marriage.
6 See Haddad and Lummis (1987) for a discussion on imams in the 
United States.
7 Azam’s ‘The Muslim Marriage Guide’, at <http://www.beliefnet.
com/story/73/story_7319_1.html> (reviewing Maqsood 1998).
8 See for example the articles by Raga El Nimr and Najla Hamadeh 
in Yamani (1996).
9 See <http://www.mwlusa.org> The Muslim Women’s League 
is based in Los Angeles, California. Other Muslim women’s 
organizations interested in similar work in clude the DC-based 
Georgetown Muslim Women’s Study Project (organized to review 
the UN Platform for Action prior to the 1995 Beijing Fourth UN 
World Conference on Women), and the North American Council 
for Muslim Women (NACMW), based in Virginia, which was 
launched in 1992 with a large national conference.
10 See <http://www.karamah.org>
11 See <http://www.alsalafyoon.com>
12 The fora email is sisters@post.queensu.ca
13 See <http://www.studyislam.com>
14 Similarly, the Canadian Society of Muslims includes on its 
website many sources of Islamic jurisprudence, as well as articles 
on ‘Family Matters’ addressing such topics as birth control 
and abortion, adoption, custody and guardianship, polygamy, 
arranged marriage, and women’s rights in an ‘Islamic prenuptial 
agreement’. See <http://www.canada-muslim.org>
15 See <http://www.domini.org/lam>
16 See al-Khateeb (1996: 15). Similarly, another source says: ‘The 
Islamic marriage contract is meant to solidify bond and specify 
stipulations that are important to both parties. The contract is 
intended to safeguard present and future legal rights of both the 
husband and wife, should encourage marital harmony, and should 
keep the family within the boundaries of the Qur’an and Sunna 
for the pleasure of Allah.’ See ‘Cont ... The Marriage Contract’ at 
<http:// geocities.com/lailah2000/contract2.html>
17 ‘A Conference on the Islamic Marriage Contract’, Harvard Law 
School Islamic Legal Studies Program, 29-31 January 1999.
18 For popular dissemination of this information, see al-Khateeb 
(1996) for a list of sample stipulations and Mills for similar 
suggestions. For a more detailed, academic discussion of contract 
stipulations, including specific examples, see Welchman (2000: 
35), Shaham (1995: 464) and Abou el-Fad! (1999).
19 Compare Mills who leaves out Islamic jurisprudential differences 
in a list of sug gested stipulations in the marriage contract with 
Abou el-Fadl (1999) who explains general Hanbali allowances of 
contractual stipulations, compared with other schools’ reluctance 
on the same, and their use of legal devices created to accomplish 
similar goals.
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20 See <http://www.karamah.org/projects/index.php>
21 See al-Hibri (1997: 28) who notes differing validity depending on 
school of thought; Welchman (2000: 167); and Carroll (1982: 277).
22 See the article, ‘An Islamic Perspective on Divorce’, at <http://www.
mwlusa.org/pub_divorce.html> Similarly, the Muslim Women’s 
League points out that classical custody laws (deciding custody 
based on abstract rules of the age and gender of the child) are among 
those that must ‘adapt to dynamic circumstances’, commenting 
that there is ‘no Qur’anic text to substantiate the arbitrary choosing 
of age as a determinant for custody’. The League urges similar 
flexibility in determining alimony awards as well.
23 See Akileh v. Elchahal (1996), a case involving two separate 
marriage contracts — an Islamic sadaq and a civil ceremony the 
following day incorporating the sadaq document specifying the 
wife’s dower; Ahmed v. Ahmed (1999), distinguishing religious 
ceremony from civil; Ohio v. Awkal (1996), describing two separate 
marriage ceremonies, civil and Islamic, on separate dates; Dajani 
v. Dajani (1988), involving a Jordanian couple married by proxy in 
Jordan, followed by a civil ceremony in the USA upon the wife’s 
arrival; and the al -Sarraf interview (2000) in which the lawyer 
describes Muslim couples generally having a Muslim ceremony 
first, and then taking care of state requirements.
24 See Tazziz v. Taaiz (1988), a marriage ceremony in the United 
States, in accordance with Islamic law; NY v. Benu (1976), a 
marriage performed by a local New York City imam not authorized 
in a city clerk’s office to perform marriages; the Awad interview 
(2000), in which the lawyer describes mosques in New York and 
New Jersey performing weddings with no state licensing; and 
McCloud (2000: 140) who urges Muslim women in the USA to get 
civil documents of both marriage and divorce. Some US Muslims, 
less concerned with Islamic law per se, may have only the civil 
ceremony, forgoing the Muslim one entirely, but these cases do 
not fall within the subject of this study.
25 See Farah v. Farah (1993) (deferred mahr of $20,000); Akileh v. 
Elchahal (1996) (im mediate sadaq of $1 and deferred $50,000; 
noting that when he proposed, the husband ‘recognized that wife 
had the right to a sadaq’); NY v. Benu (1976) (sewing machine as 
dower).
26 See also marriage contracts on file with author (Quraishi). Islamic 
history verifies the use of non-monetary mahr. For example, 
a hadith from the Prophet explicitly validates the teaching 
of sections of the Qur’an (Doi 1984: 163) and the shahada 
(declaration of Islamic faith) of the groom as dower; see Ibn Sa’d 
(1997: 279) describing Umm Sulaim’s marriage to Abu Talha, and 
stating that ‘her dower was the Islam of Abu Talha’.
27 Kadri comments (interview, 2000) on her experience with clients 
whose only interest in attempting to enforce a mahr provision is in 
unfriendly divorce proceedings, with the demand for a high mahr 
being used as an opportunity to punish the husband.
28 See listserve email discussions on ‘Sistersnet’ (sisters@post.
queensu.ca) in 1996-98 (notes on file with author Quraishi).
29 Ali (1996) comments that when divorce litigation is bitterly 
contested by a Muslim husband, it is often not because he does 
not want a divorce, but rather because he does  not want to pay 
the mahr.
30 Kadri comments (interview, 2000) that brides and grooms tend 
simply to fill in mahr provision in standard boilerplate contracts 
and rarely add specified provisions. Similarly in interviews 
with four Muslim family lawyers, none reported seeing any 
particularized contracts of this sort (Awad, interview, 2000; al-
Sarraf, interview, 2000; and Kadri, inter view, 2000).
31 Email message to Karamah responding to Marriage Contract 
Project announce ment (on file with author Quraishi). Another 
visitor to the website expressed dismay at not having a formal 
marriage contract written at her wedding, and asked if it is 
possible to create one retroactively.
32 See <http:/ /www.karamah.org>
33 This is also the position of Mona Zulfikar, who spearheaded the 
marriage contract legislative efforts in Egypt. She says one of 
the most important aspects is to ‘encourage frankness, mutual 
understanding and dialogue between the spouses, reduce the 
need to have recourse to the courts in difficult and bitter litigation 
procedures’ (Zulfikar and al Sadda 1996: 251; and cited in 
Welchman 2000: 181).
34 This is indicated by four out of the nine couples for whom one 
author (Quraishi) provided marriage contract information.
35 One of the brides assisted by this author (Quraishi) writes: ‘It wasn’t 
always easy to discuss the topics of our contract but in the end 
the entire process has brought me and... my fiancé so much closer 
and we have grown stronger’ (personal email on file with author).
36 Quoting Samia el-Moslimany saying: ‘I  put in that the burden of 
domestic chores was going to be shared by both of us... My father 
thought it was trivial, but I wanted it in the contract.’
37 See Aghili v. Saadatnefadi (1997) in which $10,000 damages was 
provided as a remedy to the wife if the husband breaches contract.
38 See the position paper, ‘Marriage on Islam’, at <http://www.
mwlusa.org>
39 Noting that over a  third of  the respondents reported marriages of 
Muslim women to non-Muslim men in their families; and noting 
that the number of Muslim men marrying non-Muslim women 
is larger.
40 ‘Some Muslim women whom we interviewed expressed the 
opinion that the man’s freedom to marry outside the faith is 
neither fair nor conducive to preserving the Islamic faith in 
future generations born in America’ (Haddad and Lummis 1987= 
146). Marquand (1996) quotes a father saying: ‘I will have a huge 
problem if my son marries a non-Muslim... and will do everything 
I can do to stop it.’
41 See the article, ‘Why Muslim man should not marry a non-
Muslim woman’, at <http://www.soundvision.com/marriage/ 
nonmuslimwoman>
42 In one extreme example, Marquand (1996) reports some members 
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of one Muslim community sought to displace a leader whose 
daughters had married non-Muslims, arguing that such a failure 
should cause him to lose his status in the community.
43 For example, says one Muslim woman, ‘I love the religion with all 
my heart, but I don’t like that the women don’t have choice’ (Todd 
1997).
44 Mahmoody (1993); Not Without My Daughter, MGM Studios, 1991. 
This movie depicts the true story of Betty Mahmoody’s escape 
from Iran with her daughter after her Iranian husband  attempted 




47 For more information about such stereotyping, see for example 
Shaheen 1997. In addition, refer to the online sources of the 
Council of Islamic-American Relations at <http://www.cairnet.
org/> and the Anti-Arab Discrimination Committee which can  be 
found at <http://www.adc.org/>
48 Betty Mahmoody (see above note 44) has herself  served as 
an  expert witness in a few cases involving Muslim marriages 
(Gustafson 1991).
49 Describing a ‘traditional Muslim wedding in Walnut’, including 
many things not included in other Muslim ceremonies, such as 
dancing, singing,  bride and  groom sitting side by side, and the 
bride’s head covered.
50 Marquand (1996) quotes one Muslim saying, ‘Sometimes male 
domination is machismo, sometimes it is genuine faith’.
51 Winton (1993) reports the story of a severely injured Muslim 
woman stating that her husband believed Islam allowed him to 
beat her.
52 Memon (1993) provides  a summary of  Islamic texts 
(including  Qur’an 4: 34) used to ‘justify battery, showing the 
misinterpretations by those who do so, and urges the American 
Muslim community to recognize and fight against domestic 
violence in their community.
53 Kadri (interview, 2000) notes a conversation with a woman 
complaining of her son beating her but who would not complain 
of such actions by her husband because she believed it was his 
right to do so. Attorney Kamran Memon (1993) notes that some 
imams tell these women to be patient and pray for the abuse to 
end, urging them not to leave their husbands and break up the 
family, and not break family privacy by talking about it to others.
54 Also featured on <http://www.zawaj.com>
55 These include (as a very brief sampling) the National Islamic 
Society of Women in America (NISWA) <http://www.niswa.org>; 
Baitul Salaam (House of Peace) <http://alnisaa1.hypermart.
net> PO Box 11041 Atlanta, GA 30310; Kamilat, <http://www.
Kamilat.org>; Karamah: Muslim Women Lawyers for Human 
Rights <http://www.Karamah.org/>; the Muslim Women’s League 
(who co-sponsored the Los Angeles conference of the Peaceful 
Families Project) <http://www.mwlusa.org>; and Muslims Against 
Family Violence, a project of ‘Stepping Together’ <http://www.
steppingtogether.org>
56 In Seth v. Seth (1985), a non-Muslim male had converted to Islam 
after a marriage contracted under US civil law and subsequently 
divorced this wife by talaq and married a Muslim woman in a 
Muslim ceremony. In Shikoh v. Shikoh (1958), the husband, an 
Indian national, declared divorce before a Brooklyn imam before 
witnesses, signed and sent a copy of the imam’s documentation 
of the declaration, entitled ‘certificate of divorce’, to the wife who 
was in Pakistan.
57 Little reports family lawyer Ahmed A. Patel saying that he reminds 
his clients who perform talaq divorces that they cannot remarry 
under US law.
58 Community property states in the USA include: Arizona, California, 
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington and 
Wisconsin; income and property earned or acquired during 
marriage is divided equally between the two spouses upon 
dissolution, even if one spouse was the predominant source of 
income. Allen (1992) quotes a Minneapolis imam stating that ‘in 
Muslim marriages, there is no notion of community property; 
whatever a woman earns outside the home she may keep, but a 
man is obligated to support his family’.
59 One encouraging case exhibits respect by one court for a 
religiously-motivated provision opting out of community 
property laws. In Mehtar v. Mehtar (1997), a Connecticut court 
upheld a Muslim couple’s pre-nuptial agreement opting out of 
South African community property laws (the marriage contract 
was executed in South Africa), stating that ‘the purpose of the 
agreement was to comply with principles of Muslim law held 
by both parties’ and holding that the requirement of financial 
disclosure usually required to validate such opt-out clauses in 
Connecticut ‘would be unfair to apply to an agreement mutually 
sought to honour deeply held religious beliefs’.
60 Iran is a primary example. Ayatollah Mohsen Kadivar has been 
quoted as saying: ‘a woman should be paid by her husband for 
working in the house, for cleaning, for breast-feeding. She can 
even say “I don’t want to do this work, I need a servant,” and her 
husband has to pay for this. This is in Islam, that he has to do this’ 
(Walter 1999).
61 The vast majority of family law cases are never published, and 
therefore are largely unavailable as a subject of research. Thus, 
most of the cases discussed in the chapter are appellate court 
cases, which may or may not be representative of Muslim family 
litigation in the United States. Moreover, family law cases are 
almost always a matter of individual state jurisdiction and thus 
the case precedent of one state does not bind another. The review 
of the cases in this study does, however, provide a good idea of 
the established persuasive and precedential authority to which a 
judge might turn in evaluating future cases.
62 For example, without citation to case law, Amina Beverly McCloud 
(2000: 140) states that marriages of Muslim immigrants to the 
United States ‘have generally received the protection of the 
courts’ because ‘marriage contracts are understood as pre-nuptial 
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or nuptial agreements’. Similarly, Imam Yusuf Ziya Kavakci, 
the imam of a Texas mosque, urges Muslims to get pre-nuptial 
agreements because they can be used to ‘safeguard your Islamic 
rights within a marriage and, if necessary, in the case of a divorce’. 
See ‘Why You Need a Prenuptial Agreement’ at <http://www.
soundvision.com/weddings/prenuptial>.
63 This attitude is probably culturally-influenced. Under Islamic law, 
once the offer and  acceptance  have been made (both usually 
included  in a  nikah ceremony),  the couple is legally married. 
Because many Muslim couples sign the contract (kitab or nikah) 
at one ceremony but do not begin to live together until some later 
date, however, many believe themselves to be only ‘engaged’ after 
the nikah.
64 See <http://www.Karamah.org> (audiotape also on file with 
author Quraishi).
65 See NY v. Benu (1976) in which the mother was charged for 
contributing to the delinquency of her minor daughters, who 
were placed in foster care with a Muslim family, and the men who 
‘married’ the girls were charged with first degree sexual assault 
of a child.
66 Rasmusen and Stake (1998) comment: ‘even if  it does not offend 
public policy, courts are reluctant  to enforce such terms because 
of  the costs to the courts,  the difficulty of enforcement without 
invading the sanctity of the marital home, and the possibility that 
enforcement would increase conflict within the marriage’.
67 The court elaborated: ‘the Mahr Agreement in the case at bar is 
nothing more and nothing less than a simple contract between 
two consenting adults. It does not contravene any statute or 
interests of society. Rather, the Mahr Agreement continues a 
custom and tradition  that is unique to a certain segment of  our 
current society and  is not at war with any public morals’ (Odatalla 
at 98).
68 In the cases reviewed below, for example, spouses asserting the 
enforceability of a Muslim marriage contract as a pre-nuptial 
agreement did not always succeed. In both California cases 
dealing with mahr claims as pre-nuptial agreements, Dqjani and 
Shaban, the court ultimately refused to honour the contract. In 
New York and Florida, the parties fared a bit better: in Aziz (NY) 
and Akileh (FL) the Muslim dower provisions were upheld, though 
the language of the Florida court indicates that they perceived 
the sadaq to be the husband’s consideration for entering into the 
contract, an analysis with which Awad would strongly disagree.
69 Welchman (2000: 140) comments that a majority of jurists 
consider mahr to be an ‘effect of the contract’.
70 For example, Al-Khateeb (1996) includes a form titled ‘Islamic 
marriage contract/ pre-nuptial agreement’.
71 Pre-nuptial agreements also generally may not include provisions 
relating to child custody and child support.
72 Al-Hibri points out that one might just as well interpret mahr 
provisions as facilitating  murder — a conclusion just as ludicrous 
as the Dajani court’s conclusion regarding divorce.
73 Of  course, she may be able to keep it if she goes through judicial 
dissolution, in which case the question of harm will be assessed by 
the arbiter, but this process is generally much longer and entails a 
burden of proof upon her.
74 The  court  refers to the entire marriage  contract, rather than the 
dower provision only, as a sadaq.
75 Incidentally, and unfortunately, the marriage contract at issue in 
this case is very similar to generic boilerplate contracts distributed 
and used by many American mosques (samples on file with author 
Quraishi).
76 The court went on to say: ‘Had the trial judge allowed the expert 
to testify, the expert in effect would have written a contract for 
the parties.’
77 Later, the Florida Court of Appeals in Akileh v. Elchahal (1996), 
when first confronted with the question of enforceability of a 
Muslim marriage contract, cited Aziz v. Aziz (1985) favourably 
and upheld a Muslim dower provision  because it found  that 
Florida  contract law applied to the secular terms of  the Muslim 
contract. The  Florida court found  that, even though the husband 
and wife later disagreed over the meaning of the sadaq (the 
husband claimed that his understanding was that women always 
forfeited the mahr if they initiated the divorce), there was a clear 
agreement at the outset of the marriage that sadaq was to be paid 
if the parties divorced, and the court honoured that agreement. 
 
For reference back to our earlier discussion of the treatment 
of these contracts as pre -nuptial agreements, in the reported 
opinion, the New York court does not refer to the contract in Aziz 
as a ‘pre-nuptial agreement’, but in Akileh (1996), the Florida court 
references Aziz as a case enforcing the sadaq as a pre-nuptial 
agreement.
78 Moreover, it might be argued  that a rationale  for the institution 
of  the deferred mahr provision  is the fact that most husbands will 
be better placed to pay high amounts later on in their careers, also 
part of the rationale for community property laws.
79 Shaban happened to involve a very low mahr amount and thus 
it was the husband who sought enforcement  of  the  marriage 
contract. The  court  went so far  as to say that the wife performed 
under the contract by entering into the marriage, and this 
constituted sufficient consideration on her part.
80 For a comparative view of the judicial treatment of mahr in 
Germany, see Jones Pauly (1999). For analysis of Muslim marriage 
cases in the UK, see Freeland and Lau (forthcoming); and Pearl 
(1985-86, 1995).
81 See Aghili v. Saadatnejadi (1997), 786 (likening sadaq to 
maintenance); Akileh v. Elchahal (1996), 247 (sadaq is a postponed 
dower that protects the woman in the event of a divorce); Dajani v. 
Dajani (1988), 872 (commenting that one purpose of the dower is to 
provide security for the wife in the event of death or dissolution, 
but also can be an outright gift).
82 See Aghili v. Saadatnejadi (1997), 786 n. 1 (commenting that sadaq 
was meant to protect the wife from unwanted divorce); Shaban 
(2001), n. 6.
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83 See Dajani v. Dajani, 872.
84 This assertion is supported by the court’s reasoning in, for 
example, Maklad v. Maklad (2001), where the court declined to 
give comity to an Egyptian certificate of divorce because  the 
wife was not present  at the time the decree was issued, had  no 
prior  notice that the certificate was sought, and was given no 
opportunity to be heard prior to its issuance.
85 Clearly not all Muslims subscribe to this as the only legitimate 
means of determining custody, but classical Islamic jurists 
addressed custody in these terms as the safest way of determining 
that the child will be placed with the best custodian. Some 
American Muslims argue for a different rule, pointing out that 
this is a jurisprudential invention, not one directly dictated by the 
original texts (see Muslim Women’s League, ‘Divorce’). It is, how 
ever, the classical Islamic custody rules that are most well known 
and are what is at issue in these cases (though often in modified 
form through modern legislation in these Muslim countries).
86 See also Adra v. Clift (1961), where the court upheld a custody 
decree from Lebanon.
87 Conversely, religion has been counted as a negative influence if it 
harms the child; see In Re Marriage of Murga (1980).
88 For an extensive discussion on the precursors to modern Muslim 
discourse in the area of Islamic jurisprudence, see Hallaq (1997).
89 At the second ‘Islam in America’ conference, 9-11 March 2001, at 
Harvard Uni versity, one panel was titled ‘Feasibility of  Muslim 
Courts/Tribunals in the United States’. A mainstream US television 
network even recently presented a fictionalized version of what one 
of these tribunals might look like, in an episode of the television 
show JAG (‘The Princess and the Petty Officer’, 14 November 2000, 
written by Mark Saraceni).
90 Various Muslim organizations in the United States have explored 
conflict resolution issues within the realm of  an  Islamic 
framework,  for example,  the Islamic Society of North America 
has held annual training conferences on conflict resolution. The 
organ ization scheduled a conference titled, ‘Muslim Peacebuilding 
after 9/11’ in 2003. For more information on such efforts, see 
<www.isna.net>
91 In particular, when one waives the right of pursuing litigation in 
court, the contract must be an ‘objective manifestation of a party’s 
intent to be bound by the religious court’s decree and the party 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights to pursue litigation 
in secular court without any religious group’s interference’ 
(Weisberg 1992: 995).
92 For example, see the website, ‘American Muslims Intent on Learning 
and Activism’, at  <http://www.amila.org> for their mission 
statement  which states ‘AMILA was formed in October 1992 by 
Muslims of college age and above to meet the spiritual, educational, 
political, and social needs of Muslims in the San Francisco Bay 
Area. We are working towards building an active American Muslim 
community with a strong commitment to spiritual enrichment, 
intellectual freedom, and community service.’ AMILA’s lectures, 
projects and activities reflect a progressive attitude towards 
claiming Islam as a vibrant American identity.
93 For example, Karamah recently participated (15 October 1999) in 
a panel of women of faith entitled ‘Religion and World Conflict’. 
The event was organized by the Inter national Women’s Forum. 
See ‘news and events’ section at <http://www.karamah.org/news/
index.php>
94 See <http://www.namlnet.org> There are also a few local city-
based Muslim bar associations with similar focus, for example in 
Chicago and the DC area.
95 See <http://www.namlnet.org>
96 ‘On the other hand is the generation of children and grandchildren 
who have no emotional ties to the homeland of the fathers and find 
little of value in their customs which are seen as counterproductive 
and an impediment to the progress in the society in which they are 
born’ (ISIM 1998: 5).
97 As a teacher in a Muslim school, Hashim notes that parents from 
a specific cultural background would not allow female children 
to spend the night even for activities such as prayer outside of 
the home due to their interpretation of proper cultural gender 
roles. Eventually, she states, when parents were able to see that 
‘the religious teachings, in fact, promoted the practice of seeking 
opportunities to worship God’, they did decide to allow their 
daughters to pursue such activities.
98 They compared statistics from 1994 with 2001 responses, noting 
that the proportion of mosques with separation by curtain, barrier 
or another room had increased to 60-66 percent of those surveyed 
in 2001.
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Negotiating Justice:  American 
Muslim Women Navigating 
Islamic Divorce and Civil Law
Z A H R A  A Y U B I  ( 2 0 1 0 )
Fifteen years ago, a divorce in the family put the questions that arise at the intersections of civil divorce and 
Islamic divorce front and center in my mind. Having found only one significant piece of scholarship that had 
been written at the time (Asifa Quraishi-Landes and Najeeba Sayeed’s “No Altars,” republished in this volume), 
I undertook a qualitative field research project in which I interviewed American Muslim women about their 
divorce experiences, the choices they had to confront about how to get divorced, their finances and children, their 
sense of justice and right and wrong in Islam as they practiced it in the United States. Two articles republished in 
this volume came from that project. This article on divorce from the Journal for Islamic Studies both documents 
several Muslim women’s divorce experiences in the United States and also argues that Islamic legal discourses 
in the United States do not address Muslim women’s concerns in divorce.
This article appeared in the Journal for Islamic Studies, 30 (2010), pp. 78-102 and is republished here by permission.
Suggested citation: Zahra Ayubi, “Negotiating Justice: American Muslim Women Navigating Islamic Divorce 
and Civil Law,” in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of Faith: American Muslim Marriage and Divorce in the Twenty-First Century 
(Boston: OpenBU, 2021), pp. 111-124. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42505
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Abstract
Drawing on interviews with divorced American 
Muslim women, I will discuss the range of ways 
Muslim women in the U.S. incorporate Islamic 
law into their lives and how they negotiate the 
religious and legal aspects of their divorces. A 
common challenge my interlocutors faced in 
divorce was establishing an access to Islamic 
divorce and a divorce on equitable terms. Using 
their understanding of Islamic law as a standard 
for justice, my interlocutors employed both civil law 
and religio-legal strategies to re-define the terms 
of Islamic divorce for themselves. Their experiences 
demonstrate a need for reform in American Muslim 
divorce ethics and Islamic legal thought.
Nawal comes from an educated, conservative 
Canadian-American Muslim home and takes her faith 
very seriously.1 She always knew that her parents 
would arrange her marriage to a man from her native 
country, Pakistan, and agreed to a proposal from a 
distant cousin, whom she did not know. She married 
him in both a civil and religious ceremony in Canada. 
Nawal soon found that she and her husband were 
incompatible because of their different upbringings. 
She faced constant abuse from him and his family as 
they made belligerent and disrespectful comments 
about her, taunting her, saying that she was ugly, a 
bad cook, and not good enough for him. His parents 
and siblings took priority over her and he threatened 
to divorce her if she objected to this. For years she 
attempted to save her marriage, which was expected 
of a good Muslim woman, but after Nawal could no 
longer tolerate his abuse, she filed for a civil divorce. 
She did not want her daughters to think that this was 
an acceptable model of a Muslim marriage.
During the two-year divorce, local Muslim community 
elders tried to reconcile the couple. Her reputation 
was destroyed and she was viewed as a woman of 
little patience and loose morals. Her husband counter-
filed for a civil divorce, contested the custody of their 
daughters, and claimed possession of the home and all 
marital assets, emphasising that under Islamic law she 
was entitled to nothing. Nawal challenged whether this 
was truly Islamic. He subsequently refused consent for 
an Islamic divorce and told their daughters they were 
still married in accordance to Islam and that she could 
not remarry, yet it was legal for him to marry again as 
he was allowed to have four wives.
Nawal’s story reveals the many challenges American 
Muslim women face during a divorce. Dominant 
American Muslim culture rejects divorce as a 
reasonable resolution to conflicts that couples 
experience, with frequent citations to a hadith 
(Prophetic saying) of disputed authenticity in which 
the Prophet Muhammad was reported to say, “Of 
all the lawful acts the most detestable to Allah is 
divorce”.2 Family pressure, Muslim communities, and 
social circles encourage women, in the form of religio-
legal arguments, to stay in bad marriages, regardless 
of which spouse initiates the divorce and thus makes 
obtaining an Islamic divorce and establishing Islamic 
terms, which according to fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence), 
are never an independent decision for women.
In this essay I will discuss only the legal aspects in 
divorce cases of nine women, particularly the women’s 
experiences navigating between civil law and the 
multiple interpretations of religious law during a 
divorce.3 I will argue that the experiences of American 
Muslim women in contending with divorce law and 
exploring their relationships to legal and religious 
discourses emphasise the need for reform of American 
Muslim legal thought on both marriage and divorce 
of American Muslims. In discussing how and whether 
women pursued an Islamic divorce in the American 
context, I will examine the legal choices women make 
based on their own sense of religious ethics and will 
shed light on the process of negotiation with ex-
husbands, civil law, Islamic institutions, or the imams 
who may or may not have assisted the women’s needs 
in divorce. In particular, I am interested in how the 
women’s religious identity and personal observance 
affected their decisions on whether to incorporate 
Islamic law in the negotiation of divorce; how they 
managed competing notions of Muslim marriage and 
divorce, and finally their use of the civil courts as a 
means to negotiate for Islamic justice.
Muslim divorce in the U.S. has generally centred 
around two legal issues. The first, scholars have 
studied U.S. court decisions on claims to Islamic law, 
paying particular attention to the enforceability of 
mahr (marriage dower) claims and stipulations made 
in some nikah (Muslim  marriage) contracts.4 Although 
these studies refer to individual cases, their focus is 
on tracking the admissibility of Islamic law in court, 
though they barely touch on the effects it has on 
women. Secondly, Muslim lawyers or leaders of Islamic 
institutions confront the lack of enforceability of 
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Islamic law in the U.S. by advocating for the creation of 
institutionalised Islamic tribunals or the adoption of 
Muslim personal status laws that would grant Islamic 
divorces.5 These proposals, however, do not consider 
the women’s relationship with religious law prior 
to divorce and rarely accept the plurality of Muslim 
interpretations of marriage, divorce, or Islamic law.
There has been little attention given to American 
Muslim women’s perspectives and the personal, 
religious decisions they make in the legal divorce 
process, in particular, on how they select between 
religious interpretations for application in civil cases. 
In any divorce involving an American Muslim woman, 
a number of questions arise. Is there a need for Islamic 
divorce in the U.S. where civil law governs conjugal 
ties? What is the definition of Islamic divorce and do 
women have access to it? Who holds the authority 
to pronounce the divorce? What are “Islamic” 
divorce terms; are they just and are there limits to 
their reinterpretation? As women make decisions 
about these questions, they interpret religious texts, 
challenge patriarchal notions in the legal tradition, 
and yet may choose not to engage Islamic law at all.
Similar to the framework of “tafsir through praxis,” 
which Sa’diyya Shaikh uses to describe South African 
women’s resistance to domestic violence, which 
places women’s experiences at the center of their 
understandings of the Qur’an, my informants also 
formulated their own tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis) by 
patching together an understanding of divorce as 
an expression of divine justice, sometimes through 
textual references to justice in the Qur’an, hadiths, 
sunna (Prophet Muhammad’s example), and various 
laws of fiqh.6 In what also resembles liberation theology, 
these women have a sense of Islam as an ethical 
religion and a source of justice, which enables them 
to seek an equitable resolution to marital injustices 
through divorce, both civil or religious.
Field work: informants and methods
In this essay I will present the experiences of nine 
ethnically diverse American Muslim women who 
were all divorced in the U.S. Two of the women are 
American-born daughters of immigrants, four are 
immigrants, and three are converts to Islam, two of 
which are African American and one, a Caucasian. Two 
women are of Middle Eastern descent and four are of 
South Asian origins. They range in age from mid 20s 
to late 50s. Due to the limited number of informants 
in this investigation, I will not attempt to draw broad 
conclusions on the causes or prevalence of divorce or 
legal strategies. This qualitative discussion validates 
these women’s narratives as real and important 
individual experiences that help us understand the 
dysfunction and potential for reform of American 
Muslim institutions. Like in other ethnographies 
involving North American Muslim women’s stories, 
such as the works by Jamillah Karim, Carolyn Rouse, 
and Shahnaz Khan, my goal is to analyse a full narrative 
of the choices women make and examine the details of 
their experience.
There is no set model of how a Muslim woman obtains 
a divorce. I have, however, divided the ten divorces 
amongst my nine informants into three categories: 
first, two are exclusively religious divorces (resulting 
from exclusively religious marriages); second, there 
are three exclusively civil divorces; and finally, five 
are cases involving both civil and religious law. These 
last cases are the most revealing about how American 
Muslim women sift through religio-legal claims and 
try to adhere to their notions of Islamic justice in 
the divorce process. Their personal understanding of 
Islamic and civil law, level of religious observance, the 
type of community in which they lived, their financial 
situations, and the flexibility of religious authorities 
were all factors that affected these women’s legal 
decisions.
American Muslim demographics, institutions, and 
marriage and divorce practices
There are approximately six million
7 Muslims in the 
U.S. who comprise of transnational and American 
origins. Muslim communities have formed national-
scale institutions, often along ethnic lines, such as the 
American Society of Muslims, which is predominantly 
African American, and the Muslim Students 
Association and the Islamic Society of North America, 
which are predominantly made up of American 
Muslims of immigrant origins. These organisations 
help amalgamate Muslim communities into a cohesive 
American Muslim population and formulate an 
ideal “Islamic” lifestyle within the U.S. One such 
organisation, the Fiqh Council of North America 
(FCNA), is a group of American Muslim scholars with 
varied training in Islamic law, who study classical and 
modern fiqh and pass fatwas (legal opinions) through 
websites and publications distributed or sold at 
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mosques on a variety of topics ranging from Islamic 
banking practices to Islamic divorce terms.
Compared to Muslim majority countries where Islamic 
law is encompassed by family codes in civil law, and 
many Commonwealth countries where Muslim personal 
law is recognised, Islamic law is not formalised in the 
United States. American Muslims live under civil law, 
but by practising Islam and participating in a Muslim 
lifestyle with respect to marriage and raising children, 
many Muslims adhere to both Islamic and civil laws 
and do so without any reservations. This creates a form 
of Islamic legal culture, rather than a binding system, 
that Muslims follow out of personal and religious 
obligation. The freedom of practising one’s religion 
in the U.S. allows the two legal frameworks, religious 
and civil, to exist independently. The FCNA’s fatwas are 
only binding for those who accept the authority of the 
scholars on the council and seek an authentic Islamic 
resolution to religio-legal challenges in America. On 
a community level, mosque boards, local imams, and 
religious elders have also functioned as religious 
authorities for mediating legal disputes or religious 
controversies.
Some conservative segments of the Muslim society in 
the U.S. maintain careful adherence to Islamic legal 
principles, such as the prohibition of usury, whereby 
they object to purchase items on credit, or a man’s 
right to practice polygamy by not declaring their plural 
marriages on civil documents. Other Muslims choose 
not to adopt Islamic laws in their daily lives. The 
practices of most American Muslims fall somewhere 
in the middle in the spectrum of legal adherence 
to Shari’a and fiqh.8 For many American Muslims, a 
marriage involves two processes, civil and religious. 
The solemnisation of marriage in Islamic terms is 
important to Muslims because it forms a union in the 
“eyes of God” and within social traditions of Muslims, 
it distinguishes their marital relations from zina (illicit 
sex). The nikah, which is usually officiated by a figure 
of religious authority, who may also be licensed by 
the state to perform marriages (or else couples often 
have separate civil marriages), is composed of an offer 
and acceptance of marriage in front of two witnesses 
and usually contains a previously determined mahr, 
which is paid, or partially deferred, by the husband to 
the wife at the time of nikah. A divorce can also have 
both a religious and civil nature. Muslim women may 
choose which law determines the divorce terms, but 
many times it all depends entirely on the husband’s 
willingness to cooperate as to whether an Islamic 
divorce will take place.
There are many types of divorce in Islamic law. Talaq is 
a unilateral repudiation pronounced by a husband, after 
which the wife observes a three-month waiting period, 
‘idda, and at its conclusion, the marriage is irrevocably 
dissolved. During ‘idda, a man can withdraw the talaq 
and take his wife back; he can reject her a second 
time but after a third pronouncement the divorce is 
irrevocable. If the husband has an outstanding balance 
on the mahr, it must be paid in full to the wife upon 
talaq. This common practice should not be confused 
with potential compensation or alimony due to a wife 
when obtaining a civil divorce.
Khul’ is an irrevocable divorce initiated by a wife 
usually in exchange for the return of the mahr, but 
most schools of jurisprudential thought agree that 
the husband’s consent is required for it to be valid 
(although the husband’s consent is not specifically 
mentioned in the Qur’anic verse upon which the 
legal concept of khul’ is based).9 Theoretically, women 
also have access to a juridical divorce, faskh, which is 
concluded by a qadi (a judge trained in Islamic law) 
presiding in an Islamic court.10 In order to establish 
a case for faskh and waive return of the mahr to the 
husband, a woman must prove her case, such as 
the husband’s insanity, impotence, imprisonment, 
abandonment, physical harm, or lack of moral conduct 
or financial maintenance. This option is not available 
in the U.S. as there is no juridical structure of Islamic 
law in place; however some imams may issue informal 
Islamic divorce decrees.
In attempts to distinguish Muslims from the rest of 
the population and to promote pious lifestyles, Islamic 
institutions encourage U.S. Muslims to follow Islamic 
law in their family affairs. This generally involves 
romanticised references to the medieval fiqh, which 
restrict women’s self-determination, by organisations 
such as the FCNA.11 Fiqh was constructed on the basis 
of pre-modern gender roles and it includes the legal 
assumption that women have very little power in 
determining their own affairs. They need consent from 
a wali (male guardian) to enter a marriage and their 
husbands’ consent to exit a marriage. Thus, in applying 
classical fiqh standards, women are regulated through 
marriage and divorce and thus become fully responsible 
for upholding the vision of an ideal Muslim family to 
which the greater American Muslim community is 
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committed. This vision is based on an unchanging 
fiqh that is treated as sacred, even though Islamic law 
in the U.S. context is an amalgamation of classical 
jurisprudence, immigrant notions of manifestations 
of Shari’a in modern Muslim nation states. It is also 
the result of American Muslim apologetic attempts 
to shape Islamic law in response to non-Muslim, and 
western criticism that women have no rights in Islam. 
Increasingly, reform-minded Muslims refer to Shari’a 
as the standard of God’s justice, however this standard 
is disjointed from the evolution of Islamic legal 
thought in America.
The experiences that many immigrant Muslims 
have had of resistance to colonial domination in 
their countries of origin, or continued post- colonial 
opposition to “Western” gender roles, persuades 
immigrants and non-immigrants alike to adhere to a 
conservative model of gender roles in the U.S., which 
is considered Islamic. Ziba Mir-Hosseini points out 
that because of criticisms from outside the Muslim 
community regarding the “patriarchal biases of fiqh 
rules” Muslims often take an:
oppositional stance and a defensive or apologetic 
tone: oppositional, because their agenda is to 
resist the advance of the ‘Western’ values and 
lifestyles espoused by twentieth- century Muslim 
states and their secular elites; apologetic, 
because they attempt to explain and justify the 
gender biases which they inadvertently reveal by 
going back to fiqh texts.12
As Kecia Ali says, even Muslim feminists like Azizah 
al-Hibri fall into apologetic traps of ignoring the 
fundamental ways in which Islamic law is an historical 
product of patriarchal interpretations. In their desire 
to show Islam in a favourable light and take pragmatic 
approaches to negotiating rights for women, feminist 
apologists latch onto isolated rights that allow women 
some agency in their matters such as claims to the 
mahr and rights to include stipulations in the nikah 
and “provide new justifications and interpretations for 
these rights that do not accurately reflect their original 
place in a system of spousal rights and obligations.”13 
In facing a plethora of religio-legal claims from 
their communities, some of my informants selected 
injunctions from fiqh favourable to women in order 
to obtain an Islamic divorce or construct favourable 
terms. However, many moved beyond apologetic 
tactics by focusing on justice as the underlying purpose 
of Islamic law, rather than searching for favourable fiqh 
terms in divorce.
Women who divorced exclusively using religious law
An exclusively religious marriage is one that is 
solemnised by the religious authority and not by civil 
law. At first, this type of marriage seems unfavourable 
for women because it allows the unofficial wife or 
co-wives14 to be deprived of health insurance or 
healthcare, public education or benefits acquired 
through marriage, and limits their mobility out of 
fear of discovery by state officials. In the event of an 
exclusive religious divorce, women may lose complete 
custody of their children and become financially 
disadvantaged. However, there may not be any civic 
difficulty in such marriages for women. For example, 
Noor and Tanveer, who did not have civil marriages, 
were able to determine or improve upon their 
divorce terms according to their own understanding 
of religion.
Noor, the daughter of Egyptian immigrants, is an 
obstetrician/gynaecologist who grew up in the U.S. 
with a strong sense of her Muslim identity and 
awareness of women’s Islamic rights. One evening 
after work, Noor found a new acquaintance visiting her 
parents’ home with an imam, proposing their nikah 
take place that very evening. Without the opportunity 
to reflect on any stipulations that she wanted to 
include in it, Noor accepted the nikah. She remembers 
being overwhelmed: “I was not in my senses, post-call 
and not fully present.”15 The couple intended to have 
an additional civil marriage but that never occurred. 
This, however, did not bother Noor because in her view 
the nikah was a spiritual contract and real marriage.
During the two-year marriage, Noor found her husband 
to be detached, aloof, and hid the entirety of his income. 
Her situation conflicted with her knowledge that in a 
Muslim marriage wives have the right to receive nafaqa 
(maintenance) from husbands, and that no one has a 
claim on a woman’s independent wealth and earnings. 
She never expected to have to financially support her 
husband and child. When she tried to confront him he 
became hostile and so she “left the house and declared 
a khul’. At first her husband was reluctant [to consent] 
but he accepted that he was not fulfilling his duties.”
After the khul’ Noor devised a visitation schedule for 
her ex-husband and child and calculated the amount 
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of child support she needed. Although religious 
contracts are rarely enforceable, to the surprise of 
Noor’s family, her ex-husband complied with the 
Islamic divorce terms. Noor concedes, “I trust[ed] him 
because he followed Islam. It would have been very 
easy [for him] not to,” indicating he felt morally and 
religiously compelled to co-operate. Later, however, 
she used civil law to make her divorce contract legally 
binding by taking written documentation of their 
agreement to court. It was for this reason that when 
her ex-husband failed on one occasion to make child-
support payments, Noor was immediately able to file 
a complaint with the courts. A judge ordered him to 
make future payments through a wage deduction 
system instead of direct payments to Noor.
Even though civil law does not recognise exclusively 
religious marriages or divorce, Noor was able to use 
the courts to enforce her visitation schedule and 
child support payments because the court recognises 
paternity and enforces child support even when parents 
are not married according to civil law. However, if she 
was not financially secure, she would not be able to rely 
on the courts. For the future, Noor says that when she 
remarries she will contract a civil marriage as well as 
a nikāh for the sake of “protecting [her] rights.” This is 
an interesting shift in choice of legal system from her 
earlier position in which she felt that Islam sufficiently 
protected her rights. She now feels she must use civil 
law in order to preserve her Islamic rights as a wife.
Tanveer is a twice-divorced African-American woman. 
After learning from a difficult first marriage and 
divorce, which I will discuss later, Tanveer contracted 
her second nikah with various stipulations regarding 
her personal autonomy during the marriage such as 
“being able to travel without supervision, fast without 
permission from [her] husband, and a unilateral right 
to divorce.”16 Tanveer did not have a second civil 
marriage as she felt that in the event of a possible 
divorce she did not want to relive the experience and 
trauma of a civil divorce. However, this marriage was a 
short one and Tanveer divorced again, but due to the 
stipulation of the right to unilateral divorce, it enabled 
her to divorce without contentious negotiations for 
her husband’s consent to khul’.
Stipulations as a Tool for Women
Although Noor and Tanveer decided their own terms in 
religious divorce, they both concede that their positive 
experience with religious contracts was due to their ex-
husband’s “God-fearing” nature and desire to adhere 
to an Islamic morality that bound them to abide by the 
nikah or divorce if they breached its conditions. Often 
Muslims have apologetically pointed to the bargaining 
power women have for stipulating conditions in the 
nikah, as evidence of women’s equality in marriage 
according to fiqh, despite the lack of enforceability 
in many contexts and difficulties in negotiating 
stipulations in the first place.
In her study on spousal abuse among American 
Muslim women, Dena Hassouneh-Phillips explores 
the efficacy of stipulations.17 Hassouneh-Phillips 
explains that her interlocutors endured physical abuse 
because “marriage for Muslim women is integral to 
religious and social life […]. Many of the women […] 
unfortunately tolerated significant abuse for many 
years, hoping that through faith, things would improve 
over time.” They were often quoted the hadith, 
“Marriage is half of faith.” Her informants’ attempts to 
empower themselves by drafting lengthy stipulations 
in the nikah or renegotiating their marriage contracts 
in Islamic arbitration led by imams proved ineffective 
in preventing the abuse.
Her analysis of the failure of stipulations as deterrents 
against domestic violence demonstrates that the 
inclusion of stipulations in the nikah is not a definitive 
solution to ensure marriage partners are on equal 
footing. As Kecia Ali points out, including stipulations 
would not curb men’s access to a unilateral, no-fault 
Islamic divorce.18 There is no incentive (i.e. the threat 
of divorce) that pressures husbands to comply with 
stipulations, while the pressure exists for the wives. 
Stipulations cannot be a long term reform solution, 
not only because they are unenforceable contracts, 
but more vitally because: “it would not address this 
basic imbalance in men’s and women’s marital rights, 
or the definition of the marriage contract as being 
unilaterally in the husband’s domain (fī yadihi).”19 
Even if all women stipulated the right to unilateral 
divorce through pre-nuptial agreements,20 until an 
honest discussion of equal rights for men and women 
in Muslim marriage takes place, the definition of 
nikah remains the same, a product of medieval gender 
inequalities in fiqh. Although in some cases women 
can hold men accountable to religious contracts. 
Noor’s need to employ the U.S. courts to enforce the 
terms of her khul’ shows that Muslim women in the 
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U.S. can benefit from legal duality in marriage and 
divorce negotiations to create incentive for husbands’ 
compliance. This poses the question, to which I will 
return, of whether the recognition of Islamic divorce 
law in the U.S. is desirable.
Women who divorced exclusively using civil law
In this section I will discuss the divorce experiences 
of three women, Firdaus, Zarrin, and Hafsa, who all 
had civil and religious marriages but chose to divorce 
using only using the civil law. They acknowledged 
Islamic law insofar as settling their personal questions 
or establishing an Islamic justification for seeking 
divorce. Their cases illustrate one way Muslim women 
accommodate both civil law and religious authority in 
the dissolution of their marriage.
Firdaus emigrated from Pakistan as a teenager and 
married her college sweetheart in a civil and religious 
marriage, the latter of which was “very important to 
[her]” because “it’s a requirement for a Muslim family 
to have a religious marriage.”21 After twenty-two 
years of marriage Firdaus learnt that her husband was 
cheating on her. Firdaus filed for civil divorce even 
after receiving many phone calls from her brother 
and elders in her community, who said divorce is not 
Islamic and not the answer.
Although the nikah was important to her, she says, 
“Islamic divorce didn’t really come up because my 
husband and I were physically separated and the 
physical separation in combination with the American 
divorce resulted in the final divorce.” Her reasoning for 
use of the term, final divorce, resembles the idea of the 
irrevocability of khul’ or, of talaq after the separation 
period of ‘idda has expired. Although Firdaus did not 
pursue an Islamic divorce independently, her idea of 
physical separation coupled with the civil divorce 
was cause for final divorce which reflects various 
“religious” notions. With respect to mahr she said, 
“In a divorce, mahr doesn’t come into play […] living 
in the United States, your divorce goes through the 
legal avenue in which everything you own is split half 
way. My mahr was so nominal compared to my divorce 
settlement that it just fell in.” She viewed both her 
civil divorce decree and settlement inclusive of Islamic 
law. It was also financially safer for Firdaus, who was 
unemployed, to receive half the marital assets and 
child support rather than claiming a nominal mahr as 
her compensation due at divorce.
Islamic Permission to Divorce using civil law
In contrast, Zarrin’s experience of a civil divorce was a 
negative one. She married straight out of high school 
and lived for thirteen years under strict conditions in 
which her controlling husband did not allow her to 
drive or learn English; he required her to log all the 
phone calls she made and received. After becoming 
depressed and contemplating suicide, Zarrin ignored 
her parents’ wishes to stay in the marriage and went 
to a Muslim counsellor and a Muslim shelter as she did 
not want to “give [non-Muslims] a reason to say bad 
things about Muslims.”
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When she filed for divorce her husband said, “under 
Islamic laws [she] could not divorce him, […] this was 
unholy and bad and [she] was going against God’s will. 
[But she] knew it was the right thing.”23 Instead of 
negotiating religious divorce with her uncooperative 
husband, Zarrin confirmed with the hoja (figure of 
religious authority) who had officiated their marriage, 
if it would be acceptable in Islam for her to seek 
divorce: “I knew I was two hundred percent right but I 
just wanted to confirm. I described [to] him [only] the 
sexual problems he had and I [asked] is it okay under 
these conditions for me to divorce […] he said yes, by 
all means go ahead and divorce.” She presented the 
situation as a case for juridical divorce faskh to receive 
her hoja’s approval, but she only pursued the divorce 
through civil law.
Zarrin initially viewed religious and civil laws as 
separate entities. Her nikah was “the difference between 
zina” and permissible sexual relations; in comparing 
it to civil marriage she says, “in our religion at least 
two people need to know that you got married, that’s 
why there are witnesses […] and in legal marriage there 
are at least two witnesses so it is probably the same 
process.” As the processes of civil and Islamic marriage 
resemble one another, she felt a civil marriage fulfilled 
the Islamic requirements of nikah. Similarly, in seeking 
divorce, she confidently accepted the civil divorce as a 
religious divorce because her hoja had pre-approved it.
Zarrin’s husband suggested an inexpensive Muslim 
lawyer who could settle their divorce. She agreed, 
realising that she could not afford a fight for child 
custody or a financial settlement. She recalls, “He 
said ‘I want the custody of the kids because I’m afraid 
that you’re going to kidnap them’ [...] I had nothing. 
I had no rights whatsoever.” The lawyer he hired was 
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“[reluctant] to draw up the papers” for finalising the 
divorce and told her to “go to another lawyer and get 
[her] rights” because he believed Zarrin was entitled to 
more as a Muslim woman and could make legitimate 
Islamic claims through the civil courts. As she could 
not afford her own attorney, she settled on her ex-
husband’s terms, which he claimed were Islamic.
Hafsa was a first-generation Pakistani-American 
woman who fell in love and got engaged with a suitor 
from her community. Her brother, acting as her wali 
(male guardian), opposed the match because he had 
identified certain problematic features of her fiancé’s 
personality, but later consented to it. Within two 
months of the marriage, “all the issues he had as an 
individual […] became apparent.”24 He was depressed, 
dropped out of graduate school, drank and gambled 
excessively. To salvage the marriage, she supported 
him financially, paid his tuition, convinced him to go 
to counseling for “anger management and abusive 
behavior,” and take medications for his depression. He 
was unresponsive and inconsistent with treatment and 
after several failed attempts in helping her husband 
who promised to change, Hafsa filed for divorce.
Before doing so, she approached the progressive Imam 
she had selected to officiate her nikah two years earlier 
because, “[she] wanted to make sure that [she] was doing 
everything according to Islam.” She told him exactly 
what had been going on [...] and he was supportive of 
her. The Imam felt that Hafsa chose divorce as a last 
resort and her repeated attempts to reconcile with 
her husband and involving others was comparable to 
attempts at reconciliation that may occur during the 
‘idda period. She recalls: “I really had done more than 
I needed to do […] because he knew that I had gotten 
the psychiatrists and everybody involved, he did feel 
that somebody had tried to intervene.” With regard 
to an Islamic divorce she says, “I guess it was more 
along the lines of the law of the land superseding any 
cultural or religious beliefs [...] and for me that settled 
the question [...] I felt really comfortable in hearing it 
from him. The Imam just validated it for me.”
Although the Imam’s permission to divorce answered 
her question about Islamic divorce, Hafsa discussed 
her ten thousand dollar mahr outside of court, in 
the hope that his parents would admit to their son’s 
flawed character and honour the nikah. As they were 
not obligated by civil law to pay her the ten thousand 
dollars, they claimed that the ring, the only gift she 
kept from the marriage, was intended to be her mahr. 
They did not address the money she had invested in 
attempting to salvage the marriage and although she 
felt their refusal to pay the mahr or reimburse her was 
not Islamic, she believed her civil divorce decree was.
Firdaus, Zarrin, and Hafsa consider the civil system as 
the institution that divorced them from their husbands 
as they felt civil law was inclusive of Isalmic law or 
resembled it closely. For Firdaus’s case this provided 
financial security. In the cases of Hafsa and Zarrin, by 
having religious permission from sympathetic imams 
to divorce in the civil system they avoided making a 
distinction between the two legal entities, which could 
have allowed the ex-husbands to prevent an Islamic 
divorce from taking place. However, by subsuming 
Islamic law under civil law, they were not able to use 
the courts to negotiate for what they felt was their 
Islamic due such as financial compensation or custody, 
because either it was too late, cost prohibitive, or to 
ensure their ex-husbands’ compliance.
Use of both civil and religious systems
Unlike the women I discussed in the previous section, 
five of my interlocutors, who are fairly well versed 
in Islamic legal debates and Muslim women’s rights, 
treated the civil and religious divorces as separate and 
considered khul’ or talaq essential to feel truly divorced 
in both a personal sense and in the eyes of God. Their 
cases fall into three categories based on the order in 
which civil and religious divorces took place. Sadaf 
and Tanveer declared khul’, then proceeded through 
the civil divorce process. Nawal and Lisa filed for civil 
divorce first and then sought Islamic divorce during or 
after the civil process. Aliya’s ex-husband mailed her 
a talaq notice and she subsequently went through the 
civil divorce process. The order in which the religious or 
civil divorces took place greatly affected the women’s 
agency in negotiating which laws, civil or Islamic, 
were applied and whether the women obtained Islamic 
divorce at all.
Sadaf is an African-American woman who converted 
to Islam in college and was widowed at a young age 
with two children. She faced community pressure to 
remarry and recalls, “I wasn’t ready to get married but 
the concern everywhere in the community was that I 
was alone and there was pressure on me to get married 
and so I just said okay.”25 Because she was rushed 
into remarriage, several unresolved issues surfaced 
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frequently. Sadaf ’s husband was abusive, irresponsible 
with their children, and disrespectful towards her. 
After staying married for the sake of the children and 
getting pregnant year after year, Sadaf declared a khul’. 
Her husband refused consent but Sadaf took him to 
counseling with an imam who knew her situation well 
and convinced him to sign Islamic divorce papers.
She felt this was a real divorce: “when we got an Islamic 
divorce, I had seen myself as divorced, and the court 
would be a formality.” However, this process turned 
into a ten-year long custody battle and numerous court 
dates for missed child support payments. He “did what 
he could do to prolong the situation because he knew 
that [she] wanted the divorce.” Sadaf ’s understanding 
of civil marriage as a separate entity from the religious 
marriage enabled her to remarry while the civil divorce 
case was pending. She says, “In my world, the Islamic 
part is necessary.” She then married the imam of a 
predominantly African-American mosque and had 
carefully drafted stipulations in her nikah, which she 
felt her husband would respect because of his personal 
and public religious obligations.
Tanveer, whom I discussed earlier in the context of her 
second divorce, had a more complex first divorce. She 
had four children with her husband of 20 years but felt 
he was controlling and not the spiritual partner she 
envisioned him to be when they married. She recalls: 
“I felt that [during] the whole marriage, there wasn’t 
any communication and [any] level of love […] So I felt, 
why am I married? He tried to exert a certain level of 
control over me […], not acknowledging my spiritual 
autonomy.” She changed her core beliefs to suit his 
tastes and was “unhappy for a long time.” When 
Tanveer told her husband she wanted a divorce, “he 
was very angry and distraught and said [it was] because 
[she] wanted to be a career woman and that’s not 
Islamic and divorce is not Islamic. He said ‘it’s going 
to be on [her]. I’m not responsible for it.’” She decided 
to “do the Islamic [divorce] first because [she] felt that 
would have more weight spiritually.”
Tanveer met with a “moderate imam” to discuss her 
khul’. However, he did not trust Tanveer’s carefully 
deliberated decision and told her he would only sign as 
a witness for her khul’ if she waited for two months to 
determine if divorce was her final decision. After two 
months, Tanveer left the house, returned the mahr, 
which was made up of some furniture and cash, and 
took the children as per their wishes. She determined 
the visitation schedule, which the court enforced, and 
sent her husband a notice titled “Declaration of Khula”, 
signed by her and the Imam. Even though her husband 
was extremely angry a few months later he consented 
to the divorce.
In a traditional Muslim marriage there is no concept of 
conjugal wealth, a position which is supported by a fatwa 
by the FCNA.26 A woman leaves with the same wealth 
she brings into a marriage and has little or no claim on 
marital assets. This poses a challenge for women like 
Tanveer who divorce by both civil and Islamic laws: 
which law should determine the division of property 
and what financial settlement is considered Islamic for 
a homemaker who cannot rely on an extended family 
for support? As Tanveer first pursued the religious 
divorce and left the house, she encountered great 
financial hardships. Initially she “was not going to ask 
for anything [because] that definitely wasn’t Islamic.” 
However, a divorced friend convinced her that it was 
indeed Islamic: “Islamically [she] was entitled [to] 
something” because “[she] breast-fed the kids, […] 
took care of the kids, and took care of the house while 
he was working.” Using a similar reasoning found in 
Moroccan divorce law, Tanveer asked herself, “If I 
didn’t do it, then how much would it cost for someone 
to do it?”27 So she claimed half of the equity of the 
marital house and “made a clause that a portion of it 
should go to the children when they are eighteen.” By 
first pursuing an Islamic divorce, Tanveer was able to 
ground herself in the Shari’a, which her husband cited 
as the very reason she could not divorce him. It was 
important to Tanveer that the subsequent civil divorce 
terms be just and Islamic, but that was only possible 
through questioning the very core of what is Islamic.
Establishing a religious divorce before a civil divorce was 
beneficial to Sadaf and Tanveer in that they did not elicit 
much debate about obtaining religious divorces from 
their husbands, and perhaps showed their assertiveness 
by declaring khul’ with the support of an understanding 
imam. The civil process, however, was either too lengthy 
or difficult for debating Islamic divorce terms.
The Mu‘allaqa problem
The next two women I will discuss first initiated civil 
divorces and then had great difficulty in subsequently 
obtaining an Islamic divorce. The mu‘allaqa (woman 
who is hanging, or in limbo) problem is a predicament 
that some American Muslim women experience as they 
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have obtained a civil divorce but are unable to secure 
a religious divorce from their husbands or religious 
authorities. Upon learning that their wives had filed for 
a civil divorce, Nawal and Lisa’s ex-husbands denied 
them Islamic divorce by taking advantage of women’s 
limited access to an Islamic divorce and men’s 
advantage in fiqh of owning the marriage contract as 
part of their domain.28 According to Nawal and Lisa, 
their motivation for doing so was to take revenge on 
their ex-wives for filing a civil divorce and to spiritually 
bind them from moving on or remarrying.
When Nawal, whose marriage I detailed in the 
introduction, filed for civil divorce, her ex-husband 
suggested to “do this according to Shari’a law.”29  
He wanted to pay her the mahr, which she said was 
unnecessary because “[She] was the one requesting the 
divorce […]” He then wanted mediation at the mosque 
to “make some decisions about the children and the 
property.” Initially she thought this was the right 
course but she says, “I realised that […] even if it was 
Islamically the right thing to do, there was no recourse 
behind it – no action I could take if he didn’t abide by 
it.” She concluded that his motivation for using Shari’a 
and his offer to pay her the mahr was based on his 
distorted understanding of the law.30 He said to her, “if 
it was by Shari’a, it was by religion, he would get the 
house, he would get the children, he wouldn’t have to 
pay child support.” She responded,
Even if that happens in Pakistan, […] the legal 
system here gives the woman a lot of rights that 
are closer to the Shari’a than what the women in 
Pakistan are allowed and that’s another reason 
why I wanted to go through the court system, 
because it would force him to do what he was 
supposed to be doing with respect to Islam.
With a belief that the Qur’an defines “Islamic” divorce 
terms as what is fair and just, Nawal turned to the 
civil court to carry out her sense of Islamic justice. In 
contrast, her ex-husband believed that an “Islamic” 
divorce is advantageous for men in Shari’a, as defined 
by Pakistani legislations. This difference in their 
understanding of what is “Islamic” is a reflection of a 
broader national debate: which discourses of Islamic 
law ought to be incorporated into American Muslims’ 
lives. As Shari’a is not institutionalised, organisations 
such as the FCNA typically refer to traditional bodies 
of fiqh. However, individual American Muslims, such 
as Nawal, may refer to primary sources of the Qur’an 
and sunna, while recent immigrants may refer back 
to the family laws of their countries of origin where 
manifestations of Shari’a are institutionalised through 
civil laws with which they are familiar.
The moment Nawal decided to use the civil system, 
her ex-husband retracted the idea that they should 
decide any terms according to Shari’a as it would be 
unprofitable for him and he would have to share the 
marital assets with her. He subsequently refused her 
a talaq (although he threatened her with it during the 
marriage), refused to take the nominal mahr in return 
for khul’ (although he initially suggested to divorce 
according to Shari’a if she accepted her two hundred 
and seventy-three dollar mahr as a divorce settlement), 
contested custody of their daughters, and refused to 
swear on the Qur’an during his depositions, saying 
that “now we weren’t doing it according to Shari’a, 
everything should be a civil matter.”
Nawal recounts searching for just Islamic divorce terms:
I was told that the father was supposed to get 
the kids but in the end it turned out that was not 
the case. […] Because a woman is not allowed 
to divorce the husband, per se, how is a woman 
supposed to go about getting a divorce in Islam? 
I needed guidance on the financial aspects and 
what were in my rights to request [in order to] 
stand in front of Allah on the Day of Judgment 
and say I did the best I could.
She constructed her civil divorce decree using her 
sense of Islamic justice and extensive research on 
modern fiqh and reformist discourse in Islamic law.
Obtaining an Islamic divorce pronouncement still 
remained an issue because “according to him it was 
just a civil divorce and according to the religious 
aspect [she] was still married to him”. This was a 
problem if she wished to remarry, and because she 
wanted to counsel her daughters when they knew that 
their parents were no longer married. She wrote to 
several American Muslim scholars and imams, asking 
for an Islamic divorce decree but “they kept saying 
ask him again” for talaq. He had refused “on three 
different occasions.” She then “wrote to an Islamic 
judge in Pakistan about [her] divorce, […her] life with 
him and why [she] needed to get the divorce.” After 
several months the judge granted her a Shari’a divorce 
decree. In wanting to end her state of mu‘allaqa , Nawal 
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wrote to an informal, non-state employed qadi outside 
of the U.S. and based on descriptions in her letter, the 
unofficial qadi issued an unofficial divorce decree. In 
the United States, figures of religious authority have 
reservations in doing the same, citing that they have 
no official power, revealing that there is a lack of new 
ijtihād (juristic reasoning) to resolve the mu‘allaqa 
problem within the American context. Nawal’s need 
was not to obtain a legally binding Islamic divorce 
decree, but rather to have am religious dissolution to 
the marriage because she had been married both by 
civil and religious law.
Lisa
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, a Caucasian American who converted to Islam 
had no option of writing to a qadi from a native Muslim 
country. She married her boyfriend shortly after they 
both converted to Islam. Throughout the marriage Lisa 
was financially supporting her husband, who refused to 
work, had extreme rage, was depressed and physically 
abusive. When she began to fear for her life Lisa moved 
out of their home and filed for a civil divorce. To 
prevent her from remarrying, her husband refused her 
request for talaq and did not consent to khul’. While 
researching how she could obtain a religious divorce 
in the U.S., Lisa came across a fatwa of the FCNA that 
stated her civil divorce decree should be accepted 
by religious authorities as a religious divorce.32 Lisa 
acknowledged that her divorce case would take several 
years to finalise as her husband showed no sign of 
settling out of court.
Lisa learned that according to fiqh, an Islamic juridical 
divorce cannot be pronounced by anyone other than a 
qadi, presiding over an Islamic court. As there are no 
qadis, or any formal Shari’a tribunals in the U.S., she 
had nowhere to take her case. However, Lisa recognised 
that even if there were such a system in place, the 
tribunal whose foremost interest as imagined by 
its proponents would be to save Muslim marriages 
and exercise classical fiqh, would have denied her a 
religious divorce because according to fiqh the burden 
of proof for grounds would fall on her. For each of her 
three reasons, her husband’s mental incapacity, abuse, 
and lack of maintenance she would face a plethora of 
limitations from fiqh. She would have to produce four 
witnesses to testify to his mental state or produce 
medical records, which in the U.S. are inaccessible due 
to patient confidentiality laws; and so, if he appeared 
sane in the tribunal, she would be proven wrong. As 
her scars had faded she did not have any proof of 
physical abuse and there were no witnesses to that 
abuse. Finally lack of financial support for her could be 
overlooked, especially as Lisa supported her husband 
before their marriage and it could be supposed that 
he had a right to expect continued support. Despite 
believing that she is divorced “in the eyes of Allah,” she 
recognizes that if Shari’a tribunals existed in the U.S it 
is quite possible that she would be denied an Islamic 
divorce. When Nawal and Lisa were denied religious 
divorces by their husbands, they both researched 
the Qur’an, sunna, and fiqh in order to explore other 
avenues available to them for obtaining a religious 
divorce. The American imams the women approached 
for documentation of Islamic divorce said that it was 
not in their power to grant them. While Nawal was able 
to find an authority from a foreign country to issue a 
religious divorce, Lisa believed that due to the unjust 
biases in classical fiqh, no authority existed to issue 
her a religious divorce in the U.S. Although Nawal’s 
case reveals the lack of a qadi system in the U.S., Lisa 
recognises that the presence of such a system would 
not be beneficial as long as Muslim institutions uphold 
traditional interpretations of fiqh which accommodate 
a husbands’ unfettered access to an instant divorce 
and their right to withhold it when they wish, while 
insisting that women need an intermediary and proof 
to appeal for divorce.
Unexpected Triple Talaq
33
In this section I will recount the experience of an 
immigrant Pakistani woman, Aliya, and the Muslim 
authorities’ support in granting a man’s right to an 
instant, unilateral divorce. She was married for ten years 
when her husband suddenly insisted on divorce. “He 
abandoned the children and [Aliya]”34 and sent her an 
irrevocable triple talaq notice, “typewritten on a sheet 
of paper—Islamic divorce witnessed by two people.” 
Shocked, Aliya did not accept the notice as legal in 
the United States where Islamic law is unofficial. She 
said, “this was just a piece of paper especially because 
he didn’t even register it in Pakistan [...] and you can’t 
just write an Islamic divorce three times — it has to be 
over a three month period so technically that was not 
a divorce.” In her definition, Islamic divorce must take 
place within a formal, state-sponsored space, with the 
opportunity to reconcile during the ‘idda, which was 
obviously eliminated with the instantly irrevocable 
triple Talaq.
Soon after Aliya learned that religious authorities in 
Europe deemed his triple talaq notice as legitimate, 
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enabling him to legally marry her best friend. He 
moved back to the U.S and to a state in which he 
could file a no-fault civil divorce. He claimed to the 
judge that the mahr was all that Aliya was entitled to 
because in Islamic law “mahr is the amount you give 
in the divorce.” Aliya fought back: “this is how they 
distort Islam [...] I got an affidavit saying that mahr is 
the amount you have to give your wife at the time of 
marriage, it has nothing to do with divorce.” The case 
eventually went to trial and she received alimony and 
child support.
Even after his triple repudiation, which she believed 
was not a valid form of talaq and could be revoked, Aliya 
wanted to stay married. Muslim figures of authority 
and everyone in Aliya’s life instantly accepted the 
triple talaq as valid, in contrast to a wife-initiated 
divorce. She had no chance to express her desire for 
reconciliation. Although Aliya would have wanted a 
divorce if she knew her husband was having an affair, 
his use of the unilateral right in fiqh to divorce without 
having to provide an explanation meant that Aliya had 
to accept an unwanted divorce.
Conclusions
The avenues my informants used in negotiating 
their divorces were either the civil system or Muslim 
networks familiar with Islamic law, and both. Their 
cases demonstrate several religio-legal challenges 
women face such as limited access to divorce, 
establishing equitable divorce terms, and confronting 
patriarchy in fiqh. It is clear that neither the civil system, 
nor services offered by various religious authorities 
offer women just solutions to the challenges that arise 
in a Muslim divorce. The civil system can be expensive, 
lengthy, and unprepared to handle litigants’ debates 
over what is or is not Islamic. Meanwhile, religious 
authorities allow for the man’s use of their unilateral 
right to divorce as a tool to threaten their wives or to 
withhold divorce, despite the existence of no-fault 
civil divorce and the sound arguments for a religious 
divorce by women.
There are several solutions to the challenges American 
Muslim women face in divorce but they are not all 
practical. Total abandonment of the nikah is not a 
solution because as my interlocutors emphasise, 
contracting a nikah is central to affirming their Muslim 
identity and beliefs. The inclusion of stipulations in 
the nikah does not address the gender inequities in 
fiqh, and the definition of nikah within it. Finally, the 
establishment of tribunals or legalising the procedure 
for obtaining an Islamic divorce within the bounds of 
traditional Islamic law or current American Muslim 
legal thought would not allow women an easier access 
in either obtaining an Islamic divorce or establishing 
equitable terms for their divorce. Solutions may be found 
by improving the understanding of Islamic marriage 
and divorce ethics in the American Muslim discourses 
(i.e. American Muslim institutions and communities) 
which have so far been influenced by archaic fiqh from 
the medieval period. My interlocutors suggest use of 
the Qur’an, sunnah, and the understanding of justice 
as the criterion for Islamic law.
The experiences of divorced American Muslim women 
and the legal methods they use in negotiating justice, 
such as reinterpretation, research, and return to their 
belief of parity in an ethical Islam, are important 
cues for reform in American Muslim legal thought. 
My interlocutors’ diverse interpretations of Islamic 
divorce, whether separate or the same as civil law, 
and the terms that they felt executed Islamic justice, 
suggest potential channels for reform in American fiqh. 
For example, Islamic marriage and civil marriage could 
remain separate processes in which couples negotiate 
what they believe the nikah means. Entering into a 
Muslim marriage contract does not necessarily mean 
that both parties have the same understanding of the 
nature of the contract, which has been indicated by 
the numerous difficulties women face when dissolving 
the contract. Another potential option could be that 
Muslim couples should have one marriage contract, a 
civil contract which includes a nikah which has been 
agreed to by both parties. The process of reform for 
American Muslims is reliant on the evolution, albeit 
slow, of Islamic legal culture and requires a different 
understanding of the definition of nikah on the basis of 
equality, and the rethinking of Islamic law, as a system 
of justice.
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sat.html#012.2173. For examples of frequent citation see fatwas 
(legal opinions) by members of the FCNA at islamonline.net 
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Secular is Not Always Better: 
A Closer Look at Some 
Woman-Empowering Features 
of  Islamic Law
A S I F A  Q U R A I S H I - L A N D E S  ( 2 0 1 3 )
When I got divorced in 2009, it was painfully obvious to me that if I had gotten divorced under the rules of fiqh, 
I would have walked away with a lot more money. Community property cut in half what I thought was clearly 
mine (I had earned or inherited most of our assets, but that didn’t matter to the state - or to the lawyers). That 
fact, coupled with just being sick and tired of apologizing for sharia as rising tides of Islamophobia took on more 
and more paternalistic and condescending tones, prompted me to write this piece. There are certainly many 
areas where I think the fiqh rules could stand some much needed reform (my “Meditation on Mahr,” also in this 
volume, elaborates one of them), but it is still just simplistic, and more than a little “White Man’s Burden”-y, to 
presume that contemporary secular law is *always* better for women. I decided to make a list proving my point, 
and my good friends at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding published it as this policy brief.
“Secular is Not Always Better: A Closer Look at Some Woman-Empowering Features of Islamic Law” first appeared 
as ISPU Policy Brief #61 in June 2013 and is included here with permission. It is also available at ispu.org.
Suggested citation: Asifa Quraishi-Landes, “Secular is Not Always Better: A Closer Look at Some Woman-
Empowering Features of Islamic Law,” in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of Faith: American Muslim Marriage and Divorce in 
the Twenty-First Century (Boston: OpenBU, 2021), pp. 125-128. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42505
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If you are interested in women’s rights and Islamic 
law, you have plenty to read. Mostly, you will find 
descriptions of how Islamic law treats women 
unequally, often with significant criticism of Islamic 
law as a whole based on this premise. Sometimes you 
will find suggestions for how it could be reformed to 
better honor women’s rights.1 But it is much harder 
to find literature discussing the woman-empowering 
aspects of classical Islamic law. This omission is 
unfortunate, because these aspects are the foundation 
of most Muslim feminist work2 and yet they remain 
in the shadows of global (especially western) feminist 
discourse. This brief highlights some of Islamic law’s 
woman-affirming aspects, with special comparison to 
women’s rights in American law.
A common presumption of western feminists is that 
Islamic family law restricts women’s rights more than 
American family law does. This is one reason cited by 
those who oppose the use of sharia-based provisions 
of Muslim marriage contracts in American courts.3 
Yet some of the rules of Islamic family law can be very 
empowering for women—in some cases arguably more 
so than American law.4
Below are three examples of how the rules of classical 
Islamic law could leave a woman financially better off 
than the relevant American law.
1. Its not a brideprice, it’s an insurance policy
The Qur’an requires the groom present to the bride a 
mutually agreed upon bridal gift (mahr) as part of a 
valid marriage contract. Unfortunately, it is common 
in western literature to translate mahr as “brideprice,” 
thus giving the impression that the bride is being sold 
to the groom. (Ironically, this description fits better 
with the dowry paid by fathers to grooms in Jane 
Austen’s England than it does with the role of the 
mahr in Muslim women’s lives.) For many Muslims, the 
mahr is a woman-empowering tool, a sort of insurance 
policy that facilitates female financial independence 
upon marriage.
With a substantial mahr, a Muslim wife can choose, for 
example, to be a stay-at-home parent and/or choose 
not to pursue a financially lucrative career without 
becoming completely financially dependent on her 
husband.  Using the mahr for financial independence 
can also empower a wife to leave a bad marriage, 
an option that is often not taken by those without 
a separate income. Living off of a mahr can be a far 
more financially secure way to begin a new life during 
and after divorce rather than, for example, waiting for 
alimony payments or a divorce settlement’s division of 
assets, a procedure that can take months or even years in 
an American family court. No legal system can provide 
foolproof protection against abusive marriages, of 
course. But it is important to recognize that, contrary 
to the image created by the term brideprice, the mahr 
is a powerful tool for women’s independence built into 
classical Islamic law that can be effectively used by 
women faced with this unfortunate situation.
2. Ours and hers: Women and Islamic property law
Under established rules of Islamic law, a Muslim man’s 
property is not wholly his, whereas a woman’s property 
(of all sorts, whether land, money, personal assets, etc.) 
is exclusively her own. Classical Islamic law states that 
women are not obliged to use their assets to financially 
support her household’s needs, whereas a man is 
legally obligated to provide food, shelter, and clothing 
for all of his immediate family members as well as 
those members of his extended family who have no 
other support. In light of this, one might plausibly 
argue that, at least on paper, Islamic property law 
discriminates against men rather than women.
The above examples present quite a different picture 
of Islamic property law and women than does the 
impression created by focusing only on gender-
discriminatory Islamic inheritance rules, such as 
allocating a sister half of her brother’s share. However, 
this rule takes on a different significance when 
considered alongside the rule that obligates men to 
use their income and assets to support their sisters, 
mothers, and wives (and all close relatives), whereas 
a Muslim woman’s property is exclusively hers and 
totally beyond the reach of others, including her 
husband and male relatives. And, contrary to popular 
misinformation, Islamic law has always flatly rejected 
the idea that a woman herself is someone’s property, 
(in stark contrast to pre-modern European attitudes).
A Muslim woman’s exclusive control over her property 
under classical Islamic law can be seriously disrupted 
by American community property laws, which hold 
that all income acquired during the marriage is owned 
equally, regardless of who actually earned it. Muslim 
women living in community property states in the 
United States are often shocked to discover that, 
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according to state law, their husbands have a legal 
claim to half of the assets that they had believed were 
(and under classical rules of Islamic law would be) 
exclusively theirs.
Pre-modern European laws, especially English common 
law (upon which the American legal system is based) 
severely limited women’s ability to acquire property, 
through, for example, restricting their ability to enter 
contracts in their own names, and by transforming 
whatever separate property they did have into the 
property of their husbands if they married. Community 
property presented a radical departure from the 
common law scheme because it designated a woman’s 
pre-marriage property as her own separate property 
(something that Islamic law already gave them), 
and gave wives ownership interests in the property 
acquired by their husbands during the marriage.
When compared to classical Islamic law, however, 
community property is not necessarily a step forward 
for women. Community property transforms all 
property acquired by either spouse during marriage 
into joint property owned equally by both.  But this 
takes away half of a wife’s property as given to her 
under Islamic law.  That is, under classical Islamic 
law, all assets that a woman acquires—even during 
marriage—are her exclusive property, not to be divided 
with anyone, including her husband. In other words, if 
one begins from the Islamic legal presumption that a 
woman’s property is exclusively hers, then community 
property actually takes away the exclusive ownership 
of all the income and assets that she acquires during 
the marriage.  Thus, in a divorce settlement in a 
community property state, a higher income-earning 
wife would likely walk away with significantly less 
than if her divorce were decided according to Islamic 
property law. 
3. Cooking and cleaning not included
Islam does not expect women to be housewives 
when they get married. Classical Islamic family law 
specifically states that wives have no marital obligation 
to perform household cooking or cleaning. Moreover, 
many Islamic schools of law state that, in some cases, 
the husband must either pay for these services or do 
them himself and, moreover, that a wife who performs 
these services is entitled to financial compensation 
for her work. This can have a significant impact on 
the post-divorce allocation of assets, especially if for 
a marriage of many years. So, while classical Islamic 
law does not have a specific concept of alimony, it does 
have a mechanism for a divorced homemaker to receive 
compensation that equals or exceeds the alimony that 
might be awarded by an American court.
Recommendations
Don’t assume.
When comparing secular and Islamic law, do not 
assume that the results for women will automatically 
be worse under Islamic law. With the help of Islamic 
law experts, take a close nuanced look at the body of 
all relevant Islamic law before dismissing its potential 
for Muslim women’s empowerment. The fact that 
gendered Islamic rules of marriage, inheritance, 
property, charity, and divorce are all interconnected is 
likely to be missed by those looking at individual rules 
in a vacuum. Many Muslims find this constellation of 
rules acceptable (and even empowering for women), 
and often rely upon it when making marriage and 
career plans.
Remember diversity. 
Islamic law, being pluralistic in nature, is made up of 
different schools of law and new rules continue to be 
created by Islamic legal scholars today. There is not 
just one “Islamic law” that is good or bad for women. 
Moreover, individual Muslims are free to choose from 
the many Islamic legal rules available when deciding 
how to live as a Muslim. Due to this diversity, not all 
American Muslim women want these classical Islamic 
rules applied to them. Some may prefer Islamic legal 
reform in light of changed social circumstances, 
while others might very well prefer the secular law. 
But what the above examples illustrate is that when 
a Muslim woman requests legal recognition of the 
rules of classical Islamic law, this does not necessarily 
mean that she is oppressed or will be financially 
worse off than if the otherwise applicable secular law 
were enforced.
Some resources for expertise on Islamic law and 
women’s rights can be found at:
• Islawmix (www.islawmix.org)
• Karamah: Muslim Women Lawyers for 
Human Rights (www.karamah.org)
• Sisters in Islam (www.sistersinislam.org)
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1 There are far too many to list here. As an example, my own 
proposal for reforming Islamic marriage contract law can be 
found in my chapter, “A Meditation on Mahr, Modernity, and 
Muslim Marriage Contract Law,” in Feminism, Law, and Religion 
(Failinger, Schlitz & Stabile, eds.), (Ashgate, forthcoming 2013).
2 For more detail on how Muslim feminists use classical-era Islamic 
law, see Asifa Quraishi, “What if Sharia Weren’t the Enemy?” 
Rethinking International Women’s rights Advocacy on Islamic 
Law, 25 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 173 (2011).
3 For more details on this, see Asifa Quraishi-Landes, “Sharia and 
Diversity: Why Some Americans are Missing the point,” ISPU report 
(available at http://www.ispu.org/getreports/35/2620publications.
aspx).
4 For more elaboration of the examples listed here, see Asifa 
Quraishi–Landes, “Rumors of the Sharia Threat Are Greatly 
Exaggerated: What American Judges Really Do with Islamic Family 
Law in Their Courtrooms,” 57 N.y.L. Sch. L. rev. 245 (2012–2013).
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What to Consider If  You’re 
Considering Divorce
Z A H R A  A Y U B I  ( 2 0 2 1 )
As I explain in the introductory notes to my other articles in this volume, I started researching the intersections 
of civil divorce and Islamic divorce fifteen years ago. Since then, many Muslim women have reached out to me 
for advice on how to get a divorce and remain true to their faith. We discuss the numerous elements of Muslim 
divorce in America. This new essay, “What to Consider If You’re Considering Divorce,” is a recapitulation of the 
major discussion points that arise in those conversations.
Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Suggested citation: Zahra Ayubi, “What to Consider If You’re Considering Divorce,” in Kecia Ali, ed., Half of 
Faith: American Muslim Marriage and Divorce in the Twenty-First Century (Boston: OpenBU, 2021), pp. 129-134. 
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42505
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If you are thinking about divorce, most likely you are 
pondering numerous what-if scenarios.  You’ll have 
questions about how it will happen, on what terms, and 
what divorce will mean for you and for your children, 
family, and friends. Beyond the theological concerns 
and community dynamics, there are legal issues, both 
Islamic and civil. If you had a nikah, does that mean 
you have to get an Islamic divorce? What if your 
husband is not willing to agree to an Islamic divorce, 
or what if he divorced you by talaq but doesn’t want a 
civil dissolution?  What if you never had a registered 
marriage in the first place? Below I’ll go over what 
pursuing Islamic divorce might mean and what steps 
you ought to take to protect yourself before making 
your decision. I’m not a lawyer—so please don’t use 
what’s below as a substitute for advice by a licensed 
attorney—but what I offer here addresses many 
concerns and considerations that women have come 
to me with in the past fifteen years of my research 
and engagement with discussions on American 
Muslim divorce. 
Deciding on Divorce
Whether or not to divorce is one of the weightier 
decisions a person might have to make in their life. 
It’s a deeply personal decision and one that can only 
be made based on individual experience. Yet many 
divorce stories sound similar. Divorce has been 
historically common among Muslims worldwide, 
though less so in South Asia. Today about 40% of 
marriages in the United States end in divorce. The 
rate of divorce for second or subsequent marriages 
is even higher. The last statistical study on American 
Muslim divorce was conducted in the early 1990s put 
the American Muslim divorce rate at 30% but many of 
us who research American Muslim divorce have noted 
that the rate has surely been climbing. Many Muslim 
women find comfort in how commonplace divorce is, 
either because they feel less at fault personally, or they 
see larger structural issues of male dominance among 
Muslims as part of the reason their husbands were not 
compatible with them in the first place.
Most Muslims who offer their opinions on divorce, 
whether religious authority figures, community or 
family elders, or friends, warn about its calamitous 
nature and treat it as a major fitna in our community. 
Some Muslim community members discourage men 
from divorcing hastily but most pressure falls on 
women to stay in bad marriages, or even dangerous 
ones. While plenty of people are concerned for women 
in bad situations, that concern and sympathy is 
often tempered by worries about family reputation, 
community norms, or the supposedly threatened state 
of the umma. They often quote a hadith that divorce 
is “the most detested” lawful thing. But the hadith 
uses the term talaq, husband-initiated divorce, hated 
by God likely because of its unilateral and irrevocable 
nature (more on that below), not terms involving wife-
initiated divorce. As you read the rest of this article, do 
your best to set aside this judgmental counsel so that 
you can ask yourself how you want to live and what you 
want for yourself—and your children, if you have them.
No one can tell anyone else whether to stay in a 
marriage or end it. The decision must come from within. 
So much of our lives revolves around the institution of 
marriage: it is one of the most essential ways we relate 
to people and organize our personal lives. Marriage 
also structures extended families and community 
life, including and maybe especially in places like the 
United States where Muslims are minorities. 
However, an outside perspective is key if your husband 
is abusive. The longer one stays in an abusive marriage 
the bigger or more impossible it feels to make a plan 
and escape from it. Certain sociological truths about 
abusive men are relevant to your decision-making 
process. For example, abusive husbands almost never 
change, and certainly not without substantial extended 
counseling and intervention from friends and family, a 
level of support that is nearly impossible to find and 
virtually never offered by those who counsel women 
to remain married for the sake of the family. Further, 
abusive men often gaslight or make their victims feel 
as though they are the guilty ones. Verbal threats 
can easily escalate to physical assaults. And calling 
law enforcement/police is often not an option, either 
because of their lack of dealing fairly with people of 
color and/or Muslims, or because they often do not like 
to protect women or get involved in what they view 
as “domestic squabbles.” Many of the women I have 
worked with over the years state that their ultimate 
reason for choosing divorce was to mitigate the 
lasting negative impact of an abusive climate on their 
children. Additionally, there are a number of ways 
abuse can occur that do not involve physical danger. 
Please refer to the Islamic wheel of domestic abuse to 
see whether these situations might apply to you. There 
are resources at Peaceful Families as well. 
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Islamic Divorces
What does it mean to get an “Islamic” divorce? Islamic 
can mean different things to different people. It can be 
what satisfies your personal conscience or relationship 
to your understanding of faith and duty, or what’s 
recognized now in your family or community, or what’s 
is found in classical Islamic jurisprudence, or what’s 
deemed Islamic in a given country’s laws. Here, I’ll 
talk about three major types of divorces in classical 
Islamic law, which many American Muslims look to 
when they investigate what “Islam says” about divorce. 
In practice, these rules are typically mixed with other 
types of notions of what is “Islamic” in different ways 
and some may decide not to pursue “Islamic” divorce 
at all. Knowing more might help you decide whether 
you need or want to get an “Islamic” divorce:
1) Talaq – this is husband-initiated divorce, which 
does not require a wife’s consent to end the marriage, 
i.e., it’s unilateral. A husband can end a marriage by 
pronouncing talaq against his wife and letting three 
months/menstrual cycles go by without any sexual 
contact. That waiting period is called the iddah, which 
is used to ascertain if the wife is pregnant. She is not 
allowed to remarry during that time.
During the iddah he can take her back, though, cancelling 
the talaq pronouncement. He can pronounce talaq and 
cancel it twice, but if he pronounces talaq a third time, 
it can’t be undone, i.e., it’s irrevocable. Some scholars 
state that three pronouncements of divorce on a single 
occasion just counts as one pronouncement, while most 
state that it causes a final irrevocable divorce. Many 
men have been known to blackmail or abuse wives by 
threatening them with talaq.
2) Khula – this is wife-initiated divorce, in which 
the wife asks the husband for his consent to end the 
marriage. This is often called a ransom divorce because 
jurists usually expected it to involve the wife paying 
back her mahr (marriage dower) or paying some other 
sum of money/property etc. to the husband in exchange 
for his consent to divorce. The khula is irrevocable and 
the husband cannot unilaterally take her back during 
the 3-month iddah waiting period.
3) Faskh – this is a juridical divorce which is also 
usually a wife-initiated divorce in which the husband’s 
consent is not necessary. A judge/qadi declares 
the marriage dissolved. Qadis require that the wife 
prove legitimate grounds such as the husband’s 
abandonment of Islam, insanity, or impotence. Some 
judges accept physical abuse or serious sins committed 
by the husband as legitimate grounds, but not all do. 
This method of divorce seems like a way to get around 
the requirement of the husband’s consent for divorce 
as well as payment or repayment of mahr but there 
are limitations. First, in the United States it’s not clear 
who holds the authority of a qadi, because we don’t 
have Islamic courts here. Second, it involves shopping 
around for a qadi (sometimes from a foreign country) 
who would agree that the wife’s reasons for seeking 
divorce are legitimate. And even one finds a qualified 
qadi, or qadi-like religious authority figure, even in the 
United States there have been many situations in which 
husbands challenged the religious-legal authority of 
the chosen qadi, calling into question the validity the 
whole avenue of juridical divorce. Note that some of 
these issues exist in many Muslim majority countries 
as well, especially for women seeking redress in nikah-
only/unregistered marriages.
In sum, if a wife doesn’t want a divorce but the 
husband is declaring one, there isn’t much recourse 
from a classical Islamic law point of view. Today a 
common response by imams is that the wife can spend 
the three-month iddah period as a time trying to win 
back her husband. If a wife’s mahr was really high 
and never paid to the wife, then perhaps demanding 
it might deter a husband from talaq, but basically 
the unilateral nature of talaq gives men an unfair 
advantage in Islamic jurisprudence in the ease with 
which they can end a marriage.
Additionally, if a wife wants a divorce, being made to 
feel guilty because God “dislikes” divorce is an unfair 
position to put women in, because the hadith is not 
about wife-initiated divorces at all. That said, if a wife 
wants a divorce and the husband is unwilling to give 
his consent no matter how much money a wife offers, 
or if she doesn’t have any much money to offer, or 
doesn’t want to talk about offering money and just 
wants out, then the question arises as what lengths 
she’ll go to in getting an Islamic divorce: how much 
does it matter? It’s not unheard of for men to go along 
with civil divorce proceedings only to withhold their 
consent to an Islamic divorce, just to be nasty or as 
revenge. Withholding Islamic divorce can keep women 
from feeling divorced in the eyes of God, or being 
accepted as divorced by the community, barring them 
from remarrying in another nikah. For this reason, 
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many Muslim women and some Muslim organizations 
treat civil divorce decrees as equivalent to Islamic 
divorce because all the intensions are the same for all 
the parties involved: to end the marriage. 
In the event that your ex is refusing a civil divorce, 
consult an attorney about petitioning the court for a 
dissolution of marriage. 
Islamic Divorce Terms
Whatever the legal system, two main issues require 
resolution in a divorce: money and child custody, both 
physical and legal. Although there are exceptions, the 
fact that divorce rules in classical Islamic law favor men 
in terms of money and legal custody (“guardianship”) 
of children (and usually but not always physical 
custody) can be a reason why some men strongly 
advocate “doing things Islamically” or insist on Islamic 
divorce in addition to civil divorce.
In classical Islamic law, men and women theoretically 
retain wealth or property they brought into the 
marriage. In practice it might be hard to disentangle 
your wealth, or not worth it, especially without the 
facilitation of civil courts. In talaq, men are required 
to pay the wife the mahr specified during the nikah, 
if it has been deferred. If it was paid, then she keeps 
that amount. Other than the mahr, the only other 
sum she receives is financial maintenance for herself 
through the end of the three-month iddah period. 
More on custody below, but if she has children she’s 
still nursing, she receives support for those children. 
That’s it. Unless a woman is independently wealthier 
than her husband, the Islamic law rules for finances in 
divorce result often favor men because there is no such 
thing as ongoing spousal support (as there may be in 
civil divorces), even if the wife has no or low income, 
and if finances can’t be untangled, wives who brought 
in wealth or accumulated it during marriage cannot 
easily take it back. 
Child custody, which includes both physical custody 
and legal guardianship, has a complex history in 
classical and pre-modern Islamic law, but generally 
favors fathers over mothers. In Islamic law, all children 
belong to their fathers; they take the father’s name 
and the father is financially responsible to provide for 
them until they are independent or married. However, 
this also means that fathers get custody of children 
in most scenarios. Historically some jurists, as well 
as in the laws of some Muslim countries that have 
adopted various forms of Islamic law as state law, 
allow women to keep custody of their daughters until 
or unless they remarry, in which case custody may 
revert to her relatives or to the child’s father. Other 
jurists hold that mothers may only retain custody until 
weaning. In still other situations in which fathers do 
not have the capacity, means, or ability to care for 
children have resulted in mothers retaining custody 
or other maternal or paternal relatives taking custody 
according to a hierarchy of kin relations. 
Overall, however, the best interests of the child are 
assumed to be upheld by the father unless proven 
otherwise. So even though there have been historical 
and legal exceptions to the “children belong to the 
father” rule, the search for exceptions to this rule in 
order to create Islamic legal situation that favor a 
mother’s custody is not very different from just going 
with civil law codes that are focused on the awarding 
custody according to the best interests of the child, 
which often, but not always, favor physical custody 
by, or predominantly by, the mother. In practice, many 
American Muslim men have accepted this. A common 
reason I have observed is that men do not want to 
be saddled with childcare duties. It is also worth 
mentioning that in many states, courts treat missing 
child support payments as a very serious offense, 
ending in contempt of court, fines, and potentially even 
jailing, or remedied through garnishing of wages. Still, 
plenty of men from all backgrounds remain delinquent 
in paying court-ordered support.  
Muslim men have been known to insist on Islamic 
divorce terms because they would then owe only mahr, 
which often a token sum amongst American Muslims 
and/or because they know that children “belong to the 
father” in Islamic law. Some men have even argued for 
“Islamic” divorce terms to lawyers and judges for these 
reasons and sometimes judges who prefer matters 
be settled out of court consider allowing divorcing 
parties to settle using “Islamic” divorce terms by 
mutual consent. If your ex-husband is making such 
an argument, or even if he isn’t, don’t feel pressure to 
agree to any divorce terms just because they are being 
labeled Islamic. Desiring a custody arrangement that 
centers your child(ren)’s best interests or safeguards 
your financial future to the extent possible doesn’t 
make you less of a Muslim; it makes you a wise and 
self-respecting one.
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Does that mean that you shouldn’t pursue Islamic 
divorce at all? You should follow your conscience and 
your sense of Allah’s justice. Some Muslim women 
find what is granted in civil law is closer to Islam 
because it protects vulnerable parties to some extent 
or because it protects their respected status in Islam as 
mothers. That said, there are still many ways women 
can be disadvantaged in divorce, especially if they are 
completely or mostly financially dependent on their 
husbands. Attaining justice or recourse for husbands’ 
bad behavior or abusive actions may be too high an 
expectation from court dates that are scheduled so 
far apart that the sense of urgency is lost in over-
scheduled court dockets. Women may not have the 
knowledge or financial means to contest for custody 
or claim fair financial settlements. Yet preparation for 
divorce can mitigate these issues to some extent.
Preparing for divorce
Civil divorce takes months at least, and possibly a 
couple of years, to finalize. You must plan for the 
interim period once you’ve begun the process but 
before the judge signs off on your divorce decree.
Immediate housing
Before anything, figure out your physical exit strategy, 
prioritizing your safety and that of your children. Will 
you stay at a friend’s house? With your parents or a 
sibling? Will you stay at your current residence while 
he moves out?  (That usually happens if the divorce is 
amicable or if he initiates/files or both.) Do you need 
to find a shelter? How long will you stay in temporary 
housing? Will you move to your own place if the 
divorce takes a long time to settle or if the divorce 
process involves the sale of the marital home?
Immediate finances
How much money will you need to carry you through 
until the divorce is finalized? Figure out how much 
you’ll need in rent (including first and last month and 
security deposit) or how much you might give to your 
sister, for example, to pitch in with the added expense 
if she agrees to have you and your children stay with 
her. Will you have any other expenses or bills to pay? 
Finally, figure out how much money you’ll need to 
budget for your divorce attorney, even if you will be 
claiming attorney’s fees in your divorce. Divorce 
can get expensive so try to save as much as possible for 
this after budgeting for more essential items.
If you have no idea about the state of your marital 
finances, before you declare your intention to divorce 
try to figure out the basic income and expenses of 
your family. How much debt do you have and who 
is responsible for paying that debt? Whose name 
appears on the credit card statements? Do your best 
to set aside the total estimated money you’ll need for 
about a year into an account only in your own name, 
if you do not have one already, or transfer money to a 
trusted person’s account just before announcing your 
intension to divorce. If you do not have any savings, or 
you have a lot of personal debt, figure out what sources 
of support you might have and what resources might 
be available in your area for free, e.g., afterschool 
childcare subsidies if you are working, food pantries, 
free legal assistance, and government safety net 
programs for which you’re eligible.
Document ill-treatment/abuse/violence
Document any and all types of abuse. You want a paper 
trail of evidence you might need for future legal action 
such as custody hearings or filing restraining orders. 
Even if you haven’t decided whether you want to use 
it, having the evidence gives you options. Even if 
you’re not sure whether something is abuse, make a 
note or take a picture. Documenting incidents, even if 
they don’t seem like a big deal, helps show patterns of 
behavior. If you and/or your children are experiencing 
any kind of physical abuse document, document, 
document! Take pictures of any old scars as well as 
fresh bruises, cuts or marks, and email them to yourself 
and/or trusted parties and/or your lawyer, if you have 
one, who will save the photographs in case your 
abuser discovers and destroys your documentation. 
Additionally, even if there is no visual evidence, write 
down the date, time, and description of instances of 
ill-treatment and again email them to yourself and 
trusted persons. Tell people whom you believe would 
vouch for you to a court and/or religious authority 
figure. If you are being abused in other ways, including 
fraud, blackmail, or your husband withholding access 
to money, the same principle of documenting the 
abuses and creating witnesses applies.
Interim child visitation
If you have children, you will learn quickly whether 
child custody is going to be a sticking point in 
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your divorce. Figuring out whether and under what 
conditions you would be comfortable with your ex 
having access to your children, if at all, is important to 
decide early on. You can convey that to your lawyer or at 
court appearances. Before you declare your intensions 
to divorce, if your husband acts in ways are harmful 
to children or otherwise inappropriate, it is important 
that you document that behavior, keeping a journal 
of examples, complete with names of witnesses to his 
behavior. This will support the custody arrangement 
you’ll be seeking.
Ending nikah-only/unregistered marriages
If you only had a nikah—that is, not a civil or state-
registered marriage, then your course of divorce and 
the ease or difficulty of the process will depend on your 
circumstances. In such cases, what seems Islamically 
correct to you, to your husband, and to your family or 
community might be different. You may or may not 
need to contend with others’ notions of what is Islamic. 
To start with, you may feel that your own intensions 
and action in declaring divorce are valid, and equal in 
weight to a man declaring divorce (although he might 
not see it that way).
In some situations, a nikah-only marriage is really 
easy to dissolve. There are no courts involved. It can 
be fast, especially if parties mutually agree to divorce. 
You can divorce by talaq, khula, or faskh. If you happen 
to have no children, or your children are grown, and/or 
you have at least relatively steady, adequate income, 
physically separating yourself, followed by initiating 
divorce yourself, either by declaring and negotiating 
khula or having a qadi-like religious authority figure 
intervene and declare divorce on your behalf, might be 
relatively easy. 
It wouldn’t be easy if you have minor children and/
or no or low income and scant savings, or if you have 
a husband who would never agree to ending the 
marriage for a variety of reasons. In this situation, if 
you can create a safe way of separating yourself and 
your children, that is the first priority before declaring 
your intentions to leave. If you suspect that your 
husband will withhold consent for khula and you don’t 
think your grounds for divorce would be convincing to 
a qadi/qadi-like figure, it might help to have friends 
and family that can support your reasoning speak to 
that qadi. It is possible that multiple parties will try 
to advise against divorce, but if you have decided to 
end your relationship, especially if there is abuse, 
again, prioritize your safety and stability and then 
search for a sympathetic religious authority figure who 
has social legitimacy in your family, networks, and/
or community. Even if your husband doesn’t respect 
that person’s authority, he might accept it with social 
intervention. That said, try your best to center your 
sense of Allah’s justice while going about finding a way 
to dissolve your nikah.
As far as divorce terms go, even for nikah-only/
unregistered marriages, a woman can still file a 
restraining order (through a lawyer or at a courthouse) 
if she fears for her physical safety. In that case involving 
law enforcement if he approaches you is possible, even 
if for some it’s undesirable. Even with a nikah-only/
unregistered marriage, a mother can still approach the 
courts (through a lawyer, or legal aid if you have few 
means, or even child protective services) to petition 
for custody and child support. Even women who have 
been supporting the household can petition for child 
support.
It is not easy to decide on divorce and move through 
the often-long process of dissolving a marriage, 
whatever the legal steps involved. But planning ahead 
and translating your faith in Allah into personal 
resolve will help, Inshallah.
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This afterword exists partly because it seemed wrong, or maybe unlucky, to start 
a reader on marriage with weddings and end it with divorce. Of course, divorce 
isn’t always a failure, even if virtually no one enters a marriage (apart from mut‘a, 
obviously) expecting it to end. As someone married for more than half my life, I 
know the pleasures and the challenges of a long-term partnership. Myriad forces—
cultural, religious, legal, and economic—recognize and support some marriages and 
deny or undermine others. As someone who studies gender and sexuality, I’m keenly 
aware that assumptions about what marriage should be like are neither timeless nor 
universal. And as anyone who’s read the work collected here will be aware, varied 
expectations exist even among and within American Muslim communities. 
One recurring theme in this reader is that some models of marriage and family 
upheld by Muslim community members and religious authorities are out of step 
with women’s diverse realities and needs. That’s true when it comes to who and how 
we marry; how we navigate elements of joint life like money, chores, and childcare; 
and if and how we dissolve unions that no longer serve their scriptural purpose of 
dwelling together in love and mercy (Q. 30:21). Seldom is it asked how ideals and 
practices—whether purportedly Islamic or found in civil law or emerging from 
widespread American cultural norms—serve American Muslim women’s interests. 
Not infrequently, women are cautioned by conservatives about preserving the 
marital unit as a bulwark against dissolute (non-Muslim) American society. What’s 
more interesting to me are the strategies, documented by this volume’s contributors, 
by which women faithfully and creatively deploy Islamic ideals and doctrines to 
build flourishing marriages, safeguard themselves and those they love from myriad 
threats and harms, and contribute to fruitful community life. 
Several years ago, in an essay for Critical Muslim, I wrote about how the nuclear family 
frequently preached and praised among American Muslims is profoundly misaligned 
with the myriad examples of extended and blended families that characterize the 
lives of prophets, including Muhammad, whose “own family experience does not 
conform to the oft-touted Islamic family model. The standard biographies tell us that 
he was orphaned, fostered by another family, taken in by extended family, shuffled 
from relative to relative. He became a step-father before becoming a father, adopted 
a ‘son’ – a grown man whom he later disaffiliated, and then married that former 
son’s former wife. He mourned the loss of parents and parent-substitutes, children, 
and more than one wife.” While we often emphasize his long, companionate, 
monogamous marriage with Khadija, “seldom do we linger on the strangeness” of the 
sira account of his marriages and kin relations in comparison to the idealized norm. 
The writings collected here demonstrate that there’s no single, simple story about 
American Muslim marriage or divorce either. Weddings are complicated. Marriages 
are very complicated. Divorces are very, very complicated. My goal in compiling 
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and sharing this body of work, which centers women’s scholarship and respects 
women’s experiences, is to contribute to a better understanding of these features 
of contemporary life. The articles here are only a small fraction of a rich literature, 
which itself represents only a tiny portion of the conversations happening in homes 
and mosques, on Twitter and in group chats, in classrooms and in community 
organizations. There is more to read, more to understand, and more to do. It is my 
hope that greater understanding leads to participation in the ongoing struggle for 
necessary changes in practices, laws, and norms in our polity and our communities, 
with love and mercy as our goals and the Loving and the Merciful as our guide. 
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Half of Faith gathers a selection of resources on, and reflections and 
analyses of, Muslim marriage and divorce in twenty-first-century America. 
In the United States as elsewhere, marriage is central to ongoing Muslim 
conversations about belonging, identity, and the good life. The articles 
collected here, written over the course of two decades by American Muslim 
women scholars, provide a window onto moments in American Muslim 
life and thought. Though far from comprehensive, topics covered include 
diversity in Islamic legal thought, marriage contracts, wedding customs, 
dower norms, divorce practices, and experiences of polygyny. Contributors 
engage—and disagree with—each other, and sometimes with their past 
selves. By bringing together and making more widely available existing 
publications alongside a few purpose-written essays, this reader aims to 
enrich current conversations and to help document scholarly debates and 
community activism. 
Contributors: Aminah Beverly Al-Deen, Kecia Ali (editor), Zahra Ayubi, 
Juliane Hammer, Debra Majeed, and Asifa Quraishi-Landes





This reader is archived at OpenBU at https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42505.
